This article describes three ways to build a pressing trap when transitioning from a 4-1-4-1-defensive formation into the press.

A pressing trap invites the opponent to act in a specific zone in their formation. This becomes more difficult if the defensive formation isn’t modified while pressing, because you can’t open any gaps without making your intentions known to the opponent, or you become unstable when trying to close the trap because of a lower Dynamik.

The 4-1-4-1 allows for simple transformations into different formations, with several possibilities and variants. These changes create a greater Dynamik, which can be used to open certain gaps and allow the team to quickly close down and snap the trap shut. Let’s begin with one of the most common variants.

The 4-1-4-1 becomes a 4-1-3-1-1/4-1-3-2

In this situation, we assume an Angriffspressing (pressing from the forwards). At first the team orientation, despite the height, seems passive. The 4-1-4-1 is position-oriented and the centre forward is the only player focused on man-marking one of the center backs. The other center back is deliberately left open.

Basic 4-1-4-1 defensive formation

Once the ball comes to the free center back, the Achter (eight) moves up to press him. The striker man-marks the center back or can leave him in his cover shadow, depending on later following mechanisms. If, for example, he drops back diagonally, he still has access to the center back but can also help out in the middle. The central defender might, in some circumstances, run free on a backpass to the goalkeeper.

The center back should be pressured in such a way that he can still rotate, but immediately after the rotation, is under pressure. Thus, he can not play back and is forced into errors. The central defender is – especially if he is right-footed – under pressure and can only play a difficult pass forward. The winger moves up on the fullback and also stands slightly further inside to make the subsequent pressing trap more effective.

The LZM (left sided center mid) moves up resulting in a 4-1-3-2 pressing formation.

Now, the center back has to play a long ball. Due to the pressure and, ideally, a slightly arc-like run from the advancing central midfielder, a precise diagonal ball is nearly impossible.

This aspect, together with the open space in his field of vision, should normally force him to pass into the open hole. But, he falls into a trap.

The winger who is furthest from the ball may fall back and inside to allow the second central midfielder to indent; this will create more local compactness and more Dynamik. Also, there’s a reason the remaining central midfielders are slightly asymmetrical. They can, on the one hand, create horizontal pressure on two different levels, and, on the other hand, have the opportunity to react to specific events from the opponents with greater Dynamik.

A long ball is played up the wing, the central defender (LIV) moves out, the other players move over. Depending on the development of the situation, the six (ZDM) can drop back, if  necessary.

If the pass cuts through the middle, the six can fight for the ball with better momentum. He plays very vertically in the hole so that the center back can move out and allow him to drop into the back line.

On a pass along the wing the six can also allow the fullback to move out. As soon as the opponent stops the ball, he is surrounded. He is pressed from all sides and nearly every passing option lies in the cover shadows and the advanced Achter (eight) can also participate. It is very, very difficult to find a way out. Just receiving the ball could lead to big problems. Theoretically, you could refer to this as a gegenpressing trap.

A long ball into the middle. There is a local compactness, with six players available to press the opponent.

The asymmetry of the remaining midfielder has also another purpose. Staggering in a 4-4-2, would result in either a 4-4-0-2, 4-0-4-2, or a 0-4-4-2; there would be a large hole somewhere, because the entire horizontal path would be free. The cover shadow would immediately lack the ability to prevent a lateral ball from the opponent, resulting in new situations and passing angles. With second balls they would also not be compact, and during outward moves the defenders would be vulnerable to long balls and deep sprints.

Poor staggering in the 4-0-4-2 as an example.

The second variant of a pressing trap is similar, but opens space elsewhere.

4-1-2-3 with asymmetric wingers

This situation is similar to the basic formation, however, this time one of the wingers attempts to establish access to the other center back. Here, the winger puts the fullback in his cover shadow while he pressures the central defender. The two Achter (eights) now move in the direction of this side of the field and control the space while the six secures and acts almost on a level with his two center backs so that they can move out on long balls.

The left winger (LA) presses the central defender (RIV) and the formation becomes 4-1-2-3.

A forward pass is not really possible and if a diagonal ball comes, the entire formation then pushes across towards the other side  of the pitch and isolates them there. The middle is protected by the three midfielders. Their position-oriented playing style in the middle keeps them very compact and allows them to isolate the wide players, while the fullback and the backwards pressing winger can set aside their pressing. The trap is created through this isolation: if the opponent passes to their near-ball winger, then the Achter (eight) and Sechser (six) will already in a position to restrict space.

Here the ball comes to the right winger (RA), who is immediately isolated, but has an open option; his right-back (RV), for a direct drop.

The full-back is forced back up through the hole, but then is almost completely isolated. The entire formation pushes over. The six (ZDM) backs up the intermediate line area and the winger (LA) can aggressively press in conjunction with the eight (LZM). Passes into the middle or on the wing should be almost impossible or must go in tight spaces, making turnovers likely.

The right-side defender (RV) has no passing options, moves further up the pitch with the ball mostly at his feet, and is then caught against the sideline. The left winger can now use the open space behind the fullback to launch the counter. Bayern has done this several times this season.

If the center back sends a long, diagonal ball to the far side, the center forward is there and can orient himself on the Sechserraum (six space). Because of the length of the pass, the formation can also move over and there is usually no time for the winger there to deliver the pass, just like in the near-ball variant of pressing the opponent’s buildup game.

This pressing trap is less intense and flashy, but works in a similar way, while at the same time having interesting advantages in offensive Umschaltspiel (transition); FC Barcelona, as well as Guardiola’s Bayern, have practiced both methods several times this year. Another interesting variant has also been seen this season.

The centre forward as a hunting wedge striker

Many teams use a 4-1-4-1 with a relatively static “wedge striker” who drives between the two central defenders, to sever the connection between them. He then runs up to the pass receiver and redirects the build-up play from the opposition into a direction where his own team can arrive sooner and in greater number, which means more local compactness. In this variant, there is really no pressing trap or change in the defensive formation.

However, you can create a pressing trap with a wedge forward, if he starts from a wide position. There, the displaced wedge forward – e.g. Messi against Rayo – can focus on the opposing fullback. He leaves both central defenders free and man marks the full-back. The opponent now has a certain problem in their buildup.

The displaced wedge striker has the full-back (LV) in his cover shadow and at the same time has access to the center back (LIV). This is pressing trap #1. Pressing trap #2 is the open space behind; a long ball can get to this space but if often results in a 3 v 2.

The central defender near the wedge striker can not play down the wing. The full-back is already man marked, a long ball is not an option, and a refusal to play on this side makes their offensive game extremely easy to figure out.

By ignoring one side, the opposing wingers can constantly move back – or into the formation, thereby providing either stability with long balls into the intermediate line space or more pressure, which is a plus for this style of play. When moving inside, for example, the two eights can produce high compactness and prevent passes into the Sechserraum (six space). This can also be practiced when the central defender near the wedge striker gets the ball.

When this happens he must play the ball, at the latest, to the other central defender, who can be easily run at again by the oncoming centre forward; this one move can take three players out of the game when run properly and produces very high compactness, if properly implemented. This compactness requires excellent coordination in its movements, however, and can take also a large toll.

The route is very long for the striker and may exhaust him. At Barcelona, Messi did this in only a few games (usually during a draw). He didn’t sprint but was in more of an intense run and generally only did so at the end of an aggressive move up from the rest of his team. A consistent implementation of this style of play may well be impossible.

Conclusion

Caveat: Theoretically, there are an infinite number of possible pressing traps and ways to arrange the positioning of the team to create them. In any formation, Pressingfallen can be generated from different positions and pressing runs. The 4-1-4-1, because of its potential movement and its use in a high press, has some interesting features which have been described here in three variants.

Generally, it is important to know that Pressingfallen exist and are used. Jürgen Klopp said he set these traps up against Real Madrid, which ultimately led to one of their successful counterattacks. So, our advice is: don’t always, if space is opened against a team, assume that it is due to poor movement. Sometimes . . .

Admiral Ackbar: Clearly resistant to pressing traps.

Thanks to @rafamufc, who translated this piece for us!

The two most prominent methods of coverage used in soccer today are man and zone. In this article we’ll explain the different types and characteristics of man coverage as well as their advantages and disadvantages.

The Basics

“If you mark man-to-man, you’re sending out eleven donkeys.” – Ernst Happel

Man coverage was by far the most frequently practiced style between the ‘20s and ‘50s. Beyond this and into the ‘70s it was still somewhat practiced, but experienced a rebirth in the ‘80s. The chronological beginning and ending of these phases differs from country to country. In Germany, it was standard to man-mark opponents until the late ‘90s and beyond. Because of this trend, BVB took one in the nuts against Bayern in 2001 and German football by extension experienced a crisis across the board.

That being said, teams have always strived to have a strong man coverage. As we shall see, there are many varieties of man coverage and none of them are standard.

Before you go into a tactical or even a philosophical debate about football, you should familiarize yourself with the different variants of man coverage.

Collective man-marking

Option 1: Strict man-marking / number marking

Strict man-marking, or what I’d call a classic or rigid man-marking is probably the best known method. You should be close enough to your mark that if he had too much to drink the night before, you’ll know from the smell of his breath; and, should he need to puke, you can hold his hair for him. Whether knowing the exact level of an opponent’s intoxication creates a tactical advantage or not is impossible to say. Lilian Thuram is said to have rubbed himself with onions in the run-up to games to confuse his opponent.

Number marking: Everyone has a direct opponent, die strikers are free and there is a Libero / sweeper / covering player

In the end, man coverage comes down to one thing: each player is more or less tasked with following a specific opponent for 90 minutes. The sayings “if he goes to the bathroom, you should follow him” or “he needs to feel your breath” come from the primitive days of football. These represent the aggressive variant of this style. Herbert Chapman, the so-called “inventor of man-marking” at Arsenal in the mid-20s, installed a loose man coverage. It was sufficient if a player kept their opponent in sight and close enough to have instant access to them.

From a tactical perspective, the implementation of man-marking is simple: the daily bread of of the defender’s circuit class is, thanks to this simple statement, merely a matter of disciplined and physically stressed tracking.

Football professor Ralf Rangnick described this method as “number marking” because the opponent was tracked across the pitch by the number on the back of his shirt.

With time (and good trainers or intelligent players) this was, of course, adapted. In the finale of the 1975 European Super Cup final between FC Bayern and Dynamo Kyiv, Dettmar Cramer set his marking in line with Kyiv’s changes; the right-back, the six, and the left-back exchanged, the strong defender Joseph White now covered the outside-right Slobodyan, while in the National Champions Cup final he had taken the more central Billy Bremner out of the game. Assignments were no longer limited to marking the opposite position but to finding a suitable marker for the opponent’s key players (often at the expense of their own offensive game).

The advantages of rigid man-marking are also clear: simplicity, no communication problems when passing and moving, no special tactical training, playing off an ideally superior athleticism, and a continuous focus on the opposition’s key player.

The tactical weaknesses, in turn, are also at hand. These weaknesses were particularly apparent in games against fluid and flexible attacking lines, especially versus the golden team of Hungary in the early 50s, called “Aranycsapat” in Hungarian. The Hungary vs England match at Wembley in 1953, where the hosts went down 3:6 against the underdogs from the continent, was a key game.

The problem was not the obvious, i.e. the tracking of the opponent and the resulting opening of space, but something else entirely. Jimmy Johnston basically held his position and didn’t track Nandor Hidegkuti at all.

The opponents were ultimately got more right, which probably had to do with the fact that Winterbottom and Johnston had discussed how to deal with Hidegkuti before the game – with the following effect: they decided that Johnston should not track him, as Sweden had done successfully, but that they should use someone from the midfield, probably the left halfback in the 3-2-2-3. – RM

The English were neither surprised nor clueless – they were simply powerless. Hidegkuti had no trackers and set up overloads and combinations; England was shot down. On May 23, 1954, there was a return match, and in an effort to avoid making the same “mistake” the center-half tracked Hidegkuti. The result speaks for itself: England suffered an even bigger 1:7 defeat.

If you play with a collective number cover / strict man-marking, then there are many simple ways to cause problems. The opponent can move his marker to open spaces. He can switch positions to cause confusion, fall back and then destroy the enemy formation so that a hole can be created, or lose his opponent and skillfully produce overloads in targeted spaces, à la Hidegkuti.

A good tactical player can also carry their opposing marker to another defender, open space between them, twist around his opponent and, with the advantage of space and speed, directly infiltrate the channel. Even with a free roaming zonal defender behind a man-marking defensive line it’s possible, if only indirectly: you just open space on one side for a teammate via the movement of the Libero, which allows an attack. Afterwards, the attacker pulls with a twist inwards and may intervene or combine in the attack game.

You can see that the playing out of this folly is both collectively and individually unlimited. However, there were – in addition to the free man behind the defensive line – further solutions, which led to a second major variant in marking.

Variant 2: Flexible Marking

Flexible marking or, as I like to call it, transfer marking refers to a twist on number coverage. In this variant, the opposing player is tracked but handed over to another player when possible. This allows a team to better handle two opponents swapping positions, e.g. two strikers crossing over each other, but communication problems can pop up.

In flexible marking, the on-coming striker is not tracked, but “handed over” to the free Libero

In the lower divisions of amateur football, for example, it is often not communicated when an outside player moves to the center and thus he is suddenly left without an opponent. In rare cases, one player pursues his man while a teammate tries to take the transfer; then there are two men on one player and the strike partner of the doubled up players is left laughing to himself.

All in all, this is the most commonly practiced variant of collective man coverage today and provides a logical progression. The opponent can not only be passed on to other players, but also into space.

This grew in practice in the early 70s under Dettmar Cramer at Munich. If the opposing players came forward to create overloads, they were tracked and then passed on to a teammate. They could then transfer this opponent into space. Because of this, Bayern were deeper and more compact, while the free opponent was stuck behind a tight defensive unit, which made the generation of overloads somewhat difficult.

With this style a kind of pressing is also possible. The opposing defenders are not man-marked and the zone covering offensive players in their team play deeper. They then support the isolated, ball oriented man-marker when he is attacking his opponent, or can take over a man freed by the the defensive marker.

This was practiced continuously but never really organized. Normally, the offensive player was exempt from defensive duties. The defensive players played in man coverage and the opposing defenders were marked only when they went on the offensive.

Nowadays, man-marking transfers are used all the time. A priority is placed on enemy counterattacks over man-marking the striker in the penalty area. The logic behind this is that the space is already open but the opponent doesn’t have much of it. That’s why situational man-marking is the only effective approach.

Otherwise, this collective man-marking variant has largely died out and is only used individually, which we will come to soon. Before we close the chapter on collective man-marking we have a third variant.

Variant 3: The space-oriented man coverage

This last variant, the space or zone-oriented man coverage is still used sometimes in the Bundesliga; by Dieter Hecking at his former club1. FC Nuremberg and others.

Here the team is often in a position-oriented spatial coverage, which we will cover in another article. From their positions they have a certain amount of space to cover. If an opponent strays into in this space, then he will be man-marked.

If the opponent leaves the opponent’s space without the ball, then the player moves back to his original position in the formation. This is, in some ways, a compromise between man and zone defense. The team is set up in a compact space-covering array and uses it to cover their targeted man. The opponent should be tightly covered and pressed when receiving a pass while the rest of the team ensures there are no open spaces.

The space-oriented man coverage, where the player only marks an opponent when they enter his “man-marking zone”

This style can be practiced so that the position simply remains open, or that the hole is filled by a collective move or a replacing player. Thus, the formation remains compact, but holes may pop up in other spaces; these missing players can be especially vulnerable to quick one-twos.

One advantage is that shifting problems and space transfers don’t stand out because they are rarer and can be harder to play. The momentum of the opponent’s action can be destroyed by intelligent attacking. Their attacks can also be delayed; making them easy to figure out and interrupt.

It is a more or less difficult way of playing with many complex and intense movements. This variant makes for an interesting compromise, but probably not a permanent solution.

Variant 4: Situational Marking

The third variant is a mixture of zone and man coverage, but still belongs more to the man coverage. In situational marking, zone defense is the supreme principle. I still think it belongs to the man coverage category, because the intensity and implementation of each team are the most prominent features.

This style is best explained as a mixed variant of zonal covering and man-marking. As a case in point, SC Freiburg has their center forwards close down the passing lanes. They are both option oriented and covering space. Meanwhile, the sixes take the opposing sixes in man coverage so they can attack them instantly. This is not collective man-marking by Freiburg, but a situationally applied tactic.

Alternatively, man-marking can be briefly applied to free-running players to prevent short passing combinations in the midfield. Ideally, this will cause the opponent to play the ball backwards and the man-marker can then resume zonal coverage. Describing this as a separate variant is not enough, e.g. Rayo Vallecano against FC Barcelona or Swansea’s style. Nevertheless, this is played by these two teams, and is one of the interesting features of option-oriented zone defense. Also, Bayern have often used situational man-marking in their intelligent pressing during the second half of this season.

No team plays this way continuously. Although that would be an interesting and high-risk variant. A more flexible version of Bilbao’s style would be the nearest example.

Marking individual players

Man coverage is currently used primarily for individual players. One wants to reduce certain risks or facilitate coordination in their team so they can occasionally revive their man-marking. There are two major variants, which we will touch on briefly.

Alternative 1: Marking Key Players

The most common and frequently used way of playing man coverage is to put a Kettenhund (watch dog) on the opponent’s strategically key players. For example, marking Mats Hummels in the Bundesliga or Sami Khedira marking Andrés Iniesta in El Clasico.

The differences are obvious: teams want to stifle the creative Dortmund center-back’s deep build-up play, while the Barcelona needle player should be covered to prevent the opponent from having any extra space and stability in possession.

“Wow, the center-back is so dangerous, my dear man we cover the free man.”

This option provides a simple zone covering framework with only a few players isolated from the base formation. They adopt a man coverage, but can often fall back into the basic formation. So, depending on the aggressiveness of the style, this is a way to switch between a fixed and a situational man coverage. This tactical device should survive for the next few years and is a good idea if used properly.

Option 2: Man-marking certain positions or zones

In this second option both individual players and zones can be covered. A good example would be the game against the false nine: where a central defender man-marks, then hands over to a midfielder or remains fixed in man coverage. In this case, it’s not about the individual player and his tactical skills, but his importance to the movement in the group and team tactics that should be prevented. The ever changing center-forward can then be covered, even after a flurry of attacks.

An asymmetrical shift in a 4-4-2. The left winger takes the full-back, the rest indent; this is a space-crunching and situationally-played version of marking specific positions.

full-backs and the full-backs to the wingers. This is to prevent the enemy getting a free run behind the defense or an opponent dribbling down the wing and turning their field of vision towards goal. The opponent’s build-up play is often directed back into the middle or lured into pressing traps.

Here, Bremer set up once more in their 4-1-4-1-formation to appropriately adjust for Leverkusen’s style.

The wingers were very man oriented and settled deep, dropping if they did not have the ball. Leverkusen couldn’t make optimal use of their high and wide full-backs, but had to get stronger over the middle. –RM

What else?

In the long term, man coverage could return; but not in its old guise. The players are probably too similar athletically, the trainers must be clever, and a classic man coverage would only occasionally be successful.

But a modern variant could possibly cause a renaissance: the raumverknappende (space crunching) marking or a collectively and aggressively enforced situational marking. In the former, Arrigo Sacchi’s dogma of compactness and his four reference points are used in a man instead of a zone defense. Instead of incorporating an isolated man-marker into a zone covering formation, as is done currently, a “Raumdecker” (space marker) could be used in a man-marking team. This would help close holes and build pressing traps.

The space markers must not be fixed, but free to pull out of the mspace crunch away from the ball. The far man-marker takes over a man in an indented position, creating a domino effect and freeing many space markers. This has already been played in a separate variant with the libero as a free man and space marker.

With progressive Dynamik and game intelligence this technique – as Bayern played to some extent in the ‘70s – could provide new kinds of football tactics. Here, however there is not only the one dimension, the length of the pitch, that is scarce but the width and thus the space factor and time factor/stress. If and when the time comes, we will see (or not).

There could be further constructs and refinements to classical man-marking; for example, by double coverage as part of a compact base formation or some more bizarre ideas that we won’t go any further into in this article.

PS: By popular demand, here is my idea of ​​space crunching marking:

Goalkeeper has the ball. The man coverage of the blue team are clearly visible.

The keeper now tries a through ball to the inside right central defender

The whole team goes into man coverage in order to press . Players will not be “passed” but “taken”, if you want to be precise, or even tracked. The space covering players between the full-backs take either the man (right half) or slide freely into the center (left half)

In this picture we see the new access and the “space crunch” effects in more detail.The far winger far winger broke away and goes to the center back while keeping an eye on the man behind him. The smart left winger of Team Red moves well. He is loosely followed by the right back, who holds while keeping an eye on the far wing. This is also why the left-sided six moved to the middle of the pitch.

The two main types of defense used in soccer are man-marking and zonal marking. In this article we will explain the different types of zonal marking and their advantages and disadvantages.

Written by Rene Maric
Translated by @rafamufc

General information about Zonal Marking

Zonal marking was the first way defense was played. The original zonal marking had very little to do with the modern style because it lacked organization. One might call it chaos marking as everyone just sort of stood around and occasionally tried to win the ball.

Today, zonal marking is anything but chaotic. The advance of athleticism, game intelligence, and especially the professionalization of football, have led to the dying out of man-marking as players are individually stronger and better coordinated as a team. The gaps are now narrower and better covered, which mitigates the vulnerability of zonal marking between the horizontal and vertical lines.

In the late eighties, zone defense was extended further by Raumvernappung (squeezing space). In this style, the game was basically kept compact and the effective playing field compressed by the factors of time, space, and the offside rule. Arrigo Sacchi trained his players to use four reference points:

“Our players had four reference points: the ball, the space, the opponent and his own teammates. Every movement had to happen in relation to these reference points. Each player had to decide which of these reference points should determine his movements. “
– Arrigo Sacchi

In order to play zonal coverage, the team must consider these reference points when shifting and pressing to remain stable and prevent opening any holes.

That being said, it should be noted that playing a ball-oriented game is not zonal marking. The ball-oriented game refers to the adjustment of the player and his team to the movement of the ball. Which, in zonal marking, is usually applied much more when pressing and squeezing space.

Theoretically, it is possible to play zonal marking without being ball-oriented. It used to be quite common to not man-mark but mark space; yet not indent or constantly move in the direction of the ball at all.

It is also a mistake to believe that Sacchi’s four reference points only apply to squeezing space and pressing. They are generally used in the defensive game and the attacking game, which has the added benefit of the reference points providing reasons for playing the different types of zonal marking.

Zonal marking as a team

First, we will explain collective zonal marking, which is practiced by the entire team, and its variants.

For easier understanding all of the scenes in this article will be based on a 4-4-2 formation in defense

Variant 1:  Position-oriented zonal marking

In position-oriented zonal marking, the player’s reference point is his “teammates”. The team simply operates in a closed block. This ‘block’ is nothing but a formation, in which the respective positions are clearly defined and a player “covers” his own position. The term  position marking could also be used.

Some examples include Lucien Favre’s Gladbach or Valeriy Lobanovskyi’s Dynamo Kyiv. At Gladbach, it is striking how effectively they move back and forth while often exerting little pressure on the opponents or the ball. Instead, they focus on thwarting attacks by controlling space. If the opposing team resorts to circulating the ball, Gladbach move so quickly and precisely that the supposedly “open” wings can’t be played.

At the same time, the vertical and horizontal compactness is preserved, so the opponent can hardly find space within the block. If they try to play into the narrow space, then the lines move toward each other (or only one line moves, depending on the game philosophy) and closes the space. Over time, this puts the opponent under pressure; resulting in winning the ball off bad passes or other technical errors.

The characteristics of position-oriented zonal marking are: clearly recognizable banks in defense and midfield, giving space to the opposition on the wings, and straight lines. However, the formation must not consist of equally wide chains or equal spacing between the various parts of the team. The goal is to keep the gaps and the space between the lines as small as possible.

In effect, this often looks somewhat passive because little pressure can be generated against an intelligent and cautious ball circulation. This season, Favre played it so that he pulled apart the space between the lines or intelligently moved the lines up to establish access for their pressing.

Example of position-oriented zonal marking

The opponent builds play on their right side, with what seems to be a 4-1-2-3 as a variation of the 4-3-3 with wide wingers. For illustrative reasons, we (blue team) are standing in an ultra-defensive formation.

The opponent plays to the right and the team moves as a group to that side of the pitch. The space that appeared to be open on the side for the winger is suddenly very tight and can not be safely played. The ball goes into the center and our (semi) left striker gets access and moves to press. The team follows his example and take the same running paths.

The opponent is approached slowly and step by step, which sometimes seems a bit laid-back. Despite the passivity and reduced access, however, the block remains stable and compact. Passes into the space between the lines are difficult and can be compressed by narrowing the team’s spacing.

Variant 2: Man-oriented zonal marking

In man-oriented zonal marking, you play with a basic formation in which the reference point is the “opponent.” From their respective base positions, the players orient themselves flexibly in the space they cover in order to maintain a certain distance to the opponent closest to them.

The contrast to man-marking is obvious. In man-marking, a player sticks very tight to an opponent, oftentimes even tracking just the one opponent. In zonal marking, a player must cover the space around his position, loosely moving his position to any nearby opponent and staying close to them.

In a way, it’s a compromise between position-oriented zonal marking and man-marking. The advantage over man-marking is fewer open holes. The advantage over position-oriented zonal marking is the increased access gained via the shorter distance to the opposition.

Example of man-oriented zonal marking

The opposing right-back receives the ball, so our team shifts to the left. It is striking that our sixes behave differently: one is based on the opponent’s right eight, one on their center forward. Our striker is also man-oriented, however not in the classic sense, but in space: he cuts off the passing lane for the opposing six, who is playing behind the other eight.

Alternatively, our other six could have oriented to the opposing left-half eight and the winger would have remained in space. So all the pass routes and options are blocked directly (by cover shadows or even situational man coverages) or indirectly (through access and narrowness).

The opposing full-back does not risk the line pass, but plays back. Our team therefore pushes out. The striker separates from the space around his opponent and begins to press. The far winger pushes out and, until the opposing center back handles the ball and continues playing, our winger is again near the opponent’s left-back. Our left six runs past the opposing right eight and is now “suddenly” oriented on the six of the opposing team.

In a way, one could say that man-oriented zonal marking, in contrast to position-oriented zonal marking, does not wait for access and pressing, but seeks it. The difference to man-marking is that the opponent will not be tracked or handed over to another teammate, but left to stand in space, and one can reorient themselves at any time. Furthermore, one does not focus on the opponent, but the action space and the access distance.

Variant 3: Space-oriented zonal marking

In this third variant, which is used much less frequently than man- and position-oriented zonal marking, the reference point is space. The team shifts toward the effective playing space “in the moment” and tries to occupy it.

On paper, one might think that sounds intelligent. The space would be overloaded and the opponent’s short pass combinations would be destroyed by a lot of pressure. In practice, however, this is not the case, if the opponents are even remotely smart. They can move into the many open spaces, particularly away from the ball, and destroy the opponent’s formation.

One example was the match between Valencia and Malaga, where Valencia wanted to restrict Malaga’s fluidity and situational narrowness with a space-oriented zonal marking, which failed completely.

Example of space-oriented zonal marking

In a sense, it was the lost twin of man-marking; in terms of idiocy. The pass goes as usual to the opposing right-back and the entire team is oriented on the new space.

They have no access, the pass goes into the middle, and they move there. What happened?

Right, away from the ball the space is wide open. Every variant of zonal marking (with space squeezing, at least) results in open spaces, but in space-oriented zonal marking they arise throughout as a natural occurrence. They will also be so large that they can be played not only on long dangerous diagonal balls but, from halfway intelligent adversaries, through short passing combinations – as in this case.

In the game between Valencia and Malaga, Valencia tried this coverage to some extent and failed. In this article you’ll find a few nice pictures from laola1.tv including a brief explanation.

Option 4: Option-oriented zonal marking

With the option-oriented or even ball-oriented zonal marking, the reference point is the ball – how can it harm us, how do we prevent that? The team moves out of position differently, depending on the position of the ball and the opportunities that arise for the opponents.

This option was practiced by Laudrup’s Swansea and, to some extent, FC Barcelona. It is important that the players play smart and are well coordinated, otherwise numerous holes will be opened and the formation torn apart.

Example of option-oriented zonal marking

It’s the same scenario, but with different movements. The opponent passes to the right-back (“our” left) and our team moves. However, our right-back thinks, “Well, hey, if they play a sexy diagonal ball, there’ll be trouble” and breaks off from the chain.

Our left winger cuts off the opponent’s right winger in his cover shadow, while the left six prevents a dangerous pass coming to the opposing center-forward through the open space. The left striker cuts off the opposing right eight with his cover shadow. His partner, the right striker, therefore moves up in anticipation.

Why does he move up? We can see it in the attack development. The opposing right-back’s pass is risky, the left striker tries to intercept him, fails and runs wider; now cutting off the opposing right-back in his cover shadow. The second striker can now press and attack the opponent’s six.

Our team moves on, the far winger focuses on the flank. If we win the ball, he thrusts into space. If it is passed off, he covers the far side from diagonal balls.

Zonal marking as an individual

Under certain circumstances, zonal marking can be operated in mixed or man-marking systems with “space-markers”. Even if this is not the norm, we will dedicate ourselves briefly to two such options. Though the possibilities are probably endless.

Option 1: The Libero

The most famous free man in the history of football is the libero. He traditionally played behind a defensive line and had no opponent to mark, covering open spaces. The libero wanted to plug the many holes left open by man-marking. Behind the tempestuous man-marking line, the libero was solid as a rock; positioning himself behind holes in anticipation of intercepting passes or taking over from a vacating teammate.

Bayern’s formation in the 1975 European Super Cup against Dynamo Kyiv, with Beckenbauer playing as libero behind a man-marking team.

Option 2: Space interpreter and zonal marker

Some players act as free agents in front of the defense; sometimes even in zonal-marking systems. They play a role isolated from the formation or a different zonal-marking than their teammates. So, a defensive six could be the only one in his midfield playing position-oriented, and thus hold his position while his teammates man-mark or organize their man-oriented zonal marking.

On the other hand, a ten could also play as a “hunter” and always orient towards where the opponent is playing. Then he would repeatedly swing from a number ten role to the half positions and make space there compact.

Anything else?

Actually, very much so. One can still incorporate a lot more reference points to put a greater emphasis on pressing and especially counter-pressing, and build new zonal marking options. Time coverage would be possible as well as ball coverage, structure coverage, Dynamik coverage and much more.

There are also tons of different variations to the previously mentioned zonal marking styles. These relate to movement, the involvement in the defensive work (see Cristiano Ronaldo’s “gambling”), the exact implementation of the defensive positional play, asymmetric possibilities, the defense’s behavior when switching to the base formation and back, etc., etc.

This list above is intended to provide only a general overview of the two large and two smaller uses of zonal marking; outside of these four variants, there are still ways to create new ideas; within these four variants there are also an incredible number of variations.

How does the chain move when a player leaves position to press? Does one press backwards, or return to their position? How exactly do you decide who presses backwards and what do the remaining players do in their positions? Who provides defensive security and when?

The possibilities are endless thanks to the countless combinations and the many complex facets of the game, Which is what makes football so incredibly diverse.

Even as a standard the use of a zonal marking system is not clearly defined. Most teams mix it up positionally. Using situational or flexible man-marking and varying them in the different phases of the defensive game. Starting from a position-oriented zonal marking against the opponent’s deep buildup in order to remain stable and organized, then, switching to a man-oriented zonal marking when the opponent is higher, in order to get faster access. During the pressing phase, they are then option-oriented and cover the potential passing lanes or something similar. As you can see, a defensive standard does not exist.

The buzzword in tactics in the Bundesliga last season was probably gegenpressing (counter pressing).Dortmund were champions thanks to their counter pressing, but Bayern have moved up and are now currently unchallenged at the top of the table. FC Barcelona under Pep Guardiola won the Champions League twice with an outstanding use of Angriffspressing and counter pressing. But is all counter pressing the same?

Distinction no. 1: Preparing the counter pressing

Counter pressing includes not only the movement of the team to the ball, but also their previous positions and positioning. It is also true to an extent that counter pressing has a mental aspect. If a player switches off after losing possession and there is no immediate effort to win back the ball, then the opportunity for counter pressing is lost.

A player would either have to have the temperament to immediately attack the ball or develop the attitude thru drills. Normally, it is a combination of training, mind, and character.

But the tactics also plays a role. A team may quickly switch after losing the ball and work hard to win back the ball, but counter pressing will only be successful if the previous position of each player is correct. An extremely wide formation with numerical overloads will be ineffective in counter pressing but an offensively compact formation with isolated narrowness will not.

The trainer can decide in advance where the team should be narrow and where they should be wide. For example, this can be adjusted to a specific interest in the opponent’s strengths in certain areas or to the team’s own weaknesses, i.e. a risky offensive player or complex moves.

Where do I want the team to be narrower and more compact in order to create the best possible counter pressure?

Distinction no. 2: Zonal marking in counter pressing

In the counter pressing process, as an end to itself, one can make some distinctions. The big question is: how does a team base its reference points?

These are not the same reference points as in zonal marking or classic pressure. When counter pressing you stand in a highly shifted, crazy formation and press directly against the ball. The question is: how do you win back the ball? There are four major variants here.

Leeway-oriented counter pressing :

Dortmund’s counter pressing falls into this category.

It is based heavily on the available space of the opponent. The opponent will be cut off, pressed, and ideally have no room to breathe. All sorts of running and passing lanes are blocked or deliberately left open, which is usually a result of the trainer’s aforementioned preparation of the team’s positioning.

By playing this way one can steer their opponents outside and overtake them by counter pressing the ball or, due to the cutoff space, move closer and closer and win the ball back classically.

leeway-oriented counterpressing

The left-back of the red team runs past his opponent and plays the ball into the middle. The indented left winger of the red team gets the ball, turns, and loses it to the opposing right-back.

The opponent with the ball is then immediately pressed and the red team automatically slide into space. They realize that the opponent has two spaces and they don’t occupy them, but base their positions on them. A nice side effect is created: the opponent will often play the pass and be intercepted if he is inaccurate, but, if the opponent delays his decision-making, the team has more time to move towards him and achieve greater narrowness.

Access-oriented counter pressing :

Bayern’s counter pressing is the most likely to fall into this category.

In most cases, the opposing ball carrier is not pressed by the entire team but by one or two nearby players, while the others are not fixed to their positions, but take on the nearest opponent in a kind of man coverage. This brief situational man orientation ensures that after the enemy passes the players can always obtain access and challenge for the ball. The pressure on the ball carrier isn’t extreme, but should be enough to push him back or force him into immediate action.

Access-oriented counterpressing, same scenario as above.

While the nearest player, in this case the player who lost the ball, presses, the red team players move in the direction of their opponents and become man-oriented. In this case, the pass is easier to play, but it leads to many challenges and the opponent may often be doubled. There are no 50-50 balls, but there is an advantage for the red team because of their movement and the structure of their attack.

Passing lane-oriented counter pressing :

Since Pep Guardiola’s hire, FC Barcelona have played with a more anticipatory counter pressing that is primarily oriented towards the passing lanes.

The surrounding players push towards the ball carrier so that they open up specific passing lanes to him and block off others. It’s not so much about reducing space or challenging for the ball, but rather provoking deliberate passes into supposedly open space and then intercepting them. This is done by channeling passes into strategically unfavorable directions (for example, diagonally to the outside in a shorthanded situation) or in that space, e.g. where Sergio Busquets is covering.

Passing lane-oriented counterpressing, same scenario as above.

They move – ideally – a little bit later or make their approaches arc-like, but can then intercept the passes. Alternatively, they use their cover shadows and prevent the opponent making simple passes. They cut them off and provoke long balls or back passes, which creates a “normal” pressing out of the counter pressing in the classic sense.

Ball-oriented counter pressing :

The first team that used a collective counter pressing may have been the Dutch at the 1974 World Cup.

It was a chaotic counter pressing in some ways, because the players themselves were all heavily focused on the ball carrier and not his options. At the time, this was probably the better choice because the individual players were not trained in the small battles for the ball and the opposing players were not organized after recovering the ball or trained to resist pressure.

ball-oriented counterpressing, same scenario as above.

In this case all of the surrounding players move to the ball and press. This opens the potential pass to the player in the middle, who will then be pressed. If the defender is not excellent in ball handling, then this option is destroyed by pushing up and exerting greater pressure on the ball carrier.

Statistics

I was interested whether the different counter pressing variants would be visible in the statistics. My hypothesis was as follows: Bayern would have to be excellent in challenges with their access-oriented style, but weaker in Pressingkompetenz because they have fewer interceptions. BVB would, in turn, be weaker at tackling, but have better Pressingkompetenz, while FC Barcelona would be the opposite of Bayern.

The numbers fit. I have calculated the average values ​​of the three central midfielders of the respective teams. When counter pressing one would have to distinguish them from each other the most, because they are the main beneficiaries. The full-backs are usually too wide or too deep, the strikers are the “pressers” and those who post the lost ball, while the midfielders either intercept the ball or challenge for it. For graphical reasons, I’ve also multiplied the values ​​by 100.

“Tackling competency” of the midfielders

Hardly surprising: Gundogan and Co. are stronger than Busquets and partners in direct challenges, while Bayern are clearly the strongest. I attribute this unique superiority to, among other things, good counter pressing and access orientation. Bayern not only tackle more often but are better at it. The Catalans, however, tackle extremely rarely and often in more awkward locations.

“Pressing competence” of the midfielders

In the Pressingkompetenz statistic it is easy to see the advantage of FC Barcelona’s pressing style.

With 174.37, they are at the top by a wide margin, while Dortmund finish second with 86.10. What is striking here is that Bayern, despite their excellent defense, are so far behind. This is easily explained by their contrasting style: Munich collect fewer loose balls, break up fewer passes and instead win the ball via provoked challenges. At the same time, the stability of the defense is greater and the quality chances for the opponent are reduced, if he can extricate himself from the counter pressing.

What else?

Not much. The transitions are fluid, because the respective teams and especially the players will naturally adjust and adapt situationally; it’s more about having a general orientation for the players’ actions. Also, counter pressing should not be confused with “normal” pressing as unfortunately happens so often. Counter pressing is the direct and immediate effort to win the ball back after it is lost, while pressing is the fundamental work to get back the ball by moving out of or within the formation.

Written by RM (in 2012, so it’s about Heynckes’ Bayern)
Translated by @rafamufc

In this World Cup we have witnessed a big tactical trend emerge: the abandonment of the back four as dogma. While only one team at the 2010 World Cup played without a back four, several teams used a different style of defense this time around.

Chile played convincingly with a back three. Mexico, Argentina, and to some extent the Netherlands, used a pendulating back four, while Uruguay and Costa Rica deployed five at the back. This article originally appeared in German on abseits.at to clarify the differences between these three implementations, all of which share the same basic alignment and layout, and what strategic strengths, weaknesses, and counterattacking options are available in each.

The back three

The most frequently mentioned example in the mainstream media – and, in reality, the most rarely used –  is the back three. Now, we must mention that even a back three can often become four or five players in a line. What matters is how the players move in relation to each other. In a three-man line, the wing-backs can often situationally drop back into line with the three central defenders, but in the movement itself they do not do so on a consistent basis.

Thus, the wing-backs, by moving man-oriented to an opponent (and thus not moving ball-oriented like the three players in the middle), can also be connected to the midfield and move with it or also take up a flexible position in open space. Modern examples of a clear back three are exceedingly rare: recently the Chileans, Barcelona under Josep Guardiola in 2012, the Catalans under Guardiola’s predecessor Johan Cruijff in the early ‘90s or Louis van Gaal’s Ajax Amsterdam are the most prominent teams to use this approach.

Chile

If the wings aren’t occupied consistently enough or with enough presence, it is difficult to provide width in the final third on defense, and, all in all, it is a complex style that is difficult to implement. Many other teams set about using a classic back four or even five. However, one compromise is the “pendulating” back four.

The pendulating back four

When using a pendulating back four, elements of the back three, four and five are mixed. Basically, the five defenders stand in a line (or a crescent shape), but the wide players are ready to move out of the chain when the opponent is on one side or the other.

The near-side wing-back then no longer shifts with the other players, but pushes out from the five-chain and presses higher in the midfield. This is most often accomplished through man orientations on the wings. The remaining defensive players don’t follow him out, but stay on a line and move as a ball-oriented back four. This means that the far-side wing-back moves into the back four and is no longer positioned as high as his counterpart.

The result resembles Newton’s cradle; the three central players remain the same, while a wing-back peels off the chain depending on triggers from the opponent’s attack side, and the other falls in line. So you have four players in a row that move accordingly, like a chain connected to the ball, with only the outermost players alternating.

In contrast to the back three there is less pressure and presence in midfield, but the problems of a three-chain are very well concealed. By the near-side player moving out and pressing at midfield level, he obtains access and generates aggressiveness, while the other far-side wing-back offers support, securing the shifting of the three central defenders and improving the width of the formation. If the opposition switches flanks he can then protect the back-line well and move out unimpeded as the previously advanced wing-back simply drops back into the back line. When there are crosses they also create a greater central presence in the penalty area, allowing them to be handled better.

Mexico

However, gaps can arise on the sides and in the half-spaces when the wing-back pushes up to attack. This presence in the half-spaces is one of the great advantages of the five chain.

The five-chain

In the five-chain the five players all move together. If the ball goes to the wing, then the chain moves evenly and equally to that side. The five players are only a very short horizontal distance from one another, creating greater compactness and making it harder for the opposition to play through. Bombing runs down the flank by the near-side wing-back are therefore impossible, in principle, but there the tradeoff is a better organization and structure in the defensive game. This is particularly evident when the central players push up to press, as they are always very well secured and hardly open any gaps; with a pendulating back-four and good passes in the open spaces between the lines, this security is lacking.

However, there are also certain disadvantages compared to the pendulating back four. The formation’s width is a little weaker, but this is usually related to the higher number of players at the back. What’s more problematic are the unsuitable attack channels and the players’ positioning when the opponent is circulating the ball well in the half-spaces and playing forward diagonally. This leads to a stronger element of control at the back of the opposition’s ball circulation, which can naturally be both positive and negative; often it is a more stable, but altogether passive style.

Costa Rica

A line without a chain and variable handling

As a last resort, there are defenses with three or five players, where there is no clear chain mechanism. The Dutch had many defenders organized on a line and in a band, but always man-oriented when they pushed up to press; whether in the center or on the wings. There is then no clear chain, but this is intuitively solved in small groups. For example, a central defender can then move up to press while the surrounding players tuck in and cover him (a generally consistent group tactical means), while they can in certain positions or in certain situations, that he will not be covered by the indenting or equal pushing up of more than one player. Alternatively, it would also be possible to variably switch between a triple-chain, five-chain, and a pendulating back four depending on the opponent and the situation during the game. Swansea City under Michael Laudrup, for example, did this often with a back four as a basic orientation.

The fundamental strategic advantages

Whether it’s a three-chain, a pendulating four, or a five-chain: in all three systems there are certain aspects which promise a strategic advantage and are common features of these three implementation options, such as playing with three central defenders. This directly follows another theoretical consistency, namely to play with only one wing player per side.

This is often a disadvantage in amateur football and amateur sports, but via the ball-oriented shifting and the athleticism in modern football the disadvantage of the simple wing occupation can be neutralized, while the strategically important zones in the horizontal – the half-spaces and the center – are occupied. This increased presence and the associated increase in access generate a higher defensive stability. With five- and pendulating four-chains this is further enhanced by the increased width of the formation in the defensive third, while the increased presence and compactness of the three-chain is in the midfield.

This increased coverage or compactness and the generally stronger central concentration also ensure that the respective teams can play much more intensely and dynamically. A team can then impose their rhythm on the opponent more easily or at least keep them out of the strategically important areas. Besides developing access to the opponents this effect also increases access to more areas of the field due to the simplified reachability of different zones.

From the half-spaces they can very simply go out wide or back to the center, because both spaces are directly accessible. Various overloads are thus possible and lead to a more flexible attacking than defensive style; at this World Cup there were 5-4-1, 5-3-2, 5-2-3, 3-4-1-2 and 5-3-1-1-formations. In addition to the game against the ball, there are also multiple potential offensive benefits to having three central defenders.

On the one hand, the midfield always has three passing options at the back, in addition to the goalkeeper. The formations are also better suited and less prone to the opponent pressing back passes, as opposed to playing with only two central defenders. Furthermore, the three defenders can flexibly move forward; the half-back can, for example, be covered well in the space around the opposing strikers when he moves forward, e.g. when an opponent presses in a 4-4-2), while the central defender can orient forward. This could be seen in the DFB Cup final last season by Bayern Munich where Martinez stood somewhat higher during very deep ball circulation and Neuer acted almost on a level with the wide half-back. In addition, further synergies can be added along with the goalkeeper as well as the midfield, such as dropping the six into the gaps between the center back and half-back or the half-back and wing-back, to create more Dynamik.

One can even observe a certain positive momentum in transition when playing with three central defenders (and singly occupied wings). After losing the ball a team can increase their presence in the center and half-spaces to better control the opposition’s counterattack or effectively gegenpress, as with three players in the back line they are always well protected and can release cleanly after recovering the ball.

In offensive transitions the two wing-backs can push forward because they are very well covered by the central players and always have a nearby passing option for easy passes back. If the center- and half-backs have the technique they can then use their nice view of the field to get the ball forward.

But, among the many benefits, there are also some disadvantages compared to the classic back four or playing with two central defenders.

The disadvantages

There are also reasons that speak for a classic back four and against a game with a three-chain, five-chain, or pendulating four. There is often a lower presence in the higher zones, as both with and without the ball there are five defenders and with three centrally bound defenders there are only five remaining players who can occupy the center and the half-spaces in the midfield band. If one uses all five or at least four players to fill these extremely important areas, however, they will often lack presence in the final third; both centrally and in providing width on the wings.

Depending on the orientation of the midline, such as with a 5-4-1, one can indeed compensate for this, but that is again at the expense of ball circulation to the center forward and penetrating the penalty box. Due to these same positioning problems there is a half-automatic defensive focus against the ball, the need to work deliberately higher and with a very active alignment and suitable movement.

However, the two biggest problems are of a different nature. When playing with a five-chain, or just three players in defense a team is sometimes prone to being outplayed on the sides.  Even simple wing teams can turn quickly turn gained space into an unpleasant dominance, which then usually negatively influences one’s own offensive transition or its effectiveness. With a very compact defense and an intense 4-4-2 the opponent can, for example, find it relatively easy to have good chances for success, if the offensive movements of the structure are suitable.

This leads to an increased complexity of the game by the offside trap. Although Costa Rica’s five-chain recorded a record number of offsides against their opponents at this World Cup, it is usually more difficult to coordinate the appropriate movements with a five-chain. If the collective doesn’t move up at the right moment, or simply does not hold the line correctly somewhere, they risk passes getting in behind the defense.

Conclusion: The future and the antidote

Overall, the five-chain or back three, in their variations, represent a very interesting tactical orientation which has many interesting strengths. In the long term it may mean that we see even more three-chains, five-chains, and pendulating fours, which are combined with the classic back fours and their variations. A move away from the back four to a comprehensive use of a three- or five-chain is unlikely; in Central Europe it is likely to be used more as a one-off.

Nevertheless, in the long run teams might take up this tactical aspect, at least to have it in their repertoire for situational use, as is already the case in Italy, but also for Guardiola’s Bayern and Rodgers’s Liverpool. It will also be interesting to the see the response to it; wing overloads, constructive ball circulation around the half-spaces, and possession football with intelligent use of suitable attack channels are all interesting possibilities.

Bayern Munich adapted Juventus’s 3-5-2/5-3-2, using a pendulating back four, with a shift of the pressing pattern and a 4-3-3/4-2-4 formation as well as the above mentioned strategical aspects. If this continues in the coming years, then the football world can look forward to more variety and flexibility; playing-wise, this is not a problem, as the World Cup has shown.

This article will delve into an oft-neglected area in tactics theory: the half-spaces.
In our analyses we have often made reference to them. We are also frequently asked what the half-spaces are and what their purpose is and I want to devote myself to answering that question here. First we should categorize the half-spaces and then briefly discuss their characteristics.

Dividing the field into zones

The playing field is typically divided into several parts. There are many different approaches to this division. One method is to divide the field into the predetermined lines of the formation. There are usually either three or four horizontal lines or bands. In a 4-4-2 there are three bands and in a 4-1-4-1 there are four. Between the bands there is the “intermediate line space” or, the space between the lines. The same process can be applied to the field vertically.

It’s also possible to make simple divisions of the field. Most of these systems divide the width of the field into three parts; the two wings and the center. Louis van Gaal differs by cutting the field into 18 rectangles, 6 vertical by 3 horizontal, in which players have certain tasks and responsibilities.

Division into 18 rectangles

The middle column here is a little wider and is still mainly divided into the middle and the wings. Depending on which part of the field the players are in and which of the four phases of the game the team is in (in possession, out of possession, defensive/offensive transition), certain players will have different tasks based on the four reference points of Arrigo Sacchi. Another alternative is to divide the field into pure geometric splits, e.g. 18 zones (3×6) of equal proportion to one another.

Numbered, incl. ominous zone 14

The “intermediate line space” of a team that sits deep will pop up in the ominous “Zone 14”, which is considered by many to be a crucial element of the game. Here’s a link to an article referencing facts and scientific studies on this.

Dividing the field horizontally

Personally, I am in favor of a division that is more focused on the tactical events, key strategic areas, and their respective game situations. Therefore I divide the field into three basic areas: the wings, half-spaces, and center.

Alternative scheming in the horizontal; “outside/wing” – “halfspace” – “middle/centre” – “halfspace” – “outside/wing”. For English readers it should also be important that obviously “halfspace” is not a good word, but it’s not an invention but the translation of the word “Halbraum” which is established in Germany already for years by it’s elite coaches and the German FA.

Theoretically, you can make the wings (Außen) in the picture above even smaller, extend the half-spaces (Halbraum) and the middle (Zentrum), or divide the three zones differently by area; even a division into seven columns is possible. But, the center of course always refers to the middle. The center is – as in chess – usually seen as the main zone. Whoever controls the center, controls the game. One can easily explain why with a few examples.

The freedom of choice is greater in the middle of the field. There is no boundary created by the touchline. One has roughly eight basic directions from which the ball can be played (forward, backward, left, right, and four diagonal lines). On the wing there are only five directions (forward, backwards, square to the left or right, and two diagonal lines). This means that the space to work with is limited and the precision of vertical passes must be higher.

This is not the case in the middle. A team that bases their play around establishing a greater presence in the center will have many more choices and thus be more dynamic. The opponent must also not only defend the two wings, but the middle and both wings, because from the center of the field either are directly playable.

On the other hand, the center is usually heavily occupied, so there is generally less time to make decisions. In addition, more space must be surveyed (360°) by the passer. Therefore, teammates and opponents can easily be overlooked. The lack of time on the ball, coupled with the challenge of lacking space, does not generally occur on the wings, where the opponent’s shape is usually less compact than in the middle. Furthermore, the winger need only survey 180° to see the whole field. Also, turnovers in the wide zones are less problematic than in the center. As was mentioned in the example of zone 14, the path from the center to the goal is the shortest. Losing the ball on defense there causes an immediate threat to one’s own goal.

But why should there be an additional division of the wing-center-wing into the half-spaces?

The goal-orientation of football

The answer is simply a logical association with the game of football. Football is about scoring goals. Whether you’re a romantic or pragmatist, fan or coach, tactician, strategist or slob: everyone ultimately wants the ball to go into the net.

The goal is located in the center of the field; both teams’ shapes change for the purpose of ball-oriented defending, reducing space, and zonal marking, depending on the position of the ball. If the ball is on the wing, then both teams will look different than when the ball is in a central position.

The “half-space” exists in this sense for analysis. Looking at the shifting movements of two teams, one not only notices the differences between the ball being on the wing or in the center, but also in a position in between the two; the half-space.

For the sake of explanation, imagine a team in a 4-4-2 is defending against a 2-5-3 team in their buildup phase. The six of the offensive team drops slightly and faces up vertically and centrally between the central defenders. The 4-4-2 team is in their “normal” positions. They must not move and this is the basic shape of the offense and defense. Both teams will now play towards a goal; that of the defending team. One team on offense, one on defense.

442 vs 253

In the next scene, the ball has landed on the wing. The defending 4-4-2 team shifts the near winger over to establish access and their shape changes. The full-back moves up to cover and the two central defenders are deeper, similar to the crescent shape we see in the midfield. The movement, the circumstances, and the strategic options are different. Naturally, the team plays from here towards the goal, but the spaces are now much tighter and difficult to break down.

Ball on the wing

In the last scene, we’ll look at what happens when the ball is in the half-space. For this purpose, the six (or a set disengaged central defender) stands in the half-space. Again, both teams change shape. We can therefore assume that the half-spaces are ideally classified as a separate space, because the resulting movement of both teams creates strategic differences.

Ball in half space

As we move between these three zones, the position of the ball only changes slightly. The movements are intense, but there is no fundamentally new shape. Thus, it should be ruled out that a further vertical dimension is needed in the layout; only the passing options and taktikpsychologischen aspects (earlier shots around the penalty area, etc.) are different.

The diagonality of the half-spaces

Adding the half-spaces between the center and wings results in a different view of the strategic and tactical peculiarities of the game: the fields of view are one aspect. In a central position, with both teams standing right in front of the goal, the fields of view are both vertical. For positions in the half-spaces, however, the fields of view are not vertical, but diagonal. A player in the half-space has as many options as the central player, but doesn’t have to turn away from the center and play to the side, instead maintaining a diagonal, goal-facing view of the field in his passing game.

The field of view

The field of view or visual field is composed of the foveal and peripheral vision. In contrast to the foveal vision, in which the eye’s sight line is aligned exactly with a targeted object to take advantage of the maximum central vision, peripheral vision provides rough, blurred, and distorted visual impressions outside of a solid fixation point. In principle, the object in question is “seen by” the peripheral vision. The sight field has a horizontal binocular (binocular) expansion of about 180-200 °; and vertically about 130 °.

vertikales and horizontal visual field

The field can be increased significantly through moving the eye muscles (range of vision). In this way, a range of approximately 270 ° can be covered solely horizontally. The glance field refers to the area that a standing man can grasp without moving his feet. With unrestricted movement of the torso, 360 ° can be detected visually in the horizontal.

The view of the goal and the positioning of the half-spaces creates a special effect. If we imagine a player can look effectively up to 50 meters forward from the center of the field (because after all, the field ends at some point), he can focus his attention on the goal or the spaces near the goal.

Angles of the central pass options

But if a player looks diagonally from the half-space towards goal (or from the spaces near the goal or the wing), he sees a lot more space and thus has, in theory, not only more options, but also significantly more space to work with.

Pass angle options from the halfspace

At the same time, the amount of space he doesn’t see is smaller. Because the player is in the half-space and (usually) has a diagonal field of view towards the goal or to the open field, he has less distance from the sideline and is facing away from it. Thus, there is little danger that he will be pressed from behind or come under great pressure.

The range of the diagonal pass works against the opponent’s movements much better than banal verticality. This is because the ball can go further and faster in addition to the nature of the more stable dynamics when the ball arrives at its destination. This also allows for a greater range from the diagonal passing game.

In addition, the half-space is not so close to the touchline that it can be used against the player, as is often the case with a winger. The half-space is thus the ideal intersection of “I have enough space” and “what I can’t see doesn’t matter anyway”.

This of course is not to be taken literally or overvalued. It is merely a clarification of the basic theoretical things in an ideal situation, which may not always happen in the game. One must therefore consider and evaluate these aspects depending on the situation; against some teams the wings may be the best means of attack.

Speaking of the attack, let’s look at the advantages of the half-spaces on offense. In essence, they provide a positive Dynamik for combination play and extra space.

The passing game

Due to the goal-oriented nature of football and the factor of the cover shadows, diagonal passes are an important alternative to vertical and horizontal passes.

Vertical passes are the fastest way to gain space. On the other hand, the view of the field is restricted for the pass receiver since he usually has his back to the opponent’s goal and can’t see what’s going on behind him. Also, if the receiver has an opponent on his back, he can’t turn towards goal and must play the ball back.

Horizontal passes primarily serve to shift play or switch sides and can also help escape pressure. But lateral passes don’t directly gain any space, so there is no pressure placed on the opponent’s goal.

A vertical or a horizontal pass can at most cause only a simple change of direction in the game, making the opponent’s movements less complex. For a square pass or a vertical pass, the opponent needs only move in the direction of the ball. In essence, either pass direction only results in a new and promising situation if the opposing team has a bad shape or the passes cause a change in direction. In a series of square passes from one side of the field to the other, the ball will pass through various valuable areas, but when it comes out the other side it will have the same theoretical starting point.

The same holds true for vertical passes, although they cause more danger because the vertical movement is (especially back to back) more difficult for the opponent to handle and they can get behind the defense for a direct chance. In general, there are exceptions to the “simplicity” of both passes in extreme zones like the penalty area, where they can lead directly to shots.

A diagonal pass, however, both directly gains space as well as shifts play, which means that the pass receiver has a good field of view and a safer opportunity to pass. The risk of a lack of pressure on the opponent from horizontal passes and the limited viewing angle from vertical passes are circumvented by the diagonal pass. Thus, diagonal passes combine the advantages of the vertical and horizontal passes, while neutralizing the respective drawbacks.

A diagonal pass causes the opponent to make a more complex movement than is the case from horizontal and vertical passes. The opponent must adjust both their direction and their height, not just one or the other. In most cases this requires the opposing players to behave somewhat asymmetrically. The individual defenders within the group must move slightly differently, which can lead to more errors.

What does this have to do specifically with the half-spaces? On the one hand, the goal-focus in the half-spaces often automatically results in diagonality. On the other hand, where the diagonal passes are played from is crucial. From the middle of the field a diagonal pass leads away from the goal; from the wings it heads towards goal, but from an isolated zone to a player who must be turned away from goal to accept the pass.

Again, the half-space combines two positive aspects and makes the disadvantages rudimentary. Diagonal passes go from the half-space either into the strategically important center or to the wing but with the ball aligned with the view of the field and directed towards goal. These advantages of the diagonality in the half-space and its underlying diagonal character are among the key features of this zone.

Furthermore, diagonal passes have an expansive character; to play a successful horizontal ball over 30 meters is as difficult as playing a vertical pass 30 meters, because the opponent can block the channels quickly. A diagonal pass can “cut” these vertical and horizontal lines, which gives a long ball a greater chance to arrive safely – in other words: the result is the opportunity to play a successful long pass. Another nice side effect: a diagonal through ball from the half-space into the middle simultaneously gains horizontal and vertical space.

Another factor of diagonality does not relate to passes, but to the opponent’s movements.

The trigonometry of the half-spaces

A vertical or horizontal movement is usually shorter than a diagonal motion with a similar effect; this is, of course, not absolute, but provides context. A team that is in a 4-2-4 and sets up their four strikers in front of the opponent’s four defenders and behind the four opposing midfielders, allows the opponent easy access to their strikers. But, if the forward line is more narrow, the two outside strikers/wingers will be in an intermediate position.

They are between their normal position and the center forward position and they are also between four rather than two opponents. While this sounds like it will cause unnecessary pressure and facilitate the opponent’s defensive work, the opposite is true. If the winger goes into this intermediate position, the opponent has to go a long way to cover them.

Let’s look at a sample calculation (yay, mathematics):

We have two lines of four; the midfield and the defense are ten meters from each other. Between them, at an imaginary limit of five meters, are the four opposition strikers. They are exactly in a vertical line with the midfielders and defenders of the opponent. Thus, each striker has five meters distance between two opponents and ten meters horizontally between their teammates.

For simplicity’s sake, assume that the backward run is equally as quick as the forward run.

We push the wingers into the middle and keep the full-backs of the opponent outside. We also assume that the wingers are indented exactly five meters. Now the full-back and the winger of the opposing team does not need to move five meters, but about seven (7.0710678); So about two more meters are required to generate pressure on the winger who will have a little more space and time to react.

But again the question pops up: where does the half-space have its special advantage over other areas. In a central intermediate position a player would be diverted from the goal if the opponent moves up; also, by indenting their wide players to cover the central players the opponents block the middle well and direct passes to the wings.

Pass through the midfield to the center forward. Not only can the opponent stay relatively simple with their shape, but the defender also has a simpler protection when pushing up to take the attacker, can guide the receiver to the side and has a shorter path in his approach.

There, the defensive unit shifts again and establishes their basic formation. On the wings, one can not take an intermediate position in this respect. In the half-space, however, a central player is ideally drawn out or at least put in a bind without allowing the defender to force the attacker’s movement. As in the previous situation, it does opens the wings, but to a lesser extent, making them easier to handle; which is just as effective.

Here the field of view is directed at attacking the middle, the full-back has a slightly longer distance to move and the opponent is somewhat unorganized. 

In addition, the center is not occupied and is therefore free to play with Dynamik. Direct layoffs from the intermediate position in the half-space can provoke the closest central player to move out of position; particularly a short twist or “opening” back towards him. This means that the pass receiver is positioned with his field of view in the direction of the central player or is turning to suggest so, causing them to be lured into pressing. A player can then more easily put in a through ball and, thanks to the strategic nature of the middle, have options in every direction; Atletico Madrid and Red Bull Salzburg under Schmidt often tried to take advantage of these schemes.

Against back three variants this looks a bit different; in certain circumstances there is a possible central intermediate position where a narrow back three effectively opens up two channels.

This positioning causes the opponent other tactical problems. FC Barcelona played from 2008-09 to 2010-11 with a front three that deliberately focused on the half-spaces and the “intermediate positions” in those zones. This was especially the case in their two successful Champions League seasons. Henry and Messi (or Eto’o) and Villa and Pedro moved from a wide position into the opposing channels. The three of them were able to bind four players while the wings were used by the advancing full-backs.

To this end, there is also a small example. Suppose the opponent played in a 4-4-1-1 defensively. Because of the positioning of the strikers and full-backs they were often forced into a 6-2-2 formation (instead of a 4-4-2) on defense, in which Xavi and Iniesta often played into the defensive and offensive half-spaces. Their ball circulation caused the two sixes to have to run a lot and because of Busquets they had one more man in midfield.

This was associated with the variable positions taken up by the two eights, the short passing game of Barcelona, and the flexible movements of the wingers and full-backs; alternating between sometimes being lower, sometimes higher, sometimes narrower and sometimes wider. In the 2010-11 season, it was of course the constant dropping off from the deep play-making number nine (Messi) which provided an additional player in the second third and in the half-spaces.

The fear of the opposing central defenders to take on Messi – which Guardiola mentioned – was created by the depth provided by the indented wingers. They tied up two to four players as they threatened to break through the channels between the full-back and center back when the opposition defenders pushed forward to take on Messi.

This is also important: the binding of the player to the zones and shapes produced this effect and must therefore always be seen in context. These special features of the half-space occupation are extremely interesting, as Barcelona were able to show under Guardiola. This variable and often simultaneous occupation of the two half-spaces on offense, especially with Messi and Iniesta, leads us to another interesting tactical aspect.

Half-space switches and shifting play between the half-spaces

Under the aegis of Guardiola, Messi and Iniesta often occupied the half-spaces in the gaps in the opponent’s midfield, one level further forward than Villa and Pedro. In their passing play they often either let the ball bounce in an open area behind them or rotated into the open space in front of them. As a result of Messi and Iniesta positioning themselves in the midfield half-spaces, they had Busquets and Xavi as central passing options. Because of this, Barcelona could quickly switch to the half-spaces on the attack, which was a hugely effective strategy in their possession style:

A pass into the half-space channel pulled the opposing team into that zone. The key players here mostly tried to establish access and because the winger was bound by the Barcelona full-back, the second central player had to cover the open space. From a back-pass into the midfield, Xavi had two options for an incisive pass: the pass through the central channels or into the channel in the half-space, where Messi was. Xavi could also play the ball square to Busquets to get a direct vertical pass to Messi.

Iniestas walk in the half-space can be used as a pass combination, as well for opening up holes and moving the opposing defense. In both cases the half-space is a very interesting area to make things as complex as possible for the opponent as well as opening up the channels and passing lanes.

Again, the use of the half-space is crucial because it binds the central player. On a pass to the wing the opponent’s block remains compact. On a central pass, the opponent’s two central midfielders move together and the retreat to their previous positions is simple. The half-space, however, has an opening effect on the middle, which makes the half-space a strategically opportunistic component.

Theoretically, one could even argue that the half-space is superior to the middle. From the half-space, both the middle and the wing are options. But from the midfield there are only the two identical half-spaces, which both have the same end product and a clear path to goal. Direct shifts from one half-space to the other are particularly effective. Bayern Munich were already making use of this under Heynckes and have continued to do so under Guardiola (especially in the game against City) with Ribery and Robben.

A shift from one half-space to the other offers several different perspectives and is the ideal intersection of a great number of strategic factors. The ball does not traverse only one zone (ie from midfield to the half-space or from the half-space to the near wing), which wouldn’t require the opposing defense to move much; or three zones (from the half-space to the far wing or vice versa) or more (wing to wing), which would give the opponent too much time to adjust to be truly effective. The time component of the pass length on the opponent’s movement is not adversely affected by direct half-space shifts. The passer and the receiver are close enough to be able to play a flat or at least chipped pass, which is not difficult to handle or play with precision. Furthermore, the opponent must move quickly or gaps will form that can be used for vertical passes to the strikers.

The switch across two zones seems to be the best option. In the middle, however, the only option for crossing two zones horizontally is to play to the wings, making it less valuable. From the wings, the middle can be played, but there are drawbacks in other strategic aspects and it would be practically difficult due to the shifting of the opponent and the boundary of the touchline. Nevertheless, passes on the wings are used, even by Bayern or Barcelona, so that the opponent will be pulled to the wings and allow the attackers to move into the midfield and attack the retreating defense with a lot of freedom. Often the winger will then move into the half-space and offer themselves up for a pass.

Thus, the half-space shifts are more effective, from a strategic point of view, because they move the ball from one space to another space with a similar freedom of choice and function. One might even argue that a direct shift from one wing to the other is no longer practical (due to the technical complexity, isolating the wing, pressure on the wings), the half-space on the far wing, however, is still within the realm of feasibility.

The middle, however, does not offer the opportunity to go into a third zone. Also, to make a direct backward shift from half-space to half space (from the wing to wing) is likely to be difficult. A direct switched ball from the touchline is also difficult to play due to the nature of the wing and the more limited space. At the same time, a backwards shift provides rather interesting tactical, psychological, and strategic opportunities that can cause the opponent, especially a ball-oriented or man-oriented team, huge problems; generally, backwards shifts are a rarely mentioned, underestimated and underused aspect in football.

Also, this feature of the half-space in terms of shifting play is higher valued both qualitatively and quantitatively. The same is the case with swapping positions and overloads in the half-spaces.

Switching positions, overloads and half-space features

The half-spaces have the benefits of being close to the other zones and offering more choices to the attacker; one can therefore combine with players from the wings and the middle. While the same is true of the middle, it doesn’t offer the same synergy. If the players all slide to the middle then it lacks the potential of shifting the ball over two zones to the flanks. Meaning: if you have the ball then you usually can’t leave the wings empty, otherwise it will be too tight in the middle. Usually both wingers are providing width and hugging the touchline, making them disappear as combination partners; this means (depending on the desired players on the wing) having two to four fewer combination options. In the half-spaces this is different.

The half-space is close to the wing. The nearest wide player is thus quite playable and not too far away. The players who are normally in the center and in the far half-space can also indent and operate closer to the half-space where the ball is without neglecting their zone. The far wing player can also indent more towards the center and take up a position in the half-space; something Jürgen Klopp often does with his far full-back. Now there is an interesting interaction between the time component and the opponents’ lack of space.

In the time component, it is the length of the shifted ball that supports the indenting; even if the winger indents more (and thus covers the far half-space player potentially indenting further), he is still playable on the wing. Once the ball-carrier sends off a switched ball, he can already be in motion and run to the wing. Once the long ball arrives, he is usually already close to the touchline. For an indirect shift with short passes between several players this works easily. As mentioned, if the ball is already lost, the indented wide player can indent further and immediately take up his proper position for ball-oriented shifting, thereby being less prone to counter attacks. Bayern took advantage of this with their false full-backs this past season; they let the actual width givers indent more in the first third, in order to open these spaces and overload the half-spaces and were good at counter-attacking in the strategically important central areas while being less protected on the wings.

The second interaction, with the opponent’s lack of space, is also easy to explain: If the ball is in the middle, then the opposing team is relatively stable there and mostly occupies the middle and the half-spaces; the wingers in a 4-4-2, for example, usually hover near the wing spaces because the time factor also affects the supporting shift. Until the ball comes to the side, that supposedly open side may be barred shut. But if the ball is in the half-space or on the wing, the far player needs to indent really far or they’ll have trouble maintaining the horizontal compactness needed. The wingers must also not stand very wide but next to the opponent’s formation in order to give width. This will enable them to indent and cover; allowing them to quickly provide better local compactness in the half-spaces while in possession.

Overloads of players from the strategically least important zone, the wings – especially in the protection of their own attacks – are thus possible; which brings us to the false full-backs of Bayern Munich again. The half-spaces can be quickly overloaded by players indenting a few meters and players swapping positions is no problem due to the high number of players in the three zones (half-space, middle, half-space) and the short distances between them. These position switches, the brief abandoning of the wing, and the general features of the half-space also provide other positive effects, which aren’t possible in the middle or on the wings.

Thus, the half-spaces also have a very collective nature; the possibility of rapid and targeted diagonal combinations, the harmony and feedback effects of the fields of view, and the way many players can combine ensures variety and constructiveness in a team’s play. This is interesting and important not only in the defensive and offensive game, but also in transition.

The half-spaces in transition

Anyone who deals with the Spanish and South American football school will often come across the phrase that the defense and offense are not separate but “one”. Therefore, the opportunities and benefits of half-spaces for the team in possession have been presented, but the importance of the half-space also applies to the defense.

Basically, the division of defense and attack is only helpful to directly consider the strategic aspects of certain situations and phases. What is behind this unity of defense and offense, is the mixing of many aspects that directly affect the other phase of the game. So a stable, intelligent, high-scale, and well-secured possession game supports the defense; a good press and counterpress also supports a decisive offense. The half-spaces have a special character in this regard.

If one plays very half-space oriented in possession, moving frequently from half-space to half-space and holding on the ball a long time within them, they not only have some offensive advantages but allow for the integration of some interesting pressing options on turnovers. For example, it’s possible that the far half-spaces are quickly filled and covered by the indenting of the far winger. The player in the half-space can go aggressively into the middle, pressure the opponent there and win back the ball or guide him towards the wing. The opponent must then either play around the block or counter over the zone where the ball just was and a relatively compact shape now stands. Likewise, counterpressing traps are possible, which are generated from the previous occupation of the half-spaces, making it easy to block the middle.

When transitioning from defense to offense the process is similar. A team that dominates the half-spaces in their defensive phase can either isolate the middle, where they will have a lot of access or guide the opponent to the wings. Then it is possible to go beyond the half-spaces, partly to open space (for example, passing the enemy on the wings, opening its half-spaces and then counterattacking there) and then use the half-space to create options. One can seek passes from the “heap”, i.e. the group around the ball and more easily and freely rotate to give a little bit more resistance to counterpressing. From the half-spaces one can play to the wing, move the game into the middle, or switch the ball to the far half-space.

Pressingtrap on Chelsea from Atlético. After winning the ball they can counter quite nicely, no?

In addition, most teams are fanned out wide when they are in possession: The width-giving effect of the wing is no longer needed in a direct counterattack as the half-space can provide it. The opponent has only a few players and more space to defend, so one can sufficiently pull the opposition apart across the half-spaces with less width in their attacking play; all without losing nearby passing options and Dynamik. At the same time this effectively gives the opponent space out wide, therefore a very narrow counterattack, e.g. the teams of Roger Schmidt, are still promising. Even for Schmidt, taking the center and the half-spaces plays a key role in understanding the threat of their counterattack.

But even if it is not used vertically, the half-space has a positive effective on transitions. Gladbach under Favre paired ball-oriented shifting with their tight, position-oriented coverage (both were at their peak in Favre’s second season) and always had a good occupation of the half-spaces and a collective narrowness in offensive transition. They could then either move forward with rapid one-touch combinations, like Reus and his offensive partners, or move away from the opponents’ counterpressing by playing backwards and build play forward with a deep, stable possession; Neustadter, Dante, and ter Stegen were natural players for this system. The halfspaces offer not only ideal connections to different horizontal, but vertical zones as well.

In a way, the half-spaces are a “connection zone” under the umbrella of the other various zones. One could see the middle as more of an “organization zone” while the wings are suited to breakthroughs. In theory, a division of the different characteristics of the zones that takes into consideration certain play styles (ball circulation method of defense, etc) is an interesting article for the future . . .

But first … let’s look at the reason why, among other things, the half-spaces have these characteristics and special tactical significance.

The special characteristics of the half-spaces in tactics history

The half-spaces have a fundamental strategic nature, which is reflected in their different consequences, interactions, and properties. However, the half-space derives its own character not just from these basic aspects but from tactical reasons.

One often has a small advantage in this zone against the most commonly used formations. The frequency of certain formations – and hence the positive tactical effects of half-spaces – are historical. Formations are ultimately, after all, only arrangements designed to meet a certain objective within a manager’s game philosophy. From different cultures and traditions, similar processes and formations evolved that are often synonymous with a particular country or playing style. Ultimately, formations are only heuristics, which intend to simplify a way of playing according to a specific philosophy handed down by the coach in training.

Formations are also created on the drawing board as an attempt at arranging the players, giving them a linear character. There are no circular formations or arbitrary distributions on the field, but clear structures in lines or at the most three triangles, which are mostly also organized in lines and merely used as a way to get things set up.

These two aspects – the nature of creating formations and the cultural characteristics in football – in combination with the previously mentioned way of categorizing the “middle” and “wings” ensures a very unique, specific character in the half-spaces. In short: because  players were/are never really planned to be in the half-spaces in the design of formations they can cause unpleasant effects in the shifting and combination options for the opponent; many teams move their central players a little towards the wing, others have turned to man-oriented play on the wings or – very often, especially in England – the wingers do not move towards the center of the field.

In all of these scenarios, the half-spaces are extremely effective and valuable. Because the half-spaces have historically never really been considered (excluding managers like Ernst Happel), they are often particularly effective and fatally surprising to opponents. So, for a long time, certain aspects of the usual, boring formations and standard movements have always been prone in the half-spaces. The horizontally unkompakte and generally symmetrical 4-4-2 of the 90s and 2000s is a prime example, whether in the buildup (spaces next to the passive strikers) or in the offensive game (widened gaps in the half-spaces). This was also due to the standard tactics like isolated wingers and their man-orienting. With a better shape and positioning, these formation problems can be fixed, but the vulnerabilities often remain and certain formations just have special characteristics that can be taken advantage of in their classical interpretation. The motto rings true: the ball runs faster.

Then there are the tactical and strategic aspects of the half-spaces and why they are effective against standard formations; the pass angles and gaps are generally easier to break with diagonal play and this effect is enhanced because of the wing and central orientation of opposing formations.

Imagine a team that is defending in a wide 4-4-2. Because they are wide, the half-spaces are open (their central players are in the middle and their wingers are on the wings). The attacking team moves two players into the half-space in a vertical line; one in the offensive half-space in midfield and the other into the attacking team’s own defensive half-space. Neither the six or the striker of the defending team will be able to cope with covering these players or their shifting movements. If the defending striker takes on his opponent he will concede space in midfield, harm the compactness of the formation and have problems establishing access. If the opponent was on the wing, he could at least be guided away and isolated from his teammates and if he was central the striker could more easily establish access. Furthermore, in the shift forward, the striker is usually at the same level and can’t protect the middle very well. In today’s space-oriented football, these problems are rare but have been seen. The English Premier League says hello. All of these circumstances beg the question:

Conclusion: Is the half-space better than the middle?

Out of sheer enthusiasm, it may seem like the half-spaces are not the second-but the most important area from a strategic perspective. Although the center has numerous benefits and is simply the closest zone to the goal, there are many similarities between the half-space and center in terms of advantages. Furthermore, the half-spaces are complemented with more variability: From the center you can play on two similar things, from the half-space two different zones, e.g. even the middle. There is also the following effect; to play from the half-space into the middle is, due to the synergy effects (the shifting of the opponents and the momentary opening of spaces for direct passes into the forwards), more effective than playing from the middle into the half-space or trying to overload within the middle two zones.

Then there is the natural diagonal character of the half-space. Central fields of view are vertical and the combination play requires you to divert yourself somewhat from the goal. In the half-space, the basic options and the eight directions of movement remain, but the field of view is directed towards goal. Also the practical negotiating of two zones and the long-range shifted ball is more effective from the half-space than the wing. In the middle there are two sides to which the ball can move two zones and in the half-space there is only one. However, in the half-space there is the potential to shift the ball over three zones to the other half-space, which is probably the most optimal location to switch play – from wing to wing the ball must travel so fast that it becomes almost impossible to control.

All in all, the discussion here is already too technical. The fact is that the half-spaces are rarely mentioned in the public media, although they belong to the standard vocabulary of Jürgen Klopp in his game analysis and Josep Guardiola explicitly coaches them when training positional play and is strategically important . This article aims to give a broad overview of the strategic aspects of the half-spaces even though we are just scratching the surface here; individual tactical aspects and dribbling options or even passing options (such as how the half-space affects the potential for through balls) as well as the tactical processes for the defending the half-space are all topics for a future article.

Our new author at Spielverlagerung.com, AO has, incidentally, also written tactic theoretical articles on the half-spaces that are here and here find.

Note: SV-reader Burrinho4 wrote in this and this tweet two interesting aspects, as well as TheSoulcollector in this comment . TW colleague then asked in a private chat, if the half-space is static / playing field dependent or dynamic / opponent dependent. My answer to him and in some ways, Burrinho and TSc, is that the half-space is dynamic, but depends on the situation and dynamics. That is also the reason why ball-oriented shifting and compactness work (internally referred to as the concept of “Strategieraumkongestion”). For me there is also the effective field, the playable, the played, the potential and the actual; in which the half-spaces, their position and texture vary. But that is for another article, as well as one about separating zones for training and strategy. Regarding the latter I have found here a worthwhile article from our SV-mate Marco Henseling.

Gegenpressing has been a buzzword in football tactics for the last five years and has garnered more and more attention in the media recently. Because of the success of FC Barcelona and Borussia Dortmund, gegen- or counterpressing has been brought up as one of the main reasons for their titles. BVB, in particular, is defined by their style. However, the media often shows a lack of understanding as to what counterpressing really is.

What is Gegenpressing?

Gegenpressing means to press the opposition right after losing possession, i.e. to press as an organized unit the moment you transition to defense. The entire team hunts the ball and, in the ideal case, immediately wins it back from the opponent. The aim is twofold; to prevent the opponent’s counterattack and to win the ball. The English, and even the Spanish and Italians, call it counterpressing and not “Gegenpressing”; in the end the opponent’s counterattack is pressured. In 2008, Jürgen Klinsmann spoke of “immediate ball recovery” and struck at the heart of the matter very well.

How does one use Gegenpressing successfully?

There are several prerequisites for successful counterpressing. The decisive factor is the overall positioning of the team and their playing style right before attempting to counterpress. The players must play as close to one another as possible so that they can press together as a unit right after the ball is lost – which is a given in short passing football. At the same time, they should not stick so close to one another that they neglect to cover enough space. Usually, a good layout in possession and a good shape behind the lost ball go hand in hand.

Some trainers use the basic rule of thumb to “occupy the fewest possible zones with individual players, but the greatest possible distance between the players within those zones so that they don’t occupy the same space” to make the positioning simple to understand; although, with a rule of thumb like this, some aspects are lost in terms of complexity.

lemma of zonal positioning

Many teams also have problems deciding when to stop pressing, i.e. when do you stop pressing if you can’t win the ball back? When should you retreat? How long should you press and with how many players? This is particularly problematic because the position of the ball is always changing. Therefore, there is a commonly used theory – the five second rule. Immediately after losing the ball the team should press at top speed and with maximum intensity for five seconds.

If the team hasn’t recovered the ball within five seconds and there is no chance of immediately winning it, they should fall back into their defensive formation. Depending on the team, the number of seconds may vary. It is recommended that the strategic basics of Gegenpressing be coached in order to develop a flexible, situation-specific length of time for counterpressing.

It is also important that the team respond very quickly and with anticipation. When possession changes, the players should already be running; next, it is important for the motor response and cognitive reaction to accurately match the manner of the opponent winning the ball and the situation and the anticipation of the possession change. The player must always expect that possession could come, but at the same time assign to the situation a certain percentage and behave accordingly. The observation of the situation and the shape is important.

Tactical aspects to consider

There are a few aspects which should be implemented for an accurate Gegenpressing. Blocking the center of the field is important for a successful implementation. In the middle of the field, the opponent has more options when it comes to rotation, field of vision, and passing. Even if a player arcs their run to block one side of the field, the opponent will have the other entire half of the field to work with. Ideally, the opponent who recovers the ball will be forced in the direction of the touchline or back towards his own goal and away from the center of the field. There, he will have no opportunity to rotate and his choices will be limited, which will also rob him of the most effective and quickest path towards goal, as any counterattack will take longer.

Ideally, the opponent will be surrounded from the center out, forcing him to play backwards or square passes and thus isolating him from his teammates. This naturally raises the question of who ultimately won the ball. Some teams only try to cut off the opponent on the ball and attack him passively. Which is good, as one will not be outplayed and the nearest presser has a chance to recover the ball. But, at the same time, the opponents can move freely, slow the game down, and generate more options for themselves.

Another option is to run directly at the ball carrier; the opponent is simply pressed aggressively as possible, one does not slow down first or establish the ominous “basketball distance” when challenging for the ball. As a result, the opponent has less time, the pace is quicker, and you can attack more aggressively. At the same time, you will lose the challenge more often, be outplayed or commit fouls.

A final method is to deliberately run past the opponent. The opponent will not be slowed down, but the first counterpressing player has no intention of winning the ball. He should merely hand off the opponent and retain his own original position in the cover shadow. As a result, the tempo here is extremely quick and the opponent will be forced into a specific action to which the pressing team can more easily react. The next player attacks and can then win the ball easier. An interesting side note: after the ball is recovered, you can immediately play a clear pass to the player who has run past the opponent. “Clear” here means that the distance is suitable, space is gained, and the teammate knows from the previous situation that he is in front of an opponent.

Another article on Gegenpressing with playing examples can be found here (in German).

What are the coverage variants?

There are basically four counterpressing variants for the various coverages.

In man-oriented Gegenpressing, one looks for an opponent to cover immediately after his team loses the ball. A player runs up, cuts off the opponent,and forces him into a follow-up action. Usually a pass comes to a player and only after the pass does the ball recovery occur. All nearby passing options should be put under immediate pressure, so that the opponent cannot get free and escape the pressure. FC Bayern practiced this style under Jupp Heynckes.

Heynckes’ manoriented counterpress

Another option is leeway-oriented counterpressing. Here, there is relatively little consideration for the opponent. Instead, one focuses on the ball carrier, the ball itself, and the surrounding area. The entire team presses in the direction of the ball and seeks to generate the greatest possible pressure. This pressure should force errors, enable the team to cover and support the first pressing player, and simultaneously absorb the nearby passing options in their cover shadow. This intense pressure often causes the opponent to immediately lose the ball or kick it long. BVB have used this style under Jürgen Klopp.

Klopp’s space- or leewayoriented counterpress

In passing lane-oriented counterpressing the opponent will also be placed under pressure by a player, but here, as in the man-oriented version, the opponent is allowed to make the first pass. In contrast to the man-oriented counterpressing, however, the pass receiver is not attacked, but the pass itself. The aim is to set up between some opponents and then, after the ball is passed, to flexibly recover the ball, trap the pass, or – if things go wrong – have two people press the pass receiver. FC Barcelona used this style often under Pep Guardiola.

Guardiola’s passing lane oriented counterpress

For ball-oriented Gegenpressing a team simply goes towards the ball without regard for a loss of structure. This means that, on the one hand, a team can achieve maximum pace and aggression, but, on the other hand, will be vulnerable and simplistic. In the 70s, Ajax and the Netherlands national team practiced this style, as did SV Grödig under Adi Hütter last season.

Adi Hütter’s balloriented counterpress at Grödig

Nevertheless, one must not assume – and as a coach must not require – that a certain type of cover always be used. It usually depends on the situation and the options available, which are presented by a team’s shape and the type of lost ball. In most cases it is a mixture of these four coverages.

Why is Gegenpressing important?

It is plain to see that Gegenpressing is tactically complex, difficult to perfect, and a physically demanding style. The question is, naturally, why should Gegenpressing be practiced and what are the advantages. The most important factor is defensive stability.

• Defensive Stability!

In modern football, most teams can transition very quickly: the players sprint forward at high speed, the players on the ball are technically skilled, and with the ball at their feet can quickly break through spaces and play good passes. The players are also tactically trained so that the strikers or the wingers are already searching for space to exploit, which makes the counterattack even more dangerous. Furthermore, it is at the moment a team loses the ball that they are disorganized, while many teams have established a philosophy of quick, vertical transitions.

If a team attempts to retreat to their defensive positions, then the opponent can advance up the field along with their retreat and quickly gain space as well as play dangerous attacks. Gegenpressing, however, drives the opponent backwards and prevents that. It thereby increases defensive stability; excluding poor implementations, naturally. Yet, Gegenpressing both prevents the opposition counterattack and makes it more difficult to be countered.

• Avoiding lost space and a lack of organization

This aspect goes hand in hand with the first. Even if you could consistently win the ball at a similar level to a good Gegenpressing by retreating, it would not avoid the loss of space and organization. After the ball is recovered you would be deeper and in a defensive shape. The great advantage of Gegenpressing is that the ball is normally recovered in an offensive shape and in a higher position on the field. As you were previously in possession, your players were positioned to attack. A quick ball recovery ensures that you can revert back to your attack. In addition, the opposition will often fan out and open up space that wasn’t available before; this synergy ensures the third great advantage, the increased offensive presence.

• Improved offense!

After the ball is won in high zones via Gegenpressing, you can either “counter” or “gegenkontern” against a team which has just moved into forward gear. They will be poorly shaped in an unsuitable Dynamik, because they want to establish a broad and deep formation out of a narrow one; while at the same time your team are compact around the ball.

While the pace of the opponent’s transitions is screwed up and your team is in a more advantageous shape (see point 2), you can immediately attack the retreating opponent or circulate the ball higher up the field. It is not for nothing that Jürgen Klopp has called Gegenpressing the “best playmaker in the world.”

Why does Gegenpressing work?

It should be of some interest to coaches as to why Gegenpressing works at all. It is important that your team makes the “first step” in Gegenpressing. If you fall back or retreat, the opponent can be proactive while your team becomes reactive. So, you have to follow the opponent’s choices rather than making your own. The advantage of making the first decision and the first step is that you set the rules and can play specific structures. It also puts you in a better position to act and determine what to do next. The exact application is then only a question of implementation; the biggest advantage is the “first step.”

That it functions not only in theory but in practice and is simply a motor and technical aspect is crucial. The opponent must contemplate during the ball recovery how to attack. This ranges from the looking at the situation and searching for passing options, to the fact that he has to handle the ball first-time when receiving it – which is sometimes even more difficult and technically complicated than receiving a difficult and hard pass. To get into a suitable position to handle this ball, (including making the decision) takes time and can be taken advantage of by a fast, aggressive counter pressing.

There is hardly any moment where an individual player is more prone to pressing than immediately after winning the ball. And that is the big secret to the success of Gegenpressing.

“Juego de Posicion” is a widely unknown concept in Austria and Germany. To coaches in Spain and the Netherlands it is a philosophical ideal that few know how to coach. In German-speaking countries, however, “Positionsspiel” has a different, more simple definition that loses many of the important aspects. But, more importantly, what is “Juego de Posicion”?

An Offensive Concept

Juego de Posicion comes down to giving the offense a set of guidelines to play within a structured scheme. The playing field is divided into specific zones with four vertical lines and some horizontal lines. Here is an example from Pep Guardiola and FC Bayern’s Säbener Straße:

Guardiola’s pitch

The players will have specific tasks and responsibilities within these zones depending on the phase of the game. The unique thing about this concept is that the options are predetermined by the position of the ball. If the ball is on the left wing at midfield, then the zones that must be occupied are entirely different than when the ball is on the right half of your own 18 yard box. The team must use continuous ball-oriented shifts when in possession. These shifts must be coordinated to give the team as many passing options and running lanes as possible while simultaneously causing the opposition problems. Short passes, switched balls, and the rotation of the ball’s position are all important tools that are defined by the complex positional tasks assigned to the players.

Is it dogmatic?

Is this how Guardiola’s pitch always looks like?

This basic idea is used by Louis van Gaal who is also accused of being highly dogmatic and using a rigid system. However, this misses the point. The goal of “Juego de Posicion” (or “Positiespel”) is that the zones and the tasks within them are flexible and can be occupied and used by different players. There are usually problems in the implementation in training or the adjustment and understanding of the players. Rigid positions and an extremely dogmatic style are created specifically for when the players don’t know when to leave their positions or aren’t confident in the other positions.

There are also guidelines for this. Triangles should be formed in order to maintain short passing combinations. The ball carrier should have two or, ideally, three passing options (in diamond rather than triangle shapes) nearby. Further passing options extend from these shapes and should arise throughout the team in an organized and connected manner. The triangles emerge from the fact that no more than three players may be in a line horizontally and no more than two players in a line vertically. If a player moves onto the same line as another player in order to offer himself for a pass, the other must switch to another line.

By doing so, you can pass around the opponent or draw him in and then shift. At Bayern, you can see this on the wing; if Robben hugs the touchline, then the full-back indents or pushes inward. However, if the full-back pushes to the wing, then the winger moves towards the half-space. This ensures the nearest eight or the defender at the back always have two passing options.

The pass patterns, the formation and the tasks of the ball carrier and the players near the ball depends on the playing philosophy of the coach. Thus, in addition to the positions occupied and the short passes, the possession and rotation of the ball is crucial. This can also lead to dogmatism.

Possession as a tool: Possession is not a philosophy

The fundamental reason behind the high possession percentage of “Juego de Posicion” is that the rotation of the ball is a tool to outplay and open the opposition. You allow the opponent to shift, lure him in, and open specific spaces or play through balls to win space. “Dominating possession” is not just a Spanish or Dutch playing philosophy, but a tool of “Juego de Posicion.”

Could a grid also look like this?

It is not an end in itself but is designed to move the opponent so that you can get through them with your attacks. Only if that doesn’t work are you allowed to circulate the ball for a moment without attempting to attack. You regroup, take shape around the opposition and try again. However, there is also a perversion of this idea that causes a lot of criticism.

Possession as a Philosophy and the resulting misunderstanding of Spain’s Tikinaccio

If possession alone is the philosophy, then there are problems. The Spanish national team under Del Bosque has not implemented “Juego de Posicion” yet the Spaniards have always enjoyed a lot of possession. This was primarily used in 2010 and 2012 as a defensive method. This “Tiki taka” does not reflect the basic intent of “Juego de Posicion” and can be practiced without even using positional play.

Teams that use tiquitaca are often susceptible to having a lot of ineffective possession. This is not a tactical method but a consequence of lacking effective positional play. It will be difficult to generate attacks, requiring you to restart your buildup over and over again, and in doing so become sluggish, which leads to absurd possession numbers.

This should not, however, lead to criticism of positional play itself. It is a neutral concept that has many advantages and does not follow a particular philosophy.

Conclusion

As you can see, Juego de Posicion is an interesting offensive concept which is often neglected in many other countries. Every coach has his own mechanisms and can install his own patterns into the structure. The basic ideas can also be used on defense. Roger Schmidt uses similar zones to Pep Guardiola to serve as landmarks for his team’s defensive work.

Schmidt’s pitch

Coaching this style is complex. The trainer must be aware of the impact of the ball’s position on the structure of the game and know the characteristics of his players in order to design the formation, processes, and tasks; not to mention how he will coach them. A coach has several tools for training the concept including verbal coaching, using lines painted on the field as landmarks, designing situational exercises, and creating  training games.

You can find the original, German article on abseits.at under this link. Adin will soon publish a big article on the topic on SV.com while I am planning a series about JdP on our German site.

14 out of 19 trophies were won in his time at FC Barcelona. 4 trophies out of a possible 6 were won in his first season with Bayern Munich. This piece will analyze the Juego de Posicion football philosophy of Pep Guardiola in his second season with Bayern Munich. The Italians know it as “Giochi di Posizione[1]” and the Dutch call it “Positiespel.” In English we will call this philosophy of football “Positional Play.” Viewing football through the prism of Positional Play is perhaps the main reason for the success of one of the greatest football coaches in history.

*Note: I expanded upon the philosophy of Positional Play in an interview with LeftWingSoccer. The interview is a follow up to this piece which includes questions about Positional Play coaching, tactics, strategy, and more! You can find the interview here.

The Principles of Positional Play

Positional Play is a philosophy that has many principles but the fundamental principle is the search for superiority. There are various ways to gain superiority and various types of superiority that can be achieved. Once superiority is found the team can use the situation to dominate the game. All other principles stem from this idea as mentioned in this extract from an exclusive interview I had with Marti Perarnau[2]:

“Positional Play does not consist of passing the ball horizontally, but something much more difficult: it consists of generating superiorities behind each line of pressure. It can be done more or less quickly, more or less vertically, more or less grouped, but the only thing that should be maintained at all times is the pursuit of superiority. Or to put it another way: create free men between the lines.

Positional Play is a model of constructed play, it is premeditated, thought about, studied and worked out in detail. The interpreters of this form of play know the various possibilities that can occur during the game and also what their roles should be at all times. Naturally, there are better and worse interpretations. There are also players that never manage to adapt to this model of play, which however, are sensational players and they manage to contribute many virtues to their team.

But in general, the interpreters of this model need to know the catalog of movements that need to be executed in depth. As in any piece of music, one same score gives rise to many different interpretations: faster, slower, more harmonious… more or less a concrete interpretation that you like, but what should be kept in any case is that the tune is similar to the original. Positional Play is a musical score played by each team who practice it at their own pace, but it is essential to generate superiorities behind each line of the opponent pressure. The team that interpreted Positional Play in a most extraordinary way was the Barcelona of Pep Guardiola.

When the coach left, the team continued playing the same game,but they were gradually losing focus and intensity in fundamental movements to the point that it became a very flat and predictable variation of play with a tendency to pass horizontally that ultimately reduces the possibilities of generating superiorities after lines of pressure of the opponent. This was one of the main problems Barca suffered in the last two seasons, although it was not the only one.

In Bayern Munich, Guardiola has promoted the Positional Play that Louis van Gaal introduced five years ago. But the one Bayern is practicing right now is a game that is much more oriented to a vertical axis than a horizontal one and this version requires a high degree of technical excellence because it seeks to construct the above mentioned superiorities not based on horizontal but vertical passes. This is an extremely ambitious interpretation of Positional Play.”

– Marti Perarnau

Superiority in positioning is necessary to be able to penetrate the opponent’s defensive lines, move the ball efficiently, and to have stability in possession. One form of superiority is numerical superiority. Having a numbers advantage means that your team has a free man. The goal is to find the free or unmarked man by moving the ball, positioning, or player movement. The free man in your attack has the best situation on the field and is very valuable to the attack. This is exemplified in this quote by Juan Manuel Lillo[3]:

“Look for the 3rd man (free man) to be able to turn and face the play.”

 – Juan Manuel Lillo

For example, when trying to escape pressure it is recommended your team looks to play a long flat pass to the 3rd man. This is a key principle in avoiding counter attacks. The 3rd player provides an option for a long pass and as a result as they usually have more space and a more efficient view of the field. It is common to see the top teams execute a layoff pass after playing a long escape pass.

A long pass generates pressure at its destination as it gives the defense more time to read its flight as well as more time to arrive. So, once a long pass escapes pressure and the pressure gathers near the destination of the pass the ball is laid off to another teammate. This allows the ball to be given to a player who now has a better view of the field and much less pressure around him than the player who played the layoff pass.

The free man must always be supported in order to take advantage of their value. To provide this support, Guardiola’s teams usually underload the farthest point away from the ball, i.e. they leave the furthest diagonal point roughly unoccupied while the team supports areas around the ball aggressively.

These underloaded areas are the least important for the immediate play, though they also play a role. Guardiola’s teams seek to have superiority in the center of the field. Permanently occupying the center means that players always have an option to pass to. The manner in which Guardiola’s players support each other means that the player will always have at least 2, and preferably 3, passing options.

This of course forms triangles and diamonds in the playing structure. An infamous example of Pep abandoning this principle is the 0-4 loss to Real Madrid in the Allianz Arena. His Bayern team played in a 4-2-4 formation which meant that the central areas were not controlled and the players in the center were not supported. This area of isolation caused Bayern to lose the ball in dangerous areas and have difficulty generating dangerous attacks.

A classic example in the search for numerical superiority in Positional Play is called “Salida Lavolpiana,” or “The way out of La Volpe[4].” This is a variation of progressing the ball out of the back in possession. Many times Pep will have players drop into the defensive line if the opponents pressure with the same number of attackers as Pep’s defenders. The value of this idea is mentioned here by Lillo:

“Positional Play consists of generating superiorities out of the defensive line against those who are pressing you. Everything is much easier when the first progression of the ball is clean.”

– Juan Manuel Lillo

Using the goalkeeper is also another way to establish superiority out of defense, progress past the opposition lines and move up the field to create an advantageous attack. Salida Lavolpiana is a variation in which the central defenders fan out wide and a central midfielder drops into the resulting space. This briefly creates a back 3 in addition to having the goalkeeper as a base for the progression of the ball.

This is used most often when an opponent pressures 2 central defenders with 2 strikers. This movement creates a 3 vs. 2 situation out of defense, meaning a free man is available. The fullbacks push up into midfield as the central defenders fan out not only to provide a pass option, but in order to provide numerical superiority in midfield as well. This ascending superiority provides an advantageous path towards the opponent goal. Juan Manuel Lillo mentions this as one of the principles of this style of play:

“Pass to the next lines of play.”

– Juan Manuel Lillo

Pep Guardiola uses these principles of play himself, as everyone has become accustomed to seeing the wide central defenders and the midfielders dropping into the defensive line. Marti Perarnau talked about the origin of Salida Lavolpiana here:

“Although in Spain it became common in the 2009-2010 season of Josep Guardiola with FC Barcelona, it is in Mexico where this concept is used most. La Volpe practiced this with his teams since the mid90s, including the Mexican National Team during the time when Guardiola played for Dorados de Sinaloa, during a time when the Catalan coach could approach La Volpismo .”

– Marti Perarnau

Another form of superiority is one of qualitative superiority. This is an idea that is well known. Searching for 1 vs. 1’s, 2 vs. 2’s, and more with your best players vs the opponent’s worst players is a common strategy in football. This is perfectly exemplified in this quote by Paco Seirul-Lo[5]:

“There’s numerical, positional, and qualitative superiority. Not all 1 vs. 1’s are a situation of equality”

– Paco Seirul-Lo

As mentioned in the above quote by Paco there is another form of superiority besides the 2 already mentioned. This is a superiority of space or positional superiority. In this form of play the players are arranged at various heights and depths. This staggering creates interior spaces and passing lanes within the opposition’s formation. There is a large focus on the spaces “in between the lines.” Players look to position themselves in areas between the opponent’s horizontal and vertical lines of defense.

There are specific zones that must be occupied by players in specific moments. The specific zones or positions that must be occupied depend on various circumstances. A certain set of players within the team occupy the specific zones in relation to the ball, though the players who do this can vary because of the flexible interchanging of roles. A player determines where they will move by referencing the position of the ball, their teammates, the opponents, and space. Arrigo Sacchi[6] made a similar point when speaking about the defending of his great AC Milan team:

“Our players had four reference points: the ball, the space, the opponent, and their own teammates. Every movement had to happen in relation to these reference points. Each player had to decide which of these reference points should determine his movements.”

– Arrigo Sacchi

These superiorities or overloads provide interesting effects in the game. Combinations become tighter and quicker when a space is overloaded. It’s possible to break through the defense on the near side of the field, to open spaces on the far side of the field, and it allows for the stable possession.

The staggering of your team’s positioning in possession directly translates into better structure when counterpressing after the ball is lost. Counterpressing refers to pressing the ball immediately after possession is lost; a well known factor of Pep Guardiola’s teams. The offensive and defensive aspects of the game cannot be separated in Positional Play.

The team’s offensive ideas have a direct impact on their defensive work. Therefore, the team’s ideas in possession set the tone for all other aspects of the match. Guardiola even has a “15-pass rule,” in which he believes that his team cannot be properly prepared to cope with transitions or build a well structured attack until they have completed at least 15 passes. This provides enough time and stability for players to move into their roles within the offensive structure and strategy. Johan Cruyff[7] talked about the success of Barcelona in defensive transition due to their aggressive ball-oriented support while in possession here:

“Do you know how Barcelona win the ball back so quickly? It’s because they don’t have to run back more than 10 metres as they never pass the ball more than 10 metres.”

– Johan Cruyff

Oscar Moreno[8] elaborates on the importance of controlling all phases of the game simultaneously here:

“Provoke the proximity of the maximum number of opposition players around the ball. Recuperate the ball imminently when lost in spaces where we are united. Divide the play of rival team while not dissociating ours. All with the idea of having awareness of, during the prices of attacking, I am generating the futures conditions defensively or vise versa.”

– Oscar Moreno

This relates both to defensive stability coming from offensive stability, and another aspect of the way Guardiola sees football. For Pep, this also applies to the idea that general concepts within the phases shouldn’t be separated. Some concepts which are used exclusively for defense can also be used for offense.

For example, in football the defense are the ones that are proactive, meaning that they determine how the game will be played due to them defending their zones in order to block access to the goal. The defense makes the rules, the offense reacts to the defense and try to score goals to win. Pep tries to change the state of modern football, while other managers attempt to win the game.

His offense attempts to be the proactive one, to determine how the game of football will be played, to take away the control of the game from the defense. Meaning the offense determine how the defense will react instead of the defense determining how the offense will play with the ball. He uses the ball to manipulate the defense. This is a key shift in the balance for control in a football match.

To add onto this idea, through hard training his players are able to work well with each other to control phases of the game where nobody seems to be in any real control. For example, when Pep’s teams lose the ball they counterpress immediately, as mentioned above. This means that even in transition phases they seek to act rather than to react to the change in play and rhythm.

They press immediately and determine what the opponent will do in the moment of transition, rather than dropping off and allowing the opponent to decide how they will transition. They cope with all conditions of the game better than the opponents do. The conditions for all of these concepts to come into play are constantly being generated, even while in possession and creating the offensive structure.

Within the structures created in possession, a main principle of supporting the ball is creating triangles or preferably diamonds. Formations are not entirely important to Pep Guardiola. They are merely numbers. He cares more about the perfect coverage of the field in relation to the ball.

Forming triangles allows players to have better orientation on the field and creates uniformity in movement. Depending on the ball’s position the players will position themselves in a way that allows them to move it into important areas of the pitch. If the ball is on the left flank in attack, the positions that must be occupied are completely different than the positions that must be occupied if the ball is in front of your own penalty box.

Players can perform specific movements while in these positions in relation to each other. These include but are not limited to: overlapping runs, diagonal inside runs, and providing a back pass option. There are general “rules” within these methods of structuring the player’s positioning in relation to the ball. These do not have to be followed strictly but are recommended to provide continuity and flow to the game. The idea is that a maximum of 3 players may occupy a horizontal line on the field at one time, while a maximum of 2 players may occupy a vertical line at one time.

If a system has natural triangles in its design than it is that much easier for the players to form triangles in possession. This is one of the many reasons we see formations with variations like 4-3-3 or 3-4-3 being used in teams who play this way. Every player is connected to one another and they move like chains throughout the field in order to have the best structure in possession and support their teammates and the ball. Oscar Moreno mentions the interconnectedness of all the players on the field here:

“Every action implies the subsequent action for receiving the ball.”

– Oscar Cano

Another key principle of Position Play is the manipulation of the opponent.

“The objective is to move the opponent, not the ball.”

– Pep Guardiola

Every single action that happens on the field must have a purpose. The ball doesn’t move just to move. The ball is moved in order to move the opponent, to gather them on one side while you plan to attack the other. Every pass has the intention of building up to the action of eliminating opponents. If it isn’t possible to eliminate opponents then the players will keep the ball and look to get the opponents to move out of position. The ability to do any of these actions is supported by the structure in possession talked about earlier.

The free man is an extremely important character in terms of manipulating the opponent. This is achieved mainly through switching the ball to the opposite site of the field once the opponents have gathered on one side. Usually the free man is the unmarked player on the opposite side of the field and he has the best value to the attack. The ball is a tool that is used to eliminate opponents and manipulate their defensive balance. The ball isn’t held in possession just for the sake of having the ball; possession is a consequence of this style of play.

Teams that use this philosophy of Positional Play determine which spaces they want to attack based on the game strategy then use a distraction in another area before striking the opponent in the desired area, i.e. playing on the left side to gather the opponents there, in order to finish the attack on the right or playing in deep areas to lure the opponents out in order to finish the attack in behind the opponent in the open spaces. We see that specific mentality of play even in counterattacking teams. Juan Manuel Lillo summarizes this concept here:

“The principle idea of Positional Play is that players pass the ball to each other in close spaces to be able to pass to a wide open man.”

– Juan Manuel Lillo

We have looked at the principles of Positional Play and strategical examples of the principles, but it is also important to look at how this philosophy relates to the specific movements and ideas of its players. The ball can move via dribbling, passing, or shooting. A player must master when and how to do any of these movements in order to create an advantageous situation for the team.

Each movement can cause the opponents to concentrate their positioning more towards the ball which opens other spaces on the field. Lionel Messi and especially Andres Iniesta are masters of this. They create spaces by drawing many players towards them. It can be considered a sort of “offensive pressing trap,” because they invite pressure from many players then escape it and conquer the resulting spaces with their teammates. Johan Cruyff talked about the types of players he wants specifically:

“I want players who can make decisive moves in small spaces, I want them to work as little as possible to save energy for that decisive action.”

– Johan Cruyff

In general, players should always choose passes that provide continuity to the game and they should always look to secure the passes by supporting them. For example, if the opponent is compact the orientation of the game should be changed with longer passes. If the opponent is not compact then it is better to combine in short movements to exploit these spaces quickly.

Both types of passes should be used flexibly though. The players will look to move the ball as quickly as possible so that the opponent cannot react in time and so that the forwards have the edge in game rhythm. In terms of positioning, standing between the lines attracts the attention of more than just one player, which can be beneficial to others.

The men between the lines, called interiores, dominate Positional Play. They are in between their opponents and this separation from their opponents is precisely what causes the gathering of opponents in specific areas. They are masters at eliminating their opponents and avoiding movements that attract opponents to an area where the opponents have defensive access to the ball. The players positioned in between the opponent’s lines should constantly move in order to have an open passing lane between them and the ball, or between them and a player who has an open passing lane in relation to the ball.

Staying out of the cover shadow of the opponents means that the opponents cannot block you with their positioning and invites more than one opponent to worry about this player. The specific manner in which a player receives the ball could also affect how they are marked.

Movement of the ball and the players is how signals are communicated in football, so if a player checks into a space to receive a ball very quickly, the defenders might match this intensity and follow the player and leave a free space to be exploited, or a free man. Siegbert Tarrasch[9] talks about chess in a way that is comparable to this aspect of Positional Play:

“Weak points or holes in the opponent’s position must be occupied by pieces, not pawns.”

– Siegbert Tarrasch

Meaning that your very best players should be the ones who are the men in between the lines. They are the ones who will most skillfully exploit the holes in the opponent’s defense as well as perform the most valuable actions for the team. Examples of these players in Guardiola’s time with FC Barcelona are: Xavi Hernandez, Lionel Messi, Andres Iniesta, and Sergio Busquets.

The fullbacks or wingers are usually very wide and open on the sidelines of the pitch. They stretch the defense and create interior spaces and passing lanes. The opening of these spaces provides a better environment for the interiores and creates superiorities and free men in the most strategically important area of the field the center.

The defenders build the game from defense and should determine the beginning of the attack. If the opponent is sitting deep and the strikers aren’t pressuring it is the job of the defenders to move towards the opponent and attack them in order to disorganize them. These are all main principles that Guardiola uses with his teams when teaching Positional Play.

*Note: Here is a video made by Felipe Araya and FootballHunting of Pablo Adrian Guede’s CD Palestino, a first division Chilean side. Guede is an Argentinean coach who in his playing days was a striker for various clubs, such as: Nueva Chicago, Deportivo Espanol, Xerez CD, Malaga, and Elche. In his time in Elche he befriended the former FC Barcelona head coach (and assistant coach to Pep Guardiola) Tito Vilanova. He has coached CD El Palo, Nueva Chicago, and just recently took over the job as manager of CD Palestino from former coach Emiliano Astorga. Guede introduced the Juego de Posicion philosophy of football and has taken CD Palestino to their first Copa Libertadores in 35 years.

http://vimeo.com/115136383

Pep Guardiola

Pep Guardiola’s first season with FC Barcelona’s first team was during the 2008/2009 season. In 2007 he was a writer for El Pais. Even at that time it was easy to see his philosophy of football shine through his writing. At a time when Frank Rijkaard[10] surprisingly used a 3-4-3 against Zaragoza in the 2007 season, Pep Guardiola had this to say in his article:

“I think, and maybe I’m wrong, but what I see is: [Barcelona] like to organize themselves according to the ball—that they attack and defend with the ball and understand that it is unacceptable that the ball is there and we are here. The players feel that, instead of moving towards the ball, the ball will reach them where they are. They feel that, in order for the attackers to succeed and appear in the newspapers, [they] need a good ball from the midfield and they, to do so, need a good ball from their defenders. I will pass it on to you and you pass it to them.

Ronaldinho knows that he is better with Eto’o and Eto’o knows he is better with Ronaldinho. They have their aspects, but are better together than alone. They insist on knowing where the free man is at every moment, and know that it is better if that man is Iniesta rather than a winger. They know that Xavi and Iniesta are compatible. And why wouldn’t they be, dammit? They understand, as all good collectives should, that when you start on the right, it is better to finish on the left end and a back pass does not indicate fear, but the beginning of another, better play.

They feel that the time will come and that possession itself is nothing, but rather a means to reach the goal. That it is better that the ball reach the extreme end of the pitch via the center rather than from up the sides. And with all this, sometimes, occasionally, they also lose. They lose through lack of will power, by not getting their shirt sweaty enough. Or because they have recently eaten too much and too well, and they have lost their appetite.

Yes, they also lose for these reasons, like all teams around the world. But they also lose because sometimes, Xavi or Iniesta or Deco will steal the ball from the midfielders when perhaps they should not. Or because the ball that starts on the right is on track to finish on the right. Or because the third man is seldom used. Or because Ronaldinho has to receive more passes from Marquez and fewer from Sylvinho…Or because the attack-defense transition, to have it or not have it, was seen and unseen, and now maybe the best is slower.”

– Pep Guardiola

This extract perfectly exemplifies the views and passion of Pep Guardiola. This is what makes him one of the best ever. In regards to Positional Play, Pep said only 3 teams in the world truly play this way. Swansea City under Laudrup, Rayo Vallecano under Jemez, and his Bayern Munich. This alone shows that there can be some problems with the complexity of this concept. It may be difficult to implement in training and for the players to grasp. Each coach has their own variation of Positional Play that fits their team and their personal philosophy.

Guardiola’s teams play defense very aggressively. The main focus is on zonal marking instead of man marking. Zonal marking gives the initiative to the defense and they determine the offense of the opponents, while man marking is a reactionary defense at best. In man marking players must react to whatever the opponent does, meaning a loss of control. While in zonal marking the defending team determines where and how they will defend and the opponent must play against them to control the game. There is a focus on the passing lanes between the opponents.

The opponents all seem open to the ball carrier but the defenders are closing the passing lanes while all pressuring the ball together. Guardiola’s teams counterpress. The moment the ball is lost is the perfect time to press the opposition because the opponent is disorganized, especially the player who won the ball.

The player who won the ball usually loses his awareness of how the game and the field positions have changed when he wins the ball. So the player who lost the ball leads the hunt and Barcelona press the ball in a “wolf pack,” blocking the passing lanes to the opponent’s teammates while closing down the player on the ball very quickly before he is allowed to escape or the opponents regain stability.

“Move the opponent, not the ball. Invite the opponent to press. You have the ball on one side, to finish on the other.”

– Pep Guardiola

Guardiola’s recent teams have been the best in the world and they follow these principles. They have purpose in every pass and look to take opponents out of the game very frequently. Many times you will be able to see players not passing the ball until receiving some sort of pressure. Boateng and Dante will sometimes stand completely still with the ball until a player presses and then they pass the ball away.

This shows the complete dedication to manipulating the opponent’s movements with the ball. Sometimes Iniesta will be in the middle of the field and he will just stop doing anything. This famous move is called “La Pausa” or “The Pause,” He stands completely still while opponents begins to pressure him and abandon their defensive positioning, creating holes in the defense and free men for Iniesta’s team.

Another interesting aspect of Guardiola’s teams was the use of a “False 9,” a player who is the center forward, but does not occupy the center forward position at all. An interesting quote by Guardiola perfectly summarizes his views on this style of play:

“Everyone is allowed to move into the box, but none are allowed to stand in it.”
– Pep Guardiola

Meaning he expects every single player to contribute to the support of the ball and the build up play before entering the penalty box to finish the move off. This means his strikers don’t usually just stand up front and wait for the ball, but are actively and fluidly involved in the build up play, while even the midfielders and defenders can finish the move in the box if the situation allows them too.

This provides interconnectedness within the team as well as confusing the opponent. When Messi was introduced as the False 9 vs Real Madrid in the Santiago Bernabeu for the first time, Madrid’s central defenders admitted they had no idea how to defend Barcelona, and they lost 6-2 on the day.

In regards to superiority in possession, this quote by Angel Iturriaga[11] perfectly captures the talent of Mr. Guardiola:

“Guardiola has sublimed Positional Play. He introduced variants in taking the ball out [of defense] that didn’t even cross La Volpe’s mind. He is an innovator and an excellent scholar. I think it is impossible to repeat that virtuoso cycle. As a coach, I would say his capacity to manage a group and egos stands out, his capacity to work and his capacity to change matches tactically. He is able to use 4 guidelines in a match and change them depending on how the rival is situated.”

– Angel Iturriaga

The variants Iturriaga speaks of are actions such as: the defensive or central midfielder dropping towards the sides of the central defenders, defensive or central midfielders dropping into the spaces in between a formation with 3 central defenders, the fullbacks pushing high and inside towards the center, and more. These variants allow for interesting changes in build-up play. Like Lahm being able to receive towards the sides instead of in the center and progressing diagonally towards the opponent goal.

Continuing with the idea of progressing the ball out of the defense, this quote by Guardiola shows his style of thinking and strategy when facing opponents:

“In football each player is responsible for another except in the [2 central defenders] vs. [1 striker] tip of each team. We start our 2 vs. 1 with a central defender driving out towards the opponent goal, causing an opponent out to prevent his progression, freeing his [partnering central defender] (generation of free man). Danger! If we lose the ball the opponent strikers have a 1 vs. 1 against our defenders. Each team decides how they will play now.”

– Pep Guardiola

Guardiola is willing to take the risks necessary to be successful. It may not look like a dangerous situation, but it takes real bravery to leave your team matched up man for man against the opponent forwards while your team is in possession trying to create a chance and the defending team is sitting back waiting to counter. It takes bravery to split your central defenders extremely far apart from each other to the touchlines of the pitch while under pressure. All of this is done in order to constantly adhere to the principles of Positional Play, no matter the cost.

Guardiola chooses different players in his starting lineups based upon how he interprets their movements and their synergies between other teammates on the field. He plans specific movements in regards to the opponent and what the strategy on the day calls for.

His tactical moves always fit the team and he doesn’t change the team in order to fit his tactics – or else they will play very badly. In terms of being a manager, Guardiola has his philosophy, is great at creating strategies against his opponents, excellent at the specific tactical movements required to execute the goals of the strategy, and is also world class when it comes to in-game changes.

When it comes to training this philosophy, Guardiola has a specific training pitch in which he trains his players:

Pep Guardiola’s Training Field.

He trains his players on this pitch and trains them to orient to these specific lines on the field.

“The only important things in our game are what happens within these 4 lines. Everything else is secondary.”

– Pep Guardiola

The four central lines are of utmost importance. This is where the men in between the lines play and it is the most important portion of the field for Guardiola. There are 4 vertical lines and 5 vertical strips of space on the field. The flanks are the outside vertical strips, the 2 inside strips are called “interior corridors[12]” in Positional Play, and the central strip is the center.

The interior corridors are arguably the most important spaces within the center, as this is usually in between all lines of the opponent defense. From here, players can have the biggest impact in eliminating opponents as well as moving diagonally towards the goal, which has its own specific benefits that will be mentioned in the game analyses.

On this field, Pep trains his players how and where to move in relation to the ball. If the ball is on the left flank and Ribery has the ball, there are various movements that can be trained to support Ribery while maintaining great positional structure and stability. For example, Ribery can begin dribbling inside, and Alaba the left back will move from the interior line to occupy the left flank that Ribery is exiting, with a possibility for an overlapping run.

Meanwhile, the near side supporting central midfielder like Schweinsteiger would move deeper and toward the left outermost vertical line of the 4 central vertical lines. This means that Ribery is dribbling inside towards goal, Alaba is giving him an overlapping run option, and Schweinsteiger is moving deeper and in between the two – forming the tip of the triangle while the other two attack.

At the same time, the rest of the team is reacting to these movements in order to have the most efficient positional structure and stability in play. During the training of these movements the general rules of never having more than 3 players on a horizontal line at the same times and never more than 2 on the same vertical line at the same time is being obeyed and thought about constantly by the players. So even the far side players are chain-reacting to these movements and forming the optimal far side structure to be able to attack if the ball is switched across to the center or the opposite flank.

This is just one example of a specific movement that could be trained using this field. Guardiola can add defenders and train specific situations and eventually the players can play on any field without a need for guidelines to help orient themselves. The players over time learn all the variations and principles that come with training on this field and use it flexibly and interchangeably. Eventually the players move extremely fluidly and all have the same mindset and sense of orientation on the field.

*Note: Here is a famous video posted by tz.de on YouTube of Guardiola training his Bayern Munich team in the art of Positional Play during the winter break of his first season with the team. He talks about the length and angling of the central midfielders in relation to each other in order to have optimal positioning to penetrate the defensive lines, specific runs/movements the players should be doing, decision making with the ball to manipulate the opponent or maintain stability, and more. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6YDl1dFI5g

Along with that form of training, Guardiola also plays various other games that improve the fundamentals needed when it comes to Positional Play, e.g. game intelligence, movement, body angle and position, clean passing technique and dribbling, awareness, and more. Another example of a game that is used in training constantly is the very famous Rondo:

An 8 vs. 2 Rondo.

The most common Rondo seen in Guardiola’s training sessions is in a 10x10m square in an 8 vs. 2 “Monkeys in the Middle” game dynamic. Usually it is played with one touch passing, but that can be changed depending on the parameters. The size of the square as well as the amount of players on each team are variable as well. This is an example of the most basic Rondo Pep uses.

The goal is usually to reach 20 or 30 passes in a row without an interception. Once that is achieved the players all tease and applaud towards the players in the middle. If you watch any of the recent training videos uploaded by Bayern Munich on YouTube you can hear players like Mueller counting each pass out loud.

The focus of the training can be either the defenders (Monkey in the Middle) or the attackers (Circle). Usually the defenders can switch out with an attacker only when they intercept the ball, not when they poke it away – promoting intelligent positioning. Once this happens, the attacker who lost the ball then joins the defender in the middle while the defender who intercepted it joins the circle.

In a Rondo, there are specific passes like a 1st line pass, a 2nd line pass, and a 3rd line pass. A 1st line pass doesn’t bypass any defenders. A 2nd line pass bypasses a defender but doesn’t split the two defenders in the middle. A 3rd line pass is the ultimate goal and is a pass which goes between the two defenders in the middle. The players on the outside may move around and change their body position at any time.

 The goal is to manipulate the defenders in such a way that you can play a penetrating pass in between them. During the exercise the intensity and speed of the ball is extremely fast and requires great technique and concentration. The players constantly adjust the angle of their positioning in relation to their teammates, sometimes taking a step backwards or forward on the edges of the square, sometimes turning their hips in a certain way so that they can play the next pass or receive a pass efficiently. They can also move closer to their teammates in order to invite pressure before playing a longer pass out of pressure to continue the passing streak.

There are various fundamentals that are trained very intensely during this game, like intelligence and technique under pressure. This applies to both the offensive players and the defenders in the middle. That is why Guardiola uses this drill almost every single practice.

A similar game that is used very often is called a Positional Game:

A 4 vs. 4 + 3 Positional Game.

This game is played in a more rectangular area with the size of the area varying depending on the coach – similar to Rondos. The touches should be limited to 1 or 2 touches, though it is variable depending on the team and coach. In this game there are 3 neutral players (yellow) and a 4 vs. 4 possession game. The objective is to keep the ball as long as possible. Once the ball is lost, the two teams of 4 switch. There is a catch, though. When the ball is lost, the team that lost it can immediately counterpress.

This trains the ability and impulse to counterpress immediately when the ball is lost as well as the possessing team to immediately escape the area of pressure when the ball is lost. Along with similar fundamentals that are trained in Rondos, this game trains positioning in possession in between defenders, which adds complexity and pressure because there are 6 offensive players on the outside with 4 defenders in the center + 1 offensive player between them.

Some may argue that these games are missing actual goals to finish the play, but football is mostly progressing through zones with the movement of the ball and players in relation to the ball, rather than finishing on goal. In fact, if a team can progress through the field consistently well, they most likely won’t have finishing problems.

There are variations of these games that are possible with a “zone progressing” goal, meaning the goals of the drills are to keep the ball and manipulate the opponent while simultaneously progressing through various zones. These are very quick and high pressure games.

It goes back to the saying of Johan Cruyff where he said he wants players who can make the correct decisions in the smallest spaces. These games are used frequently in order to sharpen the players and teach them the most valuable aspects of football. During all of these drills Guardiola uses freezing of play and talking to his players to explain concepts and to coach the players. All of these aspects in training translate to the play of the team in real matches.

Game Analyses

Manchester City vs. Bayern Munich

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

Bayern’s Positional Structure in Possession.

In this scene we see how Bayern support the man on the ball very aggressively. Including Neuer, there are 5 players supporting Benatia within the immediate area. On the far side the Bayern players make sure they are positioned so that they remain connected to the players in the immediate vicinity of the ball, even if they can’t support the ball themselves. This allows Bayern to play through the Manchester City pressure quite easily and progress up the field with ascending superiorities.

It also means that if Bayern want to finish the attack on the opposite side of the field in regards to the ball position, they are well structured to attack that area. Notice that the players all stagger and position themselves in a well oriented manner in adherence to the general rules of positional structure in the philosophy of Positional Play. This creates many triangles and diamonds which Bayern use to dominate the situation.

Bayern utilizing the potential of the free man out of defense.

Bayern use the 2 vs. 1 situation with Boateng and Benatia vs Aguero to their advantage in this scene. Here the back 4 are occupied by just Ribery and Lewandowski, meaning that Bayern already have a free man in midfield. To add onto this, Benatia invites pressure from Aguero and then Boateng receives the ball as the free man in the back line.

He proceeds to break through the first line of City’s defense and join the midfield. This creates a 7 vs. 5 overall match-up in midfield that Bayern can exploit and use to break through the opponent midfield. Also, notice that Alonso has dropped into the space on the left side of the 2 Bayern central defenders, in-between Bernat and Boateng.

Bayern manipulating Manchester City’s defense even with 10 players.

This scene takes place just before Bayern score their first goal after they have received a red card for Benatia’s tackle on Aguero. City was very easily manipulated by Bayern even though Bayern was down a man. This may be due to psychological factors in the game.

City realized they had an extra man, therefore they began pressing quite aggressively. Even though they pressed aggressively, City still occupied deeper zones with their defenders. This means that their pressure was not supported by further layers of pressing and they couldn’t gain any defensive access to the ball.

Bayern were still capable of using one player to eliminate 2 or 3 opponents in certain situations. In this scene there are roughly 5 players around Xabi Alonso while Hojbjerg positions himself excellently to maintain a passing lane between him and Alonso while still being positioned in the most dangerous hole in the City defense. The principles of moving the opponent with the ball and using the free man in the most dangerous areas still created a goal even against Manchester City with an extra man.

Ribery drawing in many Manchester City players before releasing the ball into the opened space.

This scene shows the buildup to the goahead goal Bayern scored with 10 players against a full City squad. Alonso passed the ball to Ribery in the center, who held the ball for a moment to invite extra City pressure before releasing the pass. The principle of starting the attack on one side and finishing on the other is apparent here. Also, Ribery managed to eliminate roughly 6(!) Manchester City midfielders with one pass.

This philosophy still shows its dominance in a Champions League match with 1 less player. While Ribery had adequate support near the ball, Boateng took up a position in the largest hole of the City defensive shape while maintaining connection to the ball. On a side note, Robben positioned himself very wide because he knew he was still connected to Boateng who could potentially receive the ball and potentially give him a pass. Once Boateng received the ball he played a long diagonal to the far post and Lewandowski headed in the goal.

Bayern Munich vs. Borussia Dortmund

Saturday, November 1, 2014

Boateng playing one of his great laser-like passes through the lines of defense.

In this scene Boateng plays one of his impressive laser passes through the opponents midfield. Borussia Dortmund focused their entire defensive game plan on congesting the central areas of the field. This is because they knew this is what is most important for Pep Guardiola and his style of play.

Boateng received the ball from the left side of the field so when he turned to face the far side, there was a bit more space since the opponents have gathered on the near side. Boateng attacked the area farthest from Dortmund pressure and the scene ended in a dangerous Robben shot on goal.

The value of diagonal play can be observed here. Diagonal passes eliminate both vertical and horizontal lines of the opponent defensive shape. This eliminates a large portion of the opponent players while moving towards their goal and attacking through a zone that is usually underloaded by the opponent. Also, when attacking the field from one side diagonally towards the other the players have a connection towards varied zones, like the flank or the center. While attacking from the center means you have the same option on either side.

It also provides an optimal view of the field. If your players are attacking at a diagonal angle, that means their backs are facing the corners of the field which – are the least important. Also, depending on the position of the attack moving diagonally inside mean going towards the goal, while moving diagonally from directly in the center means slightly moving away from the goal.

In this scene Boateng was slightly offset towards the left and played a diagonal which 3 Dortmund players threatened but couldn’t reach. Once the ball broke through the pressure zone and reached Lahm, Bayern had an advantageous attack in central areas of the field.

Neuer – not to be outdone by Boateng, plays one of his incredible penetrating passes.

This scene exemplifies the value of Bayern Munich’s German goalkeeper. Manuel Neuer is considered by many the best goalkeeper in the world. Goalkeepers play a large part in the building game out of defense in this philosophy of play. Using the goalkeeper means you automatically have an extra pass option. It’s 10 vs. 11 because the opponent’s goalkeeper will not press high up the field due to the risk of leaving an open goal.

Using the goalkeeper in special ways in tandem with the defensive line is something we see frequently in Bayern. Here Neuer plays a long diagonal flat pass into the center while being pressured. The pass is incredibly accurate and Robben lays the pass off to Mueller who breaks through the Dortmund midfield in order to attack the defensive line. The effect of layoff passes are also visible in this scene. When a long pass is played, pressure gathers around the destination point. Once the pressure gathers and Robben plays a one-touch layoff pass to the forward facing free man, Mueller, Bayern have an extremely advantageous attack.

AS Roma vs. Bayern Munich

Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Robben as the free man vs. AS Roma.

This scene is from Bayern’s 7-1 victory over Roma. This shows the principle of the free man and his value to the attack. Bayern positioned their most dangerous player alone on the far side of the field as a free man. Robben is normally a winger so this position was perfect for him. Roma plays very compact horizontally which leaves the far side of the field open. Guardiola prepared for this match very well in terms of strategy.

Robben received the ball here and attacked directly towards goal, ending up in a 1 vs. 1 against Ashley Cole which is a very favorable qualitative superiority for Bayern. Note that once Robben goes diagonally inside to attack, Lahm immediately runs towards the flank in order to balance Robben’s movements and proved stability in the positional structure.

Robben stretches the AS Roma midfield and allows for the ball to be played to Bayern’s 3-man strikeforce easier.

This scene is the buildup leading to Gotze’s goal and Bayern’s second goal on the night. Here the effects of Robben’s constant threat are visible. Since he was causing so many problems Roma began orienting their players more towards him. Robben was a constant threat that night and even scored 2 goals. Because of his output, the Roma defensive shape now lacked horizontal compactness.

That opened up vertical passing lanes into the trio of Gotze, Mueller, and Lewandowski through the stretched defensive connections of Roma. These 3 players are excellent in tight spaces and in combinations. This is another form of a qualitative superiority, only in a different manner. These 3 vs. the back line of Roma caused a goal in this scene. This was a great strategical game for Guardiola. His initial strategy opened up holes for the secondary strategy and Roma had no answers.

Bayern Munich vs. SC Paderborn

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

Bayern overloading the right side.

Bayern varied their formation from the usual in this match. In this match they played a 4-2-3-1 formation with a specific strategy while still adhering to the principles of Positional Play. Bayern looked to focus on the interior corridors in this match and overload them to break through. Their numerical and positional superiority on the right side of the field is where the first goal stemmed from.

Here we can see the players still supporting each other in triangulations even when the play is very congested and tight on one side. This large amount of players around the ball meant Bayern had many players in good positions in case the was a ball loss and an opportunity for counterpressing. As you can see, Robben cut inside with the ball and Rode overlapped. In order to open space for Robben moving inside, Mueller moved to the flank as well.

Gotze and Lewandowski came close to the ball for a potential combination and break through while Lahm and Alonso provided safe back pass options. Rondos and Positional Play games have a strong resemblance to this scene specifically. This is an interesting example of a varied Bayern strategy and its relation to training.

Hertha Berlin vs. Bayern Munich

Saturday, November 29th, 2014

Robben and Ribery in the interior corridors.

“I look for [the opponent’s] point of weakness, and I try to put [skilled] players in those positions.”

– Pep Guardiola

This scene shows an interesting variation to the Bayern attack. In this game Ribery and Robben played mostly in the interior corridors instead of the flanks where we are used to seeing them. The idea behind this was that Hertha Berlin leave their central areas in midfield exposed because their wide midfielders man mark Bayern’s fullbacks. This means that Berlin’s formation is roughly a 6-2-1-1, which can be easily manipulated in the midfield.

Because the holes in the opponent formation are on the sides of the two central midfielders, in the interior corridors, Guardiola decided to let his 2 most dangerous players play in these zones. From here, Bayern attacked with Ribery and Robben diagonally towards goal with the positive effects of these movements mentioned in an earlier game analysis. Bayern’s goal in this match stemmed from such movement. The free men in between the lines are the most important players for Positional Play, and this match Bayern’s two best players were used in the most important positions in Guardiola’s Positional Play philosophy.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude by talking about the reason why Guardiola hates the term “Tiki Taka.” This term implies possession of the ball with no purpose, with no movements to disorganize and eliminate opponents. The idea of Tiki Taka is to keep possession for the sake of having possession.

Sometimes Guardiola will lose a game and people will say he plays this way, keeping the ball but not doing anything with it. Another reason he is accused of this sort of play is that many teams saw his style of play and tried to copy it without knowing the core principles, and in the end wind up with nothing but pointless possession.

The Spanish National Team that made history from 2008-2012 had times where they played this way, and the players in that team were Guardiola’s players. Maybe similar accusations will arise if Germany start playing poorly now that he coaches Bayern Munich, though they just won the 2014 World Cup with a style of play similar to his Bayern Munich team. In the end, these are not his teams, but other teams that may give this idea of possessing the ball a bad name.

So yes, possession of the ball psychologically frustrates the opponents because they cannot do what they want to do. Continuity and flow of possession for a long duration does bring a sense of control. But possession is merely a consequence of the offensive game of Pep Guardiola and his principles.

Possession is not the goal, though the possession of the ball provides the innate defensive aspect that one team has the ball and the opponents cannot score because they don’t. Scoring goals, defending, and keeping possession are consequences of this philosophy of play, not the focus. The focus is to play good football and to win by doing so. Pep Guardiola wants to win in any way possible, but he believes this is the very best way to win.

Footnotes

[1]: Maurizio Viscidi is well known in Italy as one of Arrigo Sacchi’s best students and assistants. He is also a well known “Giochi Di Posizione” coach. Maurizio has worked as Director of Youth Development, Technical Coach, and Assistant Coach under Cesare Prandelli and Antonio Conte for the Italian National Football Team.

[2]: Marti Perarnau is a former Olympic Athlete who is the author of the very popular “Pep Confidential” book where he spent an entire year with Guardiola during his first season at Bayern Munich. He is also the author of Perarnau Magazine.

[3]: Juan Manuel Lillo is a pioneer of Juego de Posición. Pep Guardiola has said many times he goes to Lillo for advice. Lillo coached Guardiola as a player in his 2005-2006 season as a manager at the Mexican club Dorados de Sinaloa.

[4]: Ricardo La Volpe is a famous Argentinean coach. He won the 2003 CONCACAF Gold Cup with Mexico. Pep Guardiola notably fell in love with his 2006 Mexican National Team. The Mexican National Team lost to Argentina in the Round of 16 2-1 after extra time in that World Cup. These results brought Mexico to 4th in the FIFA World Rankings.

[5]: Paco Seirul-Lo is a fitness coach in FC Barcelona. He was the Head of Fitness Coaches under Johan Cruyff when he was appointed in 1993. He is a Spanish Sports Scientist who studied Kinesiology at the Instituto Nacional de Educacion Fisica in Madrid.

[6]: Arrigo Sacchi coached AC Milan from 1987-1991 and 1996-1997. He won two European Cups back to back in 1989 and 1990. Sacchi is famous for his contribution to the Zonal Marking style of defense.

[7]: Johan Cruyff is arguably one of the best players and coaches in the history of the game. He won 3 Balon d’Ors. He was coached by the father of “Total Football,” Rinus Michels. Pep Guardiola considers Cruyff his largest influence, being coached by him and winning 4 La Liga’s from 1991 to 1994.

[8]: Oscar Moreno is the author of “Modelo de Juego del FC Barcelona.” He is currently a coach of CD Alcoyano.

[9]: Siegbert Tarrasch was a German master of chess. He had many books on chess and contributed many things to the game of chess.

[10]: Frank Rijkaard was a great central defender and defensive midfielder for Ajax and AC Milan, playing for coaches like Cruyff, van Gaal, and Sacchi. He was also the manager of FC Barcelona from 2003-2008, winning the Champions League in 2006.

[11]: Angel Iturriaga Barco is a Spanish writer and historian. He is the author of various dictionaries about FC Barcelona and about Spanish Football.

[12]: Interior Corridors are also known in German as the word Halbraum, literally translated as Halfspaces. My colleague Rene Maric created a tactical theory piece on the importance of this zone here.

Acknowledgements

Special Thanks To:

Marti Perarnau

Rene Maric

Daniel Trejo

Felipe Araya

The term ‘compactness’ has been somewhat of a buzzword in football tactics over the past few seasons, particular in the last campaign where Simeone’s Atletico Madrid side won the league with a system so heavily oriented on the aspect. In this article, I will be looking to explore the benefits of this tactical attribute with some scenarios from past games, whilst showing the contrast between European forces and that of English teams.

“What is defending? … Defending is a matter of – ‘How much space should I defend?’ … Everything is about meters, that’s all”.

– Johan Cruyff

Defining and Measuring Compactness

The standard definition of compactness is to maintain a short distance between the furthest players both horizontally and vertically, however such a basic response lacks in it’s application – to start with, what is the optimal level of compaction? For this reason I believe there must be other definitions which could provide a less simplistic answer, proving more applicable in practice?

Basic definitions of compactness, the Red team have large distances on both a vertical and a horizontal axis, making them uncompact.

Alternatively, it could be broken down to an individual level. Possibly to the point at which the players are close enough together to be connected, ensuring a compactness within the shape – obviously a prime aspect. It could be reasoned that it is at this point where the benefits of compactness come into effect, making it a suitable definition and measurement of the term. However, all 10 players could be stood within a 5 yard perimeter, and they would be connected yet the defensive capabilities would be non-existent – so what is the optimal level? This can be somewhat dependent on the opposition, however a good starting point may be the instance that the individual players are as far away from each other as possible whilst maintaining the connections. Through this, they can control more space whilst retaining the benefits of a compact block.

Another argument is that compactness needs to be relative to the positioning of the opposition. It is not only a matter of how compact a team is within itself but also that the distances between themselves and the opposition are short. Through this a key principle of compactness is achieved, the playing area of the opposition is minimized  which wouldn’t be the case had only the initial definition been taken into account.

The Defensive Advantages of Compactness

Defensive Connections

One of the plethora of defensive advantages gained from a high compactness is the increased number of connections between the individual defenders. A connection could be classified as when a player is within distance to be able to support a teammate, such as through a secondary press. Through this, a defensive block can be much more stable against the opposition’s attempts to penetrate as multiple (an optimal number is highly dependent on the specific scene) players can attack the same space simultaneously.

The shorter distances between individual players makes penetrative passes more difficult as the passing lanes are minimized, whilst multiple players can challenge the same through ball if needed.

Defensive connections in an uncompact defence

In an uncompact shape such as here, only two players are in distance to support should the CM be challenged in some form by the ball-carrier, whilst the 3 other players are too far away to move and act in time. What is worse that in this case, where the players are slightly oriented to man-marking, two of the disconnected player are required to protect the centre from opening up. Given that they’re both disconnected from the yellow-highlighted player, the midfield’s structure is very weak and could quite simply be opened up.

The improved connections in a compact defence can be crucial.

In contrast, the player when accompanied by a team organisation of good compactness has 5 connections with other teammates; 3 of whom are from a central position, ensuring greater defensive stability in a key area of the pitch. Aside from this, the team also benefits from having two other players near the opposition ball-carrier, who can then support in the pressing.

Improved Defensive Access

A compact defensive block can make use of a better defensive access to the ball. By this, I mean that the defending team have a better ability to effectively and correctly press the ball to challenge it in some form.

A scene from a match involving AO’s UNG team (defending) against Georgia State University. Originally his team have poor access to the ball in their press.

In the above diagram, the defending team possess a poor access to the ball (in that they cannot press it correctly) due to a number of reasons; the majority of which originate from the lack of compaction. The right forward is covering a practically redundant area of the pitch (as neither team will find benefit in using it from the ball position) whilst the man-marking of the right-midfielder makes the team very uncompact horizontally. This then results in overloads in two key areas for the opposition;

1. The first overload in the ball-near space is created from the right centre-back pushing up as he is completely free, forming a 4v3 superiority down the flank (marked blue). This is primarily resulting from the lack of shifting by the team (especially in the two strikers), resulting in poor horizontal compactness.

2. Secondly, a 3v2 overload is created in the most crucial space – the centre of the midfield. With the right-midfielder marking the wing-back, the defending team are suffering the consequences of lacking horizontal compactness. The positioning of the right striker is also an issue as previously stated, whilst the lack of staggering makes the overload even more easily-exploitable for the attacking team.

With a greater compactness, his team benefit from improved access to the ball.

On a basic level, the simple factors of things such as having a strong ball-near compaction translates to a better access to the ball as more players will be in a position to press. Aspects such as a good ball-orientation and the preparation for pressing is also important to ensure than an effective pressure will be made on the ball. The impact of more players around the ball allows for the space around the ball, limiting options and restrict in the opportunity of evasion through dribbling.

With bad access to the ball, mainly as a result of a poor compactness, the ball-carrier can create a 4v3 overload whilst has the time and space to penetrate the opposition – possibly through attacking the underloaded side through a switch.

On the other hand, with a compact organisation the defending team profit from having good ball access, forcing the ball into a strategically weak area which can be pressed further with ease.

When utilising a compact shape (especially when focused on horizontal compaction specifically), there is a necessity to maintain ball access at all times. Without ball pressure, the opposition will be able to exploit the underloaded side of the pitch by switching the play due to having lots of time without a challenge disrupting their ability to progress ball possession. In the above diagram, had there not been the very good ball access which is shown then the defence would be very unstable as the opposition could make a switch to exploit the underloaded opposite flank with a 2v0.

Exploiting an Absence of Needle Players

A needle player is one who possesses an excellent close control and dribbling ability, which can be used to allow his team to maintain ball possession in a high position on the field, where it would be subject to above-average pressure from defenders. Because of this reason, they are especially effective against compact defences to the point of being considered on of the main ways to counteract a defence in this situation.

Considering this, a compact defence can be used situationally to exploit a team who lack such players; an example being Real Madrid, when playing their capital rivals Atletico. Over the past season, there has been a distinct contrast in the performances of Real Madrid and Barcelona against Simeone’s team. A key reason for this is the particular qualities of the players which Ancelotti and Enrique have available.

Barcelona are renowned for their technical excellence, with every player in the attack being able to maintain possession under considerable pressure. This helps them massively when they come to play teams such as Atletico, as they have multiple needle players who are tailored well to breaking down a compact defence.

An image from the German domain, notice how Barcelona still position many players inside the Atletico defensive block, as they can still be effective in such tight space.

On the other hand, players such as Ronaldo and Bale need space to be effective. If they aren’t provided with space to move into by the opposition, then they struggle massively which has shown as these players have failed to influence the game in recent fixtures. It’s not that Real Madrid don’t have the players necessary to be effective against Atletico, because they do – the likes of Modric and Isco could be vital in penetrating Simeone’s 4-4-2-0; however Ancelotti has misused such players at times and not used them to their full potential.

A scene from the 4-0, players such as Bale are given no space to utilise by the 4-4-2-0. Real Madrid’s structure is much more wing-oriented when compared to the above image of Barcelona.

In addition to this, Ronaldo’s inactivity in the development of possession in midfield forces Ancelotti to use Benzema in a role of dropping deep to support the likes of Modric and Kroos. This can disrupt the balance because Ronaldo creates little effectual presence as a lone striker (as he is a player of individuality) whilst means that the often underrated Benzema cannot be used to his fullest potential higher up the pitch.

Benzema (red) is required to vacate his natural position in order to facilitate the passive Ronaldo (black)

Spatial Control

By having shorter distances between the furthest players both horizontally and vertically, a team will technically be covering less space, but they will be controlling much more. By having a compact shape, a team can enforce a much higher degree of control on an area of the pitch whereas if they were more spread out, then their spatial control will be far worse.

Spatial control can be achieved through the numerical superiority within said space, which stops the opposition team from obtaining access and utilising the zone for any strategic benefit. The overload improves the cover of passing lanes, restricts any usable space and minimises the possibilities from inside the block itself in order to force the opposition into circulating possession into an alternative and usually less strategically valuable space.

The management of spatial control is a key factor in a team properly utilising compactness against the ball. In most cases of defending, there are spaces on the pitch which are not necessary to cover for the opposition cannot utilise it to provide benefit, for what could be a number of reasons from lack of access to penetration from said area. Therefore the defending team can ‘cut the corners’ of the shape to ensure that the management is at its most effective, emphasising the key areas which need controlling whilst sacrificing the spaces less valuable to the opposition. A simple and common case of this, which rarely varies depending on the opposition, is the narrow positioning of the outside midfielders in Atletico’s 4-4-2-0. Instead of covering the wide spaces, they come inside to cover the half-spaces which are much more valuable to occupy.

The defensive block is covering a large space with little control over it.

Whereas here, they’re covering less space but exerting a large degree of control over it.

Expanding on this, through maintaining a compact defensive block a team can focus on a specific space on the pitch. In most situations the optimal area to control is the centre as it holds greater strategical value for a number of reasons, such as a greater range of potential movements whilst it offers the best platform to access alternative spaces. Similarly to the sport of chess, the centre is largely considered as the most important part of the playing area.

Karpov – Kasparov: World Championship Match 1985, Game 16

In the above scene from a Karpov – Kasparov match, Kasparov (black) develops central control which is crucial to his eventual victory. This is achieved through intelligent use of his anchored D3 knight (A.K.A the octopus, referencing its excellent control of key squares) and advances his B4 pawn, forcing the A4 knight for Karpov, he forces the opposition knights into passive squares from which they can enforce no control. Where Karpov only has a bishop and queen (though advancing the queen so early is very dangerous) which can influence the centre of the board, whereas Kasparov has both knights and both bishops in strong positions.

The general shapes from Gladbach’s 2-0 win over Bayern

Furthermore, this principle can then be adapted to specific opposition. In many cases, teams will have at least somewhat of an emphasis on a particular area of the pitch in attack – to counteract this, the defending team can maintain an especially compact defence in this area, negating the impact of their strategy whilst potentially forcing a redirection of the attack.

An example of this is commonly done by Real Madrid in their Clasico matches against Messi. Defending in their 4-3-3-turned-4-4-2, they often have a greater compaction on Barcelona’s right side where Messi is positioned. From this they obviously look to minimise his influence and dribbling ability inside.

Madrid defending on Messi’s flank.

Forcing Inefficient Attacking Strategies

Through control of the centre of the pitch, a compact defence can force the opposition into one of the most inefficient attacking strategies – crossing. An analysis by Michael Caley (MC_of_A on twitter) found that headed shots and shots assisted from crosses have a conversion rate much lower than normal shots from the same position (you can find the relevant analysis here). It is a common sight than when the central passing lanes are covered with little usable space within the defensive block, the attacking team will resort to passing to the only free advanced player – the full-back. In a lot of these situations the full-back will then cross from a deep position – the most inefficient position to cross from.

This has been the case in a few matches recently, perhaps most notably in Gladbach’s 2-0 victory over Bayern, and Juventus defeat of Dortmund in the Champions League. In both games the teams utilised a defensive block with emphasis on central control, which forced the opposition into attacking the wings which often resulted in tame crosses into the box.

Following Juventus’ win, Stefan Lichtsteiner stated in the post-match interview that they simply looked to defend the centre, with BVB’s crosses causing little threat.

This strategy was particularly useful against Dortmund because Aubameyang offers little aerial ability whilst he possesses much more threat on cut-backs and central attacks. In addition, the somewhat of a surprise selection of Sokratis at right-back meant that the possession game down the right of the pitch was lacking in several aspects as he rarely got into advanced positions and didn’t support Mkhitaryan in the development of possession with potential combinations.

The issue with crossing is the almost-necessity for a first-time shot, topped with the difficult angle and pace at which the ball is being delivered into the player. Aside from that, the ExpG (expected goals) of headers are much lower than standard shots, as are cross-assisted shots in comparison to a normal one.

Reducing the Influence of Individual Weaknesses

“With Barcelona we won the European Cup and 4 Ligas with Guardiola and Koeman, now if there are two examples of individuals who cannot defend, then it’s those two. But they played in the heart of defence.” – Johan Cruyff

Through a compact organisation, a team can reduce the impact of individual weaknesses.This is due to a number of the above factors, namely the increased defensive connections. Simply given the increased support from teammates, a player who would be a defensive liability and weakness in a standard organisation is covered better, reducing the possibility of him being exposed.

Another factor in this is the distribution of space between players. When a team lacks compaction, and the shape spans quite a large area of the pitch, each player individually has to cover a large amount of space also, which is obviously difficult unless your name happens to be Sergio Busquets. From this, the weakest players can be exposed and isolated more easily by attacking the big space which they’re responsible of defending.

Expanding on this, since a stretched defensive block is more difficult to organise and maintain stability in, the distribution of space is often less even as some players end up covering more or less than others. By intelligent circulation of the ball, the attacking team could hypothetically manipulate this into creating an imbalance to their benefit, by forcing the weaker players to cover a larger amount of space.

Two diagrams from an analysis of mine which will shortly be published by New York Red Bulls, displaying the spatial distribution in an uncompact shape.

In contrast, an individual in a compact defence is required to cover a lesser amount of space, since the shape stretches across a lesser amount overall, making his defensive role significantly easier. As well as that, the distribution of space-coverage across the team can be maintained more evenly, making it more difficult for the opposition to exploit an individual weakness.

Whilst in this diagram, it shows NYRB’s usual compact shape under Marsch this season, with a better distribution of space, which is less for the individual also.

Reducing the Threat of Counterpressing

A compact defence can also have benefits during the start of attacking transition, once possession has been regained. The increased numbers around the ball provides vital insurance against counterpressing, which could potentially be used by the opposition to immediately initiate another attack. A key aspect of the effectiveness of counterpressing is the premise that there are large numbers of players still forward following the attack, who can all begin to press after losing possession.

Therefore, if the defensive team also has a large number of players around the ball during these moments then it works against one of the key features of counterpressing. Aside from this, the defender who regains possession instantly has a large number of passing options due to the amount of players nearby so he can quickly move the ball onwards away from the space where the opposition are closing in.

Pressing Benefits

The best and most extreme pressing teams in the world are all founded upon a well-organized and compact defensive block.

With an increase in supporting teammates, the main pressing movements can be accompanied by auxiliary pressing from deeper players, creating a better-structured press which can attack the space more effectively. The addition of supporting movements is key to the stability of a pressing which otherwise could be easily countered into the space left exposed.

A prime example of bad pressing was from an early Premier League (obviously) match between Chelsea and Everton. The diagram below shows how Everton’s very uncompact and uncoordinated press was easily exposed by Chelsea in the build-up to their second goal.

Everton have particularly awful vertical compactness in the build-up, meaning Chelsea could easily exploit the spaces between the lines in the centre.

There is often less of a requirement for an individual player to make long runs during pressing also. A common sight in the Premier League, is to see a lone striker run continuously for upwards of 5 seconds in an individual press, and is then easily beaten through simple passing. Not only can the player not maintain pace as he runs too far, but the simple fact that the ball can be moved quicker than a player can run over such a distance means that the pressing can very easily be bypassed.

Uncompact pressing has greater demands on and individual and is rarely effective.

On the other hand, when an individual is accompanied by other teammates, he doesn’t have to run as far as the space he needs to cover is less, and an alternative player will press once the ball nears his area. With multiple players pressing (or at least supporting) in the first line, the defending team can also adjust to a frequent changing of the ball’s position.

Whilst a compact defence can press with greater numbers, reducing the demands in both distance and intensity of the individual.

Pressing is less easily exploited when the block has a high level of compaction. During many cases of pressing with no regard to maintain vertical compaction, lines often open up between the lines, especially should the pressing be poorly-coordinated initially.

A compact defensive block also minimizes the accessibility of passing lanes, which can be vital in the effectiveness of a team’s pressing. Without the possibility of utilising a vertical pass to bypass the initial lines of pressure, a player may resort to a lateral or pass backwards which would likely invite more pressure.

The preparation in anticipation of pressing the opposition is also aided by a compact organisation beforehand. Within this, a team will make more fine movements in order to prepare the organisation to be in an optimal position to press from, ensuring that it is of high stability and co-ordination. This is supported by the compact shape as previously stated, the narrow block can be organised better and within a shorter time period as it is naturally stable due to the control and defensive connections.

Translating to Attack

It is possible to translate some of the above principles into increasing the effectiveness of attacking. In some aspects, this is not as literal as in defence given that width can often be vital in supporting central possession, as shown by the positional play of Guardiola’s Barcelona and Bayern.

Just like in the defensive aspects, an increased number of connections can benefit an attacking team. This facilitates the use of combination plays with more teammates in a distance from which they can support the ball-carrier. A prime example being Guardiola’s 3-3-4 seen through his final year at Barcelona. Such combinations can be used for many reasons from ball retention to creating a situation for penetrating the defensive block.

A scene from Barcelona’s 8-0 demolition of Osasuna. The central movements of the players allowed for a combination to destabilize the opposition.

With a greater density of players in a small area, overloads happen naturally as a result. These are vital in numerous ways, as they can allow the team to expose the opposite space on the field as the opposition try to match the numerical superiority whilst the simple number of players within a short space can cause great problems.

Through the overloads, a team will always have a free player (trusting that the positioning isn’t so bad) which can be pivotal in the breaking down of a defence. In the situations of numerical superiority (a 3v2 for example), the attacking team must utilise the free player as there is no available defensive player to cover him. An example of this can be found in Roger Schmidt’s Red Bull Salzburg in their 3-0 defeat of Bayern Munich back in January 2014.

The 5v3 overload for Sadio Mané’s opener.

Inside movements from both Mané and Kampl help form a 5v3 overload alongside the less common higher positioning from Ilsanker, which came from the previous phase.

The counterpressing following loss of possession is made much easier when the team are attacking with a more compact shape. This is quite simply a result of having a large number of players around the ball at the time of losing it, all of whom will be able to press instantly upon losing the ball.

From a defensive perspective, counterpressing can be pivotal in the nullification of potential counter-attacks from the opposition. With the instant press of the attackers, the initiating pass can be cut off, stopping the break from happening at it’s beginning.

It can even be extended to be an attacking strategy, and has been used by Schmidt for both Salzburg and Leverkusen. In early possession, they will often make a vertical pass towards an area of high density upfield. The pass doesn’t have to be aimed at a teammate, but just in the general area, so that if it gets intercepted the ball carrier will be faced with 3-4 players counterpressing immediately. From these situations then, the attackers can generate good momentum and combinations breaking out following the compact counterpress.

Working Against Compactness

In their 7-1 demolition of Rome in the Stadio Olimpico, Pep Guardiola demonstrated an excellent method of counteracting a compact defence. On paper, his fielding of Arjen Robben as right wing-back in a 3-4-2-1 understandably came to some shock for a number of fans, as is his nature, but the Dutch winger produced a magnificent performance and was pivotal in their emphatic victory.

Starting formations from Bayern’s UCL game versus Roma.

Through Robben’s very wide positioning, Bayern exploited Roma’s shape brilliantly which caused them great issues as they looked to maintain a good horizontal compactness. Simply through the wide positioning, Robben caused a massive threat whenever Roma were organised narrowly as through switching the play they could create 1v1 situations against Ashley Cole. This is emphasised in the fact that this was often through Xabi Alonso who is very effective in this area of his game.

In argument of this strategy, one could state that such long diagonal passes are largely ineffective. Colm McMullan’s OPTA presentation on the matter, titled ‘Please stop applauding diagonal cross-field passes’, proves that this type of pass in particular is a very ineffective means of ball circulation in attack.

From his study, McMullan found that for a start, this type of pass had only a 40% success rate across the top 5 European leagues. Expanding on this through analysing the events following a completed pass, he calculated the probability of a positive outcome (shot, final third pass and successful take-on are examples of these) of an attempted cross-field diagonal was a meager 17%.

Furthermore, McMullan then used an alternate method of measuring the outcome by tracking the phases of play following the long diagonal (for example, 1 pass equals a phase, as does a shot, aerial duel or other events). This then found figures even more incriminating of the pass, showing that by the end of the possession phase, the outcome was positive only 15% of the time. Such findings carried significant proof of his initial hypothesis, which stated “Diagonal cross-field passes often have excellent aesthetic qualities, but my intuition is that they rarely directly lead to an effective attack”.

On a side note, the study was particularly damning of English ‘hero’ Steven Gerrard who, although McMullan used the findings in favour of the Liverpool midfielder, made a significantly greater number of passes than any other midfielder and thus had a greater negative impact on his team – highlighting his lack of intelligence in passing.

Going back to early-winter Rome, Xabi Alonso can be considered somewhat of an exception to the rule. Unlike his former Liverpool teammate, Alonso’s diagonal switches of play are often made with great pace and low to the ground which negates two of the key issues with such passes. Usually when a player will make this type of pass, there is often a lack of pace and it travels high in the air. In relation to the issue of the speed of the pass, when it is made with low intensity the opposition have much more time to adjust, prepare well for the situation and often challenge the ball upon the attacker receiving it. As for the trajectory, the fact that it travels high not only makes it difficult to control (especially when he is being challenged) due to the angle at which the ball is received, but it is almost impossible for the first touch to continue the attack – it often momentarily slows the play.

With Alonso’s faster and flatter passing however, the team can rarely shift in time to be organised at the point of the attacker receiving the ball, whilst the flat passes don’t slow the play down since the first touch can often be forward, maintaining the pace of the attack. This equates into frequent 1v1 situations being made and given the quality of players which Bayern possess in this aspect, their attacking ability is far better than most – certainly not least in this situation as Robben made one of his best performances this season.

A scene just following the 1st goal – where Robben had cut inside, beaten Ashley Cole and made an excellent curling shot into the far corner.

As you can see above, Roma are quite significantly horizontally compact whilst the diagonal compactness is also strong with the midfield covering the necessary zones. Their compaction and horizontal ball-orientation in this case is a result of having to deal with the left-sided overload which Bayern are forming through Gotze, Bernat, Muller and Alonso – a certain quote comes to mind:

“You have the ball on one side, to finish on the other.” – Josep Guardiola

The quartet do well to move the ball deeper to Alonso, who is in a position where Roma cannot press him instantly due to poor access. Then, as a result of the aforementioned characteristics of Alonso’s passing, he is able to find Robben with a brilliant switching pass which creates a 1v1 situation against Ashley Cole whom he beats before setting up Lahm for a cross towards the penalty spot.

This factor alone was the source of a significant issue which Rudi Garcia was faced with. If he organised his team with an emphasis on horizontal compaction, then they would get exposed by Robben in the switching of play as demonstrated above. It only becomes a significant issue for Roma however, if you consider the consequences of not maintaining a compact defence against Bayern. Had Garcia allowed his team to become stretched then the attacking talents of Gotze, Lewandowski and co. would’ve exploited the centre instantly, making it somewhat of a lose-lose situation for the Giallorossi.

In hindsight, if Roma had made an emphasis on maintaining access to Alonso as frequently as possible, they may have found fewer issues as Bayern’s ability to switch would’ve been limited – something which teams have been doing more and more frequently in the Rückrunde. Admittedly, it is rather easy to suggest ways in which the defense could’ve been better organised following the original strategy resulting in a 7-1 dismantling.

Another way of exploiting compactness is through a previously-mentioned aspect; ball access. During moments where the defending team is unable to press effectively, they become immediately susceptible in areas weakened by their compactness – usually the flanks or behind the defensive line. When against such a team, it is therefore imperative to exploit these situations when they arise – which is inevitable as very few teams can go a full 90 minutes with constant ball access in defence.

Andre Villas-Boas’ teams are notorious for having this issue, as his Chelsea and Spurs sides both had issues with playing a high block without pressure on the ball, and he has brought the problem to Russia too. This is typified in a scene from Zenit’s 2-2 draw with Sevilla in the Europa League which sent the Russians out as Emery’s side edged the first leg 2:1.

In their Europa League game against Sevilla, Zenit press with poor organisation and lack ball access as a result.

In this case, Vitolo has managed to find lots of time and space on the ball as a result of Zenit having no access. You can contribute this to a number of different reasons, namely that the defending team had a very poor spatial compactness as demonstrated by the yellow highlight. The diagonal compactness, or spatial distribution is also quite poor particularly in the pair of Witsel and Shatov who show poor co-ordination and communication which ultimately leaves Vitolo free.

England’s Issues

Because it wouldn’t be an article about compactness if we didn’t have a laugh at the Premier League’s ‘attempts’.

Whether it be a result of a poor-quality of coaching and management, or simply a factor of teams following suit after one-another in a mess of midfield-passivity and high blocks without ball access, the Premier League is notoriously bad in this tactical aspect.

The best way to observe the stark contrast is when an English team takes to the European stage in search of Champions League glory (ha).

A scene from Manchester City’s 1:0 defeat in Barcelona.

In the above situation, Pellegrini’s side display a poor organisation in terms of compactness, which translates into an uncoordinated press. The vertical and horizontal compactness isn’t exactly good, but it’s not bad either – the issue is their spatial compactness. This is the level of compactness within the block and as shown by the red space here, they lack it severely in midfield. Once Rakitic breaks (can you break something which was never correct?) the line of Milner and Silva, he has a great area to drive into.

The poor organisation overall in this scene can be contributed at least somewhat down to the lack of preparation. In the seconds before the diagram there was no effort to prepare the team to press by any player – the most severe case is perhaps amongst the deeper midfield 3 who have made no attempt to close out the space highlighted in red which would’ve made the press at least partially stable.

These factors result in absolutely zero defensive access as Rakitic cannot be put under any decent pressure for a long period of time, at which point he could have already caused damage to the English defence. This, accompanied by spaces in the defensive block through poor spatial compaction, equates to a very threatening situation for City to deal with – one which results in an unmarked Neymar hitting the post from inside the box.

Other aspects such as the incorrect situational man-marking highlight the poor intelligence which is common in English football, most likely a result of the coaching standard and culture.

You can contrast this easily with teams such as Atletico Madrid, Bayern Munich and Juventus however instead of looking at the champions in their respective leagues (just like Man City), we’ll go to Monaco – a team Arsenal expected to walk over.

In contrast, Monaco held great compactness in their victory in London, stopping any chance of central access for Arsenal.

In stark contrast to City, Monaco defend with a brilliantly organised compact shape. From this, they have benefits which City didn’t possess – such as strong defensive access to the ball (as they’re in a strong position to press with Berbatov suported by Mouthino and Dirar), whilst they control the centre and force the likes of Sanchez drop away from a dangerous area, as shown above. It is noteworthy that second before this diagram, the midfield and forwards made slight adjustments before pressing again, showing a preparation to increase effectiveness.

While we all enjoy European league’s summer break, watching some Copa América or Women’s World Cup, let us talk about the everyman’s strategy in football.

If you cannot break through an opposing defence why not just play the ball down the flank and cross it into the middle? It seems like an easy strategy at first glance. However, after years of statistically analysing football, it should be common sense that knocking the ball into the box is not the most effective way of using ball possession in the opposing half. But here is the deal: It only needs to work once or twice in a match for it to be deemed profitable, while being an easily realisable tactic. Just throw all the advantages of effectively exploiting ball possession and attacking opportunities out of the window.

Particularly in England, one could have the feeling cross passes are something worth striving for. Crossing is seen as a counter to the opposition parking the bus – a cornerstone of English football thinking. Note: High and intense pressing is not common in Premier League or in Italy’s Serie A. Players and spectators often describe the English way of football as very intense and fatiguing. A usual Premier League clash goes back and forth. Of course, continual attacking runs down the flanks, where the opposing is not defending as strongly as in the centre of the pitch, accelerate the game.

However, we sometimes watch matches like when Manchester United drew with Fulham on February 9, 2014, crossing the ball 82 times. The input was high, the outcome extremely little. And remember, every inaccurate cross means the team loses the ball, even if it hurtles through the six yard box, while all target players standing five yards deeper.

Manchester United vs Fulham | Squawka.com

Don’t get me wrong. There are great full-backs and wingers like Atlético’s Juanfran or the legendary Ricardo Quaresma, who can play accurate cross passes in a constant manner. Or a team can utilise cross passes to shift the balance of an attacking play instead of putting the ball in the box for the purpose of forcing strikers in cheerless air duels.

As for this article, I have looked at various numbers of the last season in Europe’s leading leagues – Premier League, Bundesliga, La Liga, and Serie A. We can clearly see the Bundesliga is the exception to the rule. Germany’s primary football competition displayed the highest crossing accuracy, the lowest amount of open crosses, and the lowest percentage of goals that were scored via open crosses. Seemingly, La Liga and Serie A outnumbered the Premier League, while the English teams nevertheless scored more goals directly from open crosses.

Crossing accuracy

Open crosses per game

Percentage of goals from open crosses

Only 13 percent of all Bundesliga goals stemmed directly from a cross, while the average Bundesliga team needed 80.24 crosses for scoring a single goal. A Premier League side needed 67.46. Overall, teams in big four leagues required 71.97 open crosses per goal on average. Another aspect we have already known is that only 20 percent of all key passes via open crosses have led to goals. (By the way, Hamburger SV played 453 crosses last season, leading to 65 shot attempts, converting only one. That can be considered waste of ball possession.) In contrast, 45 percent of all key passes via through balls have created successful goal scoring attempts. Of course, there are problems with measuring crosses or through balls that lead indirectly to goals.

Interestingly, not every team that sees much of the ball in the opposition half crosses more than sides with less ball possession. For instance, Bayer Leverkusen (top left) played only 13.29 crosses per game, despite 32 percent of their actions happened in the opponent’s half. With 26.89 crosses per game Internazionale had the highest amount of crosses last season, while Borussia M’Gladbach had the lowest with 11.29.

The bigger a bubble the more goals are scored from open crosses per game.

Some could urge an argument that crossing the ball generates more shots in the penalty area than trying to pass the defence line by playing short passes or risky through balls. Again, let us look at the numbers. There is no distinct correlation between the percentage of shots taken in the penalty area and the number of open crosses. Regarding the shots taken inside the six yard box, the correlation seems slightly more significant, considering that a team, which has more shot attempts inside the tiny six yard area, mostly is a dominant one that, besides other tools, uses cross passes. Bayern Munich had 16.5 crosses per game last season, Barcelona produced 20.37 in La Liga.

However, the number of open crosses played per game has barely any effect on the shots taken inside the penalty area. It is the challenge of constantly crossing the ball accurately what could make this strategy worthwhile.

The same goes for the correlation between crossing und the shot conversion inside the penalty area. Looking only at the Premier League numbers, we have the case that teams with a higher frequency of crossing have even a lower conversion rate inside the penalty area as well as inside the six yard box.

Only Premier League 2014-2015

Only Premier League 2014-2015

I finish with a quote from Liverpool’s legendary left-half Bob Paisley: “It’s not about the long ball or the short ball; it’s about the right ball.” That is what we have to keep in mind. Intriguingly, the numbers do not give us the evidence that crossing is principally an ineffective way to approach the question of how we can create goal scoring opportunities – but it can be an ineffective way in certain cases.

Attacking is not all about mastering one-on-one situations. It is about vision, movement, smoothness, and a sense of spaces. Something Arjen Robben has perfected.

We all know how to pull off a Robben. From the right wing, you cut inside on your strong left foot to move to a more central attacking position, using your great acceleration and agility to take on defenders until you find the space to shoot the ball with the inside of your foot, tipping it into far corner. Every attacking player would wish it was all that easy.

Arjen Robben represents a certain breed of wingers in world football. The Dutchman has only one strong foot he usually uses to pass the ball and more importantly to put the ball into the net. Normally, he plays on the right side. So he cannot just run down the outside lane and cross the ball with his right foot in the penalty area. That is everything but news. Robben is one of the most impressive inverse (or inverted) wingers we can enjoy nowadays.

And the assumption is that these players utilise diagonal movement far more often than conventional wingers. The advantages of such types of players, which had already existed for quite some time, have been discovered due to the narrowness of central space, and the likes of Robert Pires, Lionel Messi and the late Robben have shown the right way to fill that particular role.

As already mentioned, the frequent attack pattern of an inverted winger is cutting inside from the wing, which can be completed by a shot attempt with the strong foot or an accurate through ball played at an angle of 90 degrees. Even though the players have many options when they cut inside, the action pattern might be crystal-clear and even individually strong footballers could become predictable. Therefore, some players are more effective when they are fielded conventionally and frequently switch between a more classic style of play and the one inverted wingers uses. That is why, despite, for instance, a left footer plays on the left side, he can also cut inside and act like an inverted winger. However, the ability of having two feet of equal value is rather helpful.

Are conventional wingers, who just bomb up and down the pitch at express speed and knock the ball in the box when they reach the last third, a dying breed? Can we simply separate wingers into two categories?

Just out of curiosity, I looked at some numbers, comparing the last season’s league stats of twenty inverse wingers with only one strong foot and twenty conventional wingers with only one strong foot. For instance, left footer Gareth Bale almost always played on the right side at Real Madrid. Thus, he belongs to the first category. In contrast, Manchester City’s Jesus Navas, who has only a strong right foot, was always fielded as attacking right winger. He belongs to the second category.

Green = Conventional | Red = Invers

Intriguingly, the numbers do not show a clear distinction between both types of wingers. In fact, the crossing accuracy and the amount of key passes generated by open crosses are virtually identical. Of course, conventional wingers play more crosses in total, while inverse wingers can generate more shots with their strong foot as well as more shots from outside the box. Actually, the numbers of key passes that come by the way of throughballs are most interesting. According to the collected data, conventional wingers play more than four times as many key passes. The reasons for that are not obvious, but could be related to how throughballs are measured, especially when early, flat crosses cut through the defenders line. Apart from that, these data show that it is rather a question of how to use strong wingers than a matter of philosophy.

The 3-6-1 is a rarely used formation, which could bring some interesting opportunities in top-class football. The aim of this analysis is to give a small example of a system utilizing this formation.

Formations are indeed mostly just telephone numbers, but they can inherit certain characteristics. A 10-0-0 would, due to its extremeness, not really give much presence in the front two lines, right? Obviously, such extreme cases are virtually non-existent. There are just a few tendencies towards specific formations with some variations and action patterns that create a system. The “problematic” zones of most formations can be neutralized (or enhanced) by specific actions / movement patterns. The system – which involves the formation, the roles, the quality of the players, the structural background, the movement, etc. – thus is mostly the focus of our analyses.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a formation which might bring very interesting possibilities and seems underused. I am talking about the 3-6-1.

The 3-6-1: A logical step

Some teams even were referred to as 3-7-0 (Barcelona vs Santos, 2011) or 4-6-0 (United, 2007/08) which wasn’t really true as this mostly referred to the type of players they used compared to the typical use of players in more classical interpretations of these formations. United, for instance, still pressed mostly in a 4-4-2 and didn’t really have at least one player positioned in or at the last oppositional line.

Other formations like the 5-4-1 with flat four or the 4-5-1 with flat midfield five however were utilized in the last years. BVB showed some good performances with the latter system under Jürgen Klopp, the 5-4-1 was played by Costa Rica at the last World Cup successfully. However, both formations – if interpreted how the ‘telephone number’ suggests – have an obvious tendency to lack the presence upfront and at the press in higher zones. Also, they ability to transition to possession or counter effectively can be impaired.

Again this can be solved at times with the use of midfielders or wingers leaving the line to press higher, but this fundamental problem of these formations needs specific players, certain situations or, obviously, a formative change to be solved.

Still, the basic idea of these formations with just one player in the most forward line is interesting because you can shape yourself with many players behind the ball and occupy the deeper zones massively. An attempt to connect this high presence in the middle, the enormous width staggering (Breitenstaffelung in German) and the high amount of players in the first two lines with more presence and access in the higher zones, both in possession and out of it, could be the 3-6-1.

Atlético created the 3-6-1 a couple of times against Barcelona years ago situationally. Diego Simeone is thus the official SV-Patron of this article.

Chain of Six enables flexibility in and out of possession

In a way, four or five players are redundant in the last lines, if you have enough pressure and presence in front of these zones. Chile and Bayern for instance had a high stability defensively and against the ball with a back three where just a few players would situationally drop deeper; either the wing-backs or the central midfielders.

Also the pendulating back fours of nominal 3-5-2 and 3-4-3 formations worked well at the World Cup and for some teams (like Liverpool under Rodgers in their best phases or Gladbach versus Bayern yesterday).

A 3-6-1 gives teams the possibility to flexibly act with a back three, back four or back five. After all, with six players in a chain in front of the first line there are enough players to resolve from the chain, drop deeper and re-organize if needed. The same can of course be done further up. The six players in the central line can leave forward and support. This movement is possible in the 4-5-1 and the 5-4-1, too, but due to the amount of players this is not only possible in a more flexible way, but also with higher intensity. You can utilize more players or leave the lines further and longer, because the cover behind is higher. The amount of players also enables more access to the second line of the oppositional build up.

Even if, for example, three players push forward at the same time, a compact and supporting 3-3 block remains behind as cover. Due to the Sechserkette it’s possible to accomplish vastly different pressing patterns with diverse effects. The possibilities are almost endless.

To show the theoretical effectivity of this I decided to create one specific system with concrete movement patterns which could be used.

3-6-1 in high press

The 3-6-1 may sound fundamentally defensive, but like virtually any line-up it can be interpreted more offensively. With a very high pressing there are some interesting and potentially interesting side effects of the initial 3-6-1 staggering.

3-6-1-base formation at high pressing.

In this situation the opposing keeper has the ball, the two central defenders are initially left open. The wingers in this scenario are behaving more man-oriented, while the central players remain on their positions. The opponent will be forced to build up. If they hit it long, we have a much better staggering for the second balls with much more presence. Especially long diagonals to the wingers are useful, because the whole 3-6-1 block will move towards there and isolate them.

In Germany, as avid readers of our site know, there is the Halbraum between wing and middle. The word, by the way, stems from the old formations with half backs, centre halves, inside forwards and so on. In German they became Halbläufer, Halbstürmer and Halbverteidiger which in turn led to the zones they mostly were positioned to become the Halbraum or Halfspace. In German coaching education they are used between middle and wings, coaches like Klopp and Tuchel refer explicitly to it.

In the 3-6-1 we have basically two wingers or, to be more precise, one runner on the wing and one runner in the half space. Two central midfielders support them and together they move towards the middle, where they get supported by the back line shifting to the ball. Now it’s possible to create a high intensity and pressure on the ball with many players occupying the middle due to the ball oriented movement of the collective. The passes into central midfield or long balls seem open, but due to the amount of players and movement possibilities should be covered well. When the opponents starts the deep circulation, so does the pressing start.

Movement of the 3-6-1 base formation in high press. Ball possession of the right central defender.

The goalkeeper passes to the right centre back, which triggers the press. The central forward tries to isolate the central defenders, whereas the winger closes down the full back. Alternatively, it’s possible to leave him open and focus more on the right winger of the opponent while letting them build through the side, but the first mentioned option creates a higher pressure. Also the winger can be let open with longer passes defended by the remaining defense and especially the runner in the half space.

An interesting mechanism is to let one of the central midfielders advance to the oppositional central midfielder. The ball near is recommended but it can be also done with the ball far central midfielder with a long diagonal run to congest space more and try to prevent switches. In this situation the remaining central midfielders move towards the ball and the gap opened by the player who advanced forward to press.

Against long balls to the left central midfielder of the orange team or diagonally to the left winger there is enough presence to immediately create access. It’s very hard for the opponent to penetrate the shape and even if they do so, the formation enables the possibility for massive backwards press and high compactness.

But possession-oriented teams with good goalkeeper and strong ball circulation may play the ball over the goalkeeper quickly to the other side. Theoretically, this could lead to problems, but again the highly occupied second line is helping there.

Response to the oppositional ball circulation around the pressing.

The ball far players now again move towards the ball and shift. The centre forward can’t immediately press the second centre back or consistently defend after switches of sides, which is why he should drop deeper first and take the oppositional central midfielder in his covering shadow if possible. The previously quasi-man-marking player (central midfielder) drops deeper and returns to his abandoned position. The right half space runner moves out and closes down the first passing option. This mechanism should slow down the oppositional build up and the positive effects of their switch should be cushioned.

On the ball side the side defender and the winger orientate towards their nearest oppositional player. They are not intended to cover them immediately, but keep distance first. With this, they should be allowed to the wings and the pressing team wins time for the movement of the players from the weak side. This is especially important for the three man back line. For very fast combinations and good movement of the opponent it’s perhaps slightly instable on the sides, which might lead to a more passive and more cautious 3-6-1-0 as counter measure.

Position oriented and more cautious 3-6-1 (-0)–high press with two (or three) possible pressing schemes.

In this variation the centre-forward is deeper whereby the oppositional centre backs can build up undisturbed. The question is: Where? This formation lives from it’s staggering-pressure (Staffelungsdruck). This means, that every supposedly open player is under immediate pressure even if he receives the pass properly due to the shape. The 3-6-1 also isolates him from relevant zones and team mates. The central forward now has to cover less space, he’s focusing on the space around and between the oppositional holders and when they split, they can be picked up by the midfielders.

The green and red arrows show which opportunities are given to the opponent. Both schemes create a 3-3-3-1 with extreme vertical compactness and three rows of three players mutually shifted to each other. While the red scheme attracts the opponents more towards the sides to attack them aggressively on the wing through shifting to the ball and having more access centrally, the green scheme is stronger (on paper, at least) after long diagonals in wing defending whilst still occupying the middle effectively.

If the opposing team uses a deeper dropping holding midfielder, it changes little. On the contrary: The 3-6-1 should have it easier to keep the opponent in irrelevant zones and the movement when shifting should be simpler / more success stable.

This applies however not only to the high press. Even a lower alignment can act with similar schemes.

The 3-6-1 with deeper alignment

3-6-1-basic staggering in midfield pressing.

In the end, the formation is just somewhat drawn deeper and slightly adapted. The wing runners are a bit deeper, the pressing schemes have been adjusted. The principles still remain fairly similar. There are two mutually shifted 3-3-staggerings with minor differences. Personally, I think such a medium press would be quite interesting.

The opponent can’t or at least won’t utilize the goalkeeper in these higher zones, has to play it back often and will have problems against a fairly positionoriented, passive defense. Long balls behind the defense might be defended with a lesser success probability but the slightly deeper wingers and a goalkeeper competently coming out of the box should lessen this and support the three central defenders.

The height of this pressing variation and the formation in itself are interesting, because you can counter potentially extremely fast and effectively. Behind the oppositional defense there should be some space, also the row of six enables massive movement forward.

Counter options after winning the ball.

In this hypothetical situation above the 3-6-1 wins the ball in the left half space. The intercepted pass can be played immediately to the left wing runner who either moves up or pushes into the middle and opens space for the runner in the half space. The centre forward and the holding midfielder can move along into the open green space to support zonal changes of the ball or advance directly.

Both lateral players on the ball far side are moving forward and thus creating enormous problems for the opponent because they flexibly occupy the further zones and in the same time can take advantage of the higher positions of the oppositional full back and winger. These counters thus allow to attack a high number of different spaces and provide many options while still being covered well with two central players and three defenders.

The special thing about the counters in this system is the central coverage while maintaining great spacing in the zones. That’s very important for counters: Have width, but still keep the connections and options for combination play alive. The centre forward is the only player to covert he middle first and then he can move laterally to open space, act as supporting player for flick-ons and lay-offs or for direct passes in behind the defense.

On both sides there are also two players who can combine in narrow spaces, change positions and open space for each other.  On the other side there are two passing options for a switch. There is again the possibility to combine in small spaces, change positions and give passing options hard to cover for the opponent. Return passes into the well-staffed space in front of the defense or directly into the centre forward give depth into both directions. All in all, this is a quality shape that is useful for movement in counters, but also in ball circulation.

An even deeper alignment would also be possible, obviously. An example of a movement pattern in a 3-6-1 deep press:

3-6-1-deep press

In this scheme the player in the right half space would drop to cover for long diagonals with the wing runner staying higher, the central midfielders occupy the middle and the ball near players are fairly man-oriented. The side defender of the back line acts a bit more aggressive in terms of leaving the line and press, because the central midfielders and the runner in half space are a bit more conservative positionally. They are moving out when the ball comes into the middle.

This makes a very central shape where the runners near the ball can create access and the centre forward attacks the back pass of the opponent if it occurs. This system is different to the above system, which shows the various possibilities of one formation.

Of course, such a style of play requires a suitable player material. A team that would be perfectly suited is Chelsea. Note: This article was written in German first in winter 2014/15 before the transfers (and crisis) of Chelsea occurred.

Chelsea’s 3-6-1

The intention of this line-up is to give an approximate indication about which player types could occupy the respective positions in such a 3-6-1 formation. The above mentioned back three would be utilized quite offensively, yet all three of them have the defensive skillset for this system even if they were often utilized as full backs.

Alternatively, Terry, Zouma and Cahill are also possible. Hazard, Oscar, Willian and Cuadrado would occupy the four wing/halfspace positions. All of them – except Hazard probably – are quite good defensively for wingers and on the other hand all of them can dribble. Matic and Fabregas act as circulation players in the middle. Fabregas can roam forward with good coverage to utilize his strength in final passing and circulation. Matic on the other hand is the more strategic distributor in deeper zones and also the one who’s more suited to tight situations.

A fit and content Diego Costa is a very good centre forward for this system due to his movement, his physical abilities and the support around him. The system and environment for him resembles partly what made him so important for Atlético. Obviously, Hazard could be used in a different position and players like Ramires or Obi Mikel could get into the team.

The 3-6-1 would be therefore interesting for a team like Chelsea which has the abilities for such a system due to their squad and obviously their competent coach in terms of playing against the ball and in counters. The formation is not only potentially outstanding for the transition (in both directions), but also useful in own possession.

Variability in the offense

Theoretically it’s possible to just push forward the players in the half space and play a regular 3-4-2-1. A classical 3-4-3 is also possible. It’s more important anyways to have clean patterns, creative and supportive movement with specific guidelines for movement and finding of positions. Guardiola’s conceptual positional play (“El Juego De Posición”) for instance always uses different line-ups and formations but has similar effects and the same strategical principles. To stay (more or less) with the 3-6-1 theme of this article I’ve created a graphic with a huge amount of hypothetical movements to show what’s possible:

The 3-6-1 in build up

Let’s start at the back: The goalkeeper can move laterally to offer himself as passing option for the side defenders or to switch the game into the middle or to the other side. Obviously, with goalkeepers like Neuer, ter Stegen, Sommer, Buffon, Bravo, Reina or De Gea it’s even possible to try it outside of the box.

The central one of the back three tries to open passing lanes to two central midfielders which can act narrow to each other for fast combinations or split a bit wider, too. The side defenders of the back three move a bit towards the ball and cover, but if it suits their profile they can also advance forward to attack. The wing and half space runners can change positions, move freely and overload the space between the lines and the middle. The three light blue points in the space between the lines are potentially three positions which can be filled flexibly by these deeper players.

The other players in higher zones should support these rotations and create overloads. For opening space and layoffs the central forward is responsible. This should make it hard for the opposition to cover properly, especially when utilizing man marking. Especially their full backs and wingers could get problems about who to mark.

Obviously trying to use all the possibilities above would be too much for many players, especially when not having much training and preparation time. Not all movements are simple or done cleanly and with high success stability. The latter thing could be a problem for the 3-6-1.

Which problems are there?

The 3-6-1 is – like every other formation – shaky against very good and well-adapted movement, fast circulation with good layoffs and intelligent switches of attacks, incl. ball position, rhythm and directions. A very good opponent can break it. Also there are some efficiency problems in the use and integration of some players (wings, mainly) against the ball and with the ball and perhaps problems in harmonical movement in pressing in front of the 3-6-block, some possible problems against long balls behind the defense and playing out of the oppositional counterpressing if done with high intensity.

Still, it’s a promising formation with many possibilities (for instance a switch to a 3-1-5-1 is easily possible) and no bigger weaknesses than others.

3-1-5-1

In the 3-1-5-1 it’s possible to use a holding midfielder who drops into the back line – like Busquets did for Barcelona under Guardiola in 2011/12 – when needed to support the width staggering.

Conclusion

After the recent uses of the 4-5-1 and 5-4-1 the 3-6-1 should be next. It integrates the reasons why these two formations were used (in different systems) in a different way and has other, different properties. The goal of this article was to show this and some possible interpretations.

The Bundesliga, the heart of German football, lives from its entertainment qualities. It is sold as an exciting and attractive league with modern stadiums, fan-owned clubs and a relatively passionate but also peaceful atmosphere during the matches. The Bundesliga, though, is suffering at the moment. It is suffering from the uber-pressing syndrome.

The Revolution began at some point in the mid or late 2000s. Ralf Rangnick, nick-named ‘football professor,’ was involved; Jürgen Klopp as well. The latter was so successful with the team of Borussia Dortmund that the pressing and aggressive transition style became more than acceptable in the football society. It became desirable. Everywhere, not only in Germany, Borussia were hailed for their, superficially speaking, hunting behaviour.

Over the years, a lot of coaches and their teams have developed an affinity towards pressing styles. The opposing build-up play has been attacked earlier. Teams have moved up more quickly and have tried to advance to the opponent’s goal by passing shorter distances. As Dortmund’s type of football did not only rely on components such as passion and the willingness to run, but also included a lot of collective and group tactical schemes, which only allowed their strong defensive grasp in midfield, some coaches have gradually departed from that strategy.

Instead of pushing forward early and using a relatively high-risk field protection behind the first block, teams now focus more and more on a deeper middle press – what is, of course, barely a new phenomenon. On the top of this, the use of Gegenpressing has largely disappeared. Only a few coaches still accept the risk that can pay off when the pressure of tight, aggressive formations is high and tactical mechanisms are working.

What happens to the Bundesliga? It becomes uniform.

Many teams neutralise each other in duels between two 4-4-2 systems, using a middle press, while man-orientated defending dominates the wing zones and the centre is covered more or less compactly.

Plus, teams usually relinquish aggressive forward movement, and therefore avoid to leave open gaps that could potentially be exploited by opposing counter-attacks. Thus, on the one hand Bundesliga teams target counter-attacks, but on the other hand they do everything they can to not let the opponent hit them on the break.

The possibility of playing successful counter-attacks has decreased in the recent past, when looking solely on structural aspects. If a team gets caught on the break, there are usually individual mistakes or micro-tactical flaws that led to that.

What are the reasons? Most Bundesliga coaches as well as the vast majority of their players have no creativity to speak of. It is a lack of distinct development of own ideas that causes the general concentration on reactive methods.

Naturally, a simple 4-4-2 or 4-2-3-1 system is easier to implement, while on the other side a concept such as Juego de Posición requires a higher level of tactical training, so that the players are not only able to execute a single possession-based game plan, but that they have also the ability to understand adjustments within the confines of a competitive match.

Currently, there are only two sides, Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund, that mainly design their game play to use effective ball possession. It is questionable if most of the other coaches are even intellectually capable of doing equal things. Some of them, of course, are restricted by the lack of technical superiority of their players. But is the strategy of knocking the ball forward without any alternative? Is it really necessary to immediately lose possession on purpose?

Particularly the situations when a team build up are repetitive. Therefore, using a playbook and studying attacking plays, which are a bit more sophisticated, are not impossible.

Though, there has to be the will to change, the audacity to get over early failings, and the confidence to disregard public opinions. Germany’s football culture might be a major reason, why many Bundesliga sides make themselves comfortable with a reactive strategy. From pub tables to tabloids, the bulk of observers prefers intensity and quick offensive plays. The likes of Louis van Gaal, Pep Guardiola, and Joachim Löw have been under critical surveillance since they have had a bias towards positional plays, ball possession, and calmer attacks.

If Bayern loses a match, the calls for a faster playing style emerge. If Wolfsburg loses a match, hardly anybody demands a more constructive, possession-based tactic, although they are considered a top-tier side.

The Bundesliga is, among La Liga, Serie A and English Premier League, one of the best leagues in the world. Moreover, the Bundesliga has been considered to be some sort of a pioneer of football tactics in the 2010s. That status, however, cannot be taken for granted. The title race has barely been competitive, as Bayern have dominated for quite a while. Consequently, at least the overall quality has to remain on a high level.

There is no room for the “It is what it is” apology.

Borussia Dortmund’s success under Klopp’s guidance seemed to be a modern fairy tale. Neglecting other approaches, the Bundesliga have unfortunately fallen in love with anti-proactive styles. Even though leading the opposing build-up with a high press has been some sort of proactive football, this philosophy has more or less disappeared. It is now the time – better late than never – for a paradigm change. It is now the time that the clubs’ front offices give coaches, who are creative, not accepting any kind of rigidity, a chance.

Eventually, the majority of fans will follow and the football culture will change.

One of the questions I have received most is how to create a game model. Which aspects should you look at and how? This is my article trying to answer that.

Obviously writing in detail about all of that would probably take a whole book.

Some fundamentals are required like being able to analyze your players, the trends in your leagues, which types of teams you’ll play often against (from a strategical, not necessarily tactical point of view) and how to connect all of these aspects to a system. Sir Alex Ferguson or also Claudio Ranieri now have created a successful system partly because of specific patterns recognizable in the league and thus utilizing game theory to their and their players’ advantage.

Another thing is the ability not only to coach this from a methodological point of view (incl. man management, didactics, etc.), but also in terms of understanding your players. I have done some work about this in my webinar on Inspire! and in my German book “Fußball Durch Fußball” (translated as Football by/through Football) together with Marco Henseling. Also recently I wrote an article for the coaching magazine of the German FA on how to create an opponent specific match plan.

Still, the question mentioned at start always pops up: How do I make a game model for my team? Thus, I want to give a small example on this.

The Base

Perhaps the most important thing is to decide which things are non-negotiable for you as a coach and which are flexible.

Normally I do create my system, both as a coach with my amateur team or as an analyst / consultant, in regards to the players I have at my disposal and the league we play in – because this will deduce on how many training we have, which level we will have physically, technically and tactically but also how the opposition will normally play. Then I / we adapt them towards the opponent on a weekly basis. Still, there are some aspects I consider most important and thus I will look to introduce them into my team no matter what – at least as a coach.

Man or zonal marking, pressing, counterpressing, compactness, positional play and ball oriented movement out of possession, short passing, etc. could be such things; nevertheless specific aspects of this can be varied in detail if the players have specific strengths or weaknesses.

When I took over a team that played man marking, I did look to introduce zonal marking but let them play a variation of zonal marking which allowed them to man mark in their zone. This is used by Dieter Hecking similarly and the literal English translation would be “zonal man marking”; everyone man marks but just in the zones that belong to their opposition. As most teams don’t overload or change positions in an organized way in this league it worked fairly fine. Thus, they had their typical orientation but did not leave gaps as open as in man marking.

Man Marking vs Zonal Man Marking (or: Man Marking In Zone). On the left you see a player tracking his opponent even away from his zone. On the right you can see the same player tracking his opponent until the outer limits of his zone and then leaving him to his team mate who steps up. There are endless variations of this, though (some do it off the ball, some only near the ball, different switches of who moves up, etc.).

I did this also because of other external factors: Due to lack of training time on this level I would not be able to introduce a clean and well executed zonal marking so I first did this before I would later leave it for a proper zone. The other possibility I contemplated  was to let them play a very strict zonal marking where the extremeness of it (similar to Villarreal or Gladbach) would help me to change their mindset faster as the message was clearer and later on introduce a more variable variation; I decided against this way due to the players.

Also I looked at playing a positional style of play – look up Adin’s article on our site or Kieran Smith’s great presentation on Inspire for more information on Juego de Posición – which worked well in the first season but only in the first two thirds; in the last third the team just had players who are more suited to a chaotic, dynamical style which lead to us building up in something akin to Juego de Posición and then playing more ‘messy’ in the last third and even before that. After some of the players left, we changed to a different style in possession which did not have much principles of Positional Play anymore.

Example of an asymmetrical 3-4-1-2 I used with an earlier team of mine.

Thus, it’s important to clarify which things you want to see and which things you could adapt how. Not only your squad is important, but the whole context of the league.

Analyze The Surroundings

Different cultures, levels and leagues have different patterns. Some leagues vary a huge amount, others have teams playing in very similar systems.

Let’s go back to the previous example: In Austrian lower leagues until a certain level most teams either play a 3-4-1-2 with man marking and sweeper or a 4-4-2 with a mixture of zonal marking and man marking (wings in the back four as man markers, central midfield players too). Thus, when building the game model it’s important to reflect what this means tactically and what the strengths and weaknesses of the oppositional systems are.

This is not focused just on the formation; it’s much more about the movement and patterns these teams use. One example from the EPL are the positioning and passes from Fuchs and Albrighton paired with Vardy’s movement at Leicester; they lure out the oppositional wing and full back and then play long diagonals in behind after Vardy runs horizontally and then into deep, which attacks specific marking and movement aspects of EPL teams. Also it uses Vardy’s ability quite well.

The left winger occupies the right full back, the left full back has now a gap to play a long ball. Vardy can either run directly in behind or run horizontally and then into depth, depending on communication of the players marking him, the gap, what Fuchs does on the ball and things like when eye contact occurs between them.

If your opponents are mostly playing man marking, you should teach your players (first) how to play against man marking, how to read man marking schemes and how to behave individually and collectively against that. The same applies for zonal marking, of course.

For instance, some coaches use as guideline against zonal marking to position in behind the oppositional pressing line and move out of the cover shadows of the players in these lines. Others like to put their players in one line with the opposition so they can turn into more space. And some put their players into the next line of the opposition to play with lay-offs after long verticals – sometimes on purpose to players behind oppositional players so they can feel where the pressure will be coming from.

In all of these situations the first decision for the player getting free is if he’ll run into the gap or if he’ll already be positioned. The first decision helps him in terms of visual field of opposition who either don’t see him or have to lose eye contact to the ball carrier. In the first picture left he drops and receives between opposition, so he has more space to turn into. In the second picture he goes into depth, so he can either break through or lay it off to his team mate – who is positioned in a way that if he gets pressed he can get his body between ball and opponent most easily. In the latter he moves centrally in between these four which gives them a tough decision who will push out to press (or if it will happen).

So depending on the tactical goal and the coaches’ preference for his players the exact position will vary.

Yet, if the opponent man marks, you don’t have such lines. The opponent will follow you, this creates messy shapes and you’ll have problems to position yourself behind the opponent due to him marking and running after you, normally staying at your back. Here are other things important which are called ‘dismarking’ by some experts like the people from 3four3 from the US. On a surface level there are some fundamental (and interconnected) ways to leave your marker which I just want to mention and will explore in a tactical theory article someday:

• Distraction & miscommunication
• Misdirection & Deception
• Dynamical Positioning
• Positional Rotation
• Specific passing patterns
• Dribbling & Receiving

Coaching these aspects could possibly be more important in a league more focused on aggressive man marking all over the pitch which we will use in this example. Coaching instructions can precisely be about this, too:

• Read your opponent! Does he follow you if you move higher? If you move deeper? Be active and try to create distance.

It’s important to look at such reoccurring aspects from many perspectives and in many situations to optimally use them.

The Players

In the end it’s the most important to create a suitable system for your players. Which players are success stable when and act well in which situations? Where not? How do the synergies between players look like? Could they occur more/better in other situations? Can we create these situations consistently? If so, how? Which aspects of their play am I realistically able to coach and enhance, which not?

This is an art in itself. Finding out how players act together is hard, especially when experimenting with new schemes, systems and so on. Culture and age is also important to note for training and the application of these aspects.

To show how this might look, I will create an hypothetical example so it’s more understandable.

In this example we will have following players for our first XI; please note that I kept the description of the players very basic and simple, in truth it’s much more complex and involves also psychological aspects, their injury history, how they orientate and position themselves naturally in some situations, their technical or athletic ability, etc.:

• One player who can build from deep but can’t play in the back line
• Another player who is an intelligent players who gives balance with average technical and great physical ability
• Two strong players who could act as centre backs who are dynamic enough to act as full backs but not on a consistent basis with above average build up for this level
• A player who’s adept at building from deep, has great distribution and reads the game well out of possession
• Two players who could play as wingbacks and wingers on each side too (although then totally different roles) but with the left wing back being more a central midfielder or even full back
• One box to box player who is a strong runner, has good feeling for space around the box and a great feel for finishing situations in the box
• A player with great ability on the ball in tight spaces, above average height and heading, lack of stamina but good speed and very good distribution
• A fairly simple player who is great in holding onto the ball, simple one-touch combinations and fast

The opponents mostly play the afromentioned man marking scheme in a 3-4-1-2 (with a sweeper as spare man). Now how do we build a system out of these 11? I, subjectively, would choose the following game model:

An Asymmetrical 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1

Especially in lower levels it’s hard to find a team where you can use symmetrical shapes; even if you try to most don’t play symmetrically. To utilize the potential to the fullest, it’s often required to play a bit asymmetrical. In this case the 3-2-4-1 in possession has a slightly lopsided diamond in the middle and will become a 3-4-2-1 and perhaps even a 4-3-2-1 or 5-2-2-1 out of possession.

Asymmetrical 3-2-4-1.

For simpler explanation in our hypothetical training we will pair some players which are interacting in a specific way (positional changes and balancing movements) with each other. I like to use these pairings because it simplifies orientation on this level and will come handy in something I will mention later on, too.

The left holding midfielder will be paired with the sweeper; when we get pressured he should act in the middle as option for passes and to distribute while he can drop between the left side back and the central back. This in turn allows the side backs to become full backs and push forward. We then either have two wings on each side or the wing backs can move towards the middle.

Our next pairing is the right holding midfielder with the right wing back. They should not move to far away from each other, hold positions and change them in specific situations; especially prior to a switch from the left side or in more passive situations with good marking of the opponent (obviously the cues and triggers can be much more detailed and frequent).

The left central midfielder is paired with the left wing back; here the asymmetry occurs. While the two holding midfielders are in one line, they are paired differently thus one of them will drop more frequently deeper (if we train it correctly and properly) with the other moving more often towards the wing in the second or third line of our nominal formation. The left central midfielder is positioned higher in the basic build up but has similar movement with the wing back on his side while the right central midfielder is free to roam, to move deeper and support there, to build play in higher zones or act as second striker.

Our striker upfront on the other hand is instructed to move towards the sides with a tendency to go more towards the left; he can interact with the players there and opens space for our free player on the right side of our central midfield / “top” of our lopsided diamond.

Why do we choose this? Most teams in the league, as you can remember, have a 3-4-1-2 and man marking. With these positions and movements we have

• More players in the central spaces
• Positional changes as team tactical tool to get free against man marking and mess up their spacing and coverage scheme
• The ability to build with three or two / four players in the first line and overload the wings if needed, which might be especially useful against 3-4-1-2 opponents with aggressive man marking
• Open spaces centrally with the ability to fill them by many players surrounding these zones

We can also change our pressing fairly easily against the teams in this league. If the opponent has a 3-4-1-2, we let them build and then advance aggressively after a sideways pass.

If their player in the first line is very wide, our wing back will advance to press him – the central players move towards the ball and cover these zones. If their player in the first line is narrow, our central midfielder will advance to press. If they build up with a back four we can make similar schemes or create a 5-4-1 if we want to go more stable; with a high pressing line and compactness but without pressing upfront at first.

The problems could lie in counters and presence in the last line which is why the movement of our right central midfielder and our wings will be of huge importance. Without wanting to go into too much detail: The wings and/or the central midfielder on the ball far side could already position them a bit higher and the centre forward moves towards the ball side so we have possibilities to counter and compensate the lack of players in the last line out of possession a bit.

Now the obvious question is: How do we coach this? Besides the sessions and the methodology it’s important to create easy instructions and guidelines for the players that we can use.

Simplifying The System For Individual Understanding

On twitter I once wrote a very basic short article on how Barcelona can be so fluid without having too many or too complex instructions for each player. You can find this here. Let’s create something similar for the system we just created.

This is an example of simple instructions of a few simple points without jargon / concept language to give players guidelines for their movement, orientation and decision making in possession – we’ll use simple and understandable action language in our talks with the players and in the instructions we will use as a consistent reference in training:

Goalkeeper:

• If the central back / sweeper is supporting near the ball, move away. Position yourself in the gap between the center back and side back just 20 meters deeper.
• If the central back / sweeper is supporting away from the ball, move towards the ball. Offer yourself for a simple back pass. When you receive, try to already face where you want to pass next. Check your surroundings always. If you don’t find a passing option, go long towards the sides.
• Use hand gestures: If you have space in front of you, show with your hand you want the ball in front of you. If you are not sure, point with your hand towards your feet.
• If the back line advances, advance with them. Keep 20 meters distances to them but always be active. Try to intercept long counters behind the back line or prevent them by helping your team mates.
• If the ball position changes in the oppositional half – no matter who has the ball – move towards the ball.

Central Back:

• Don’t position yourself with the side backs in one line in possession. If you do that, you cut their connection and make smaller space. Try to be a few meters deeper. Imagine a diamond or pentagon with the side backs and central midfielders! With this, the opposition needs to cover more space in pressing.
• If you get pressured from the side or don’t get pressured at all and there is space in the midfield in front of you, you are allowed to advance.
• If you feel our build up is too passive, move towards the right a bit and instruct the left holding midfielder to drop deeper.
• When passing to the side, always look diagonally behind you after that. You should check if there are players in the passing lanes to the other side back for switches and if the middle is open for passes there if you should get the ball back.
• If you face the whole field, look for diagonal passes towards the wing. There we have the positional switches and can get a free man with dynamical superiority.

Side Backs:

• If the Central Back advances, check if one of the central midfielders is dropping. If not, move 10-15 meters towards the middle to create a back two for cover.
• When we get the ball and secured it, immediately split and make the pitch big. Don’t position yourself in a horizontal line with the central back / sweeper.
• If there is space in front of you, you are allowed to advance.
• If there are two players in the middle – as in a midfielder dropping deeper – you should advance forward.
• Before receiving position yourself so you face the central spaces and always try to look towards the highest midfielders so you have the most information input for your possible passes. If you play it to the wings, try to do it directly!
• You are allowed to position yourself in a line with the central midfielders but only if there is still an open passing lane to your central back and you are not too near to the wing back in front of you.
• Only move towards the middle when we have possession if you think we will lose the ball soon or your support in the middle is the only option to stay in possession. Otherwise stay wide.

Left Holding Midfielder:

• If the central back advances, move towards the side to open space. Move backwards so you still have an open body posture towards up front. Look around you so you don’t get pressured from behind.
• If you don’t find space in the middle, drop deeper so the side backs can become full backs. Try then to either find them or the central midfielders.
• Don’t move too far to the sides. Always stay in front of the gap between the central back and the side back. Only move to get free and to escape oppositional access.
• Turn if there is a vertical or diagonal pass to the players higher than you; you should be able to receive lay offs from them and then distribute forward again.
• Try to have an open body posture towards the right side; with this you have a good overview of many players and can also distribute it long.

Right Holding Midfielder:

• Don’t initiate positional changes with the right wing back if you are potentially able to receive the next pass. If you feel you won’t get the ball and can’t get free, you are free to initiate positional changes with the right wing back.
• Don’t be in one horizontal line with the right wing back. Try to be in a line between him and the right side back.
• If you pass to the middle, look toward the right side to see what your partner is doing. If he gets a pass (especially from you), immediately look towards the middle so you know where you could pass to if you receive it back immediately.
• Never be further away from the right wing back then 20 meters, except your partner in central midfield has dropped deeper. Then move towards the middle to occupy the space in front of the gap between him and the central back / sweeper.
• One great situation to change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it back. Now you can move towards the wing and he can advance into the middle. Look at your partner and create eye contact when changing position!
• You are allowed to advance through the middle and towards the oppositional box, attack open space in front of you if you see it.
• If you are on the wing, play like you think a wing back plays! (if more training time, teach them the instructions of the wing back too)

Right Wing Back

• Look at your partner and create eye contact when changing position! One great situation to change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it back. If you feel you saw open space in the middle and you are not able to receive this or the next pass, move into the open space for a positional change.
• Don’t be in one line with your partner. Try to be positioned higher so you also open space for the side back. Move laterally into the middle or diagonally towards goal, if the side back on your side advances.
• When passing it forward, immediately look towards the middle. When passing it backwards, immediately look forward.
• If you pass it diagonally into the middle, advance on the side. If you played it vertically on the side, advance diagonally through the middle.
• When being on the ball or engaged in a combination, move into the middle. This creates an overload and chaos for the opponent while our shape allows us to cover this.
• Only move towards the middle when we have possession if you think we will lose the ball soon or your support in the middle is the only option to stay in possession. Otherwise stay wide. If your partner advances, fill in behind him and stay deeper if needed.

Left Central Midfielder

• Don’t be positioned in a horizontal line with you the left wing back besides you, your partner. Try to be higher.
• One great situation to change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it back. Now you can move towards the wing and he can advance into the middle. Look at your partner and create eye contact when changing position!
• Keep at least 10 to 15 meters distance vertically to the holding midfielder behind you. If he drops deeper, you are allowed to drop a line deeper. If the other holding midfielder moves centrally, you don’t have to.
• You can move towards the sides to get a vertical pass from your wing back. He should move into the middle then; try to find him or the centre forward with a pass.
• If the central forward is on the right side, you can advance to occupy the last line.
• Look around before receiving; when you pass to the side, immediately look towards the middle and look for the other central midfielder. If you pass to the middle, look for the central forward and the wing back.

Left Wing Back

• Don’t be positioned in a horizontal line with you the left wing back besides you, your partner. Try to be deeper.
• One great situation to change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it back. Now you can move towards the wing and he can advance into the middle. Look at your partner and create eye contact when changing position!
• If your partner drops, you should advance. If the side back on your side advances, move towards the middle or into the last line. If you pass it diagonally into the middle, advance on the side. If you played it vertically on the side, advance diagonally through the middle.
• When passing it forward, immediately look towards the middle. When passing it backwards, immediately look forward.
• When being on the ball or engaged in a combination, move into the middle. This creates an overload and chaos for the opponent while our shape allows us to cover this.
• Only move towards the middle when we have possession if you think we will lose the ball soon or your support in the middle is the only option to stay in possession. Otherwise stay wide.

Right Central Midfielder

• Look around you; if there is open space and our team has no passing option, fill it and act as distributor.
• Keep about 15 meters distance vertically to the holding midfielder behind you. Imagine it as opening space for him! The oppositional players in the middle should always have to question themselves who to mark. This means only occasionally move into the last line so the centre back of the opponent won’t just start to mark you. If this happens, roam towards the side or slightly deeper.
• Don’t move towards the left side and don’t occupy the same spaces as the left central midfielder.

Centre Forward

• Move towards the side where the ball is. Open space by moving towards the wing (opens gap between the centre backs of the opponent) or occupying their sweeper (if your man marker tracks you there which opens one side up).
• If they play with a back four, occupy the space behind their full back if he advances or the channel between full and centre back.
• Try to run horizontally towards the ball side and look for long balls behind their defense into space with abrupt vertical movements into gaps.
• If there is space open, you are allowed to drop but try to do lay offs and immediately turn and go into depth with speed again.
• If one of the central midfielders advances forward, you can drop deeper into the opened space to lose your marker.
• Before receiving, look around your shoulder. After passing, do that again. Try to find an open man for possible break through and so you can get through balls yourself.

With this we have covered with a few simple instructions which we can coach our whole system which as a whole is fairly complex. We are able to use it for coaching and it makes the players immediately understand tactical aspects due to the consistent reference point we use.

Out of possession we also can create such instructions although I prefer simple guidelines for all players more. Because of our system we should especially try to focus on these things in our sessions and coaching points:

• If we lose the ball, immediately press the ball. Run towards him in full speed! If you can’t reach it, still move towards the ball and cover for your team mates.
• If we lose the ball, don’t try to get to your nominal position; go to the nearest position in our system.
• Imagine our system as a net or chain; if someone moves out, we follow him and move towards the gap.
• Keep short distances and compactness (this should be focused in training sessions especially to really keep them consistently and so the players know which distances are meant).
• First focus on the ball, then on your team mate. If the opponent near you is not having the ball or being the next player who will get it, ignore him.

Additionally to these guidelines I’d personally create some game forms for specific aspects, go through some situations explicitly and of course correct within the drills, at times using freezing. The drills and methodology is important but won’t be covered in detail here.

Methodology And Coaching

In Germany Marco Henseling’s and my coaching book – incl. interviews with Robert Matosevic, Marti Perarnau and Roger Schmidt – got published in winter. There we talked about periodization, basic strategical and tactical aspects, pedagogy and didactics, technical training, forms of learning, etc. etc.

To talk about this in detail here would take too much: Even our book lacked many aspects and still had nearly 240 pages without that many graphics and diagrams as we didn’t talk much about sessions but about the fundamentals which lead to being able to build a session. The five main points were:

• Football specific
• Holistic
• Complex
• Synergistic
• Differential

A small graphic illustrating the hierarchy between these aspects; top to bottom.

Basically, being “football specific” is the base. Everything you do should be extracted from the game and its principles itself; not the opposite. Many go the other way and do weight lifting because “you need power too in football”. That’s the wrong starting point in my eyes. Football specific comes from the game itself. If you do that as base, there are four basic things which have to follow.

The drill has to be holistic; should train as many aspects as possible as the game itself never has an isolated aspect to it. There’s always context. Try to make an image of the game in your drills and put everything you can coach for an action into it. But these aspects have to interact with each other, as they do in the game.

That’s “complexity”. The simultaneous interaction between the aspects makes it complex. The complexity should be arranged in a way it makes the whole thing more than the sum of its parts (“synergistic”). Every decision in the drill interacts with what happened before and what will happen after; the possible consequences of the next actions are part of every decision! Then it should be flexible and varying every time with every repetition. Not repetition should be the exact same. That’s “differential”.

These principles are based on sports science, the talks with elite coaches, among them the interview(s) with Roger Schmidt and our former work from Spielverlagerung with Thomas Tuchel as analysts. Note: This does not mean that everything else is ineffective; it’s just the way I deduced so far for myself to be working best based on personal experience as coach, talking with coaches, analyzing methodologies and the newest input from sports science reflected on the game of football. It also does not mean that there are no instructions from the coach; they are put into the session through talks with the players, explanations, freezing, video analysis (if possible), the session design and the patterns created based on the session design. Also we had more than enough instructions in the last part of this article, right?

An example for a drill in this system could be this:

The size of the field should be 24m length, 36m width. Using cones on the pitch we can mark a 3×3 grid; the central zone is twice as wide as the side zones. So the zones are 9x8m three times on each side and 18x8m three times in the central strip. On both ends there are two goals each, on the sides where the middle bordered on the side strip.

The teams have two different instructions based on the Priming we want to accomplish for our game model of the 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1. I would put up one team to play in a 3-2-1 and the other team in a 2-3-1 or in a 3-2 versus 2-3. In the latter example we would have the central back, wing backs and centre midfielders in one team versus the side backs, holding midfielders and center forward in the other.

The rules of this game could be for instance specified like this: Maximum of two players in the same zone in the middle strip, maximum of one player in the same zone on the wing, a maximum of two players in the whole wing zone on one side. To this specific instructions for the players are added.

Instructions: At the beginning we could say that a back-pass option is always important to leave pressure and being able to switch. The side backs should be positioned at the edges of their zones; basically copying how they split in the game and the ability to advance when one of the central midfielders drops. When they see this (remember the basic system instructions?) they have to split wider and go into the wing zones, advance if necessary / possible.

In the 3-2 we of course have our central back building play and the wing backs already higher in before. The wing backs should always occupy width and not move to the ball, so we can switch the sides when needed.

The central players are free to move, but could change their position and occupy the wing, drop or advance. As per our “non-negotiable” strategical aspects we play with immediate pressing and for regular pressing they first have to position themselves in their shape in the central zone – and only in that! – with all players.

This gives them high compactness and forces them to move towards the ball. The two goals on the sides – instead of one centrally – not only force the team in possession to switch the sides fast and frequently but to play diagonal passes behind and move with the team out of possession forced to always give cover and defend the paths to the goal properly. One false movement or lack of connection to the team mate would open space for an immediate through ball.

Coaching points? I actually did this with my team to test it.

First started coaching towards high intensity in passing and pressing, rarely focusing on technical aspects and later on – when intensity was high and the rules were understood – I praised right decisions and did not correct as much first. Then I started to correct some positions and explained them.

In the breaks (periodization of the drill was 4x8min, 90 seconds break) I gave short explanations and feedback through asking questions about specific aspects. For instance on dismarking and movement of the side players; the left side back for example had problems in terms of movement to open space for himself or others which we went through in front of the team shortly.

Later he had better movement and some interesting overlaps and diagonal dribbles into the middle. The left wing back of the 3-2 team was brilliant; he gave depth well, sometimes tried to get a diagonal pass behind the defense, always staying on his position, a few times changing intelligently into the middle and sometimes dropping deeper to build up from deeper zone with more space and time.

The last repetition was very nice; there were many on one side, then diagonally to the central players who laid it off to the back line who immediately switched with one pass to the other side with immediate movement and support. Thus, the movement was self-initiated. According to our Priming they started to do more fast shifts, had flexible build up situations and later on started – thanks to the coaching – to change the positions.

The right wing back was initially static, later moved often to the center and once ended up on the left; ultimately even against the ball the positional changes started to become functional. As I coached from outside explicitly to “not move to the original position, but the next!” this became better later on. Athletically, the impact was also high and the players had many actions, many sprints and seemed fairly exhausted. All in all the players gave good feedback and there were small but visible steps towards our Priming made.

Sessions like these can – with additional drills to support this, the instructions mentioned above, some visualizations and proper coaching – lead after some time to the game model we created.

More literature:

• Our tactical theory sections on Spielverlagerung.com and Spielverlagerung.de incl. the “How to analyze?” on the German page and my coaching methodology book
• The work of Jan Van Winckel, Paco Seirullo, Vitor Frade or Raymond Verheijen
• Kieran Smith’s presentation on Inspire about Juego De Posicion (and other webinars on there, incl. my own on Schmidt’s press where I talk about action language and basic football stuff, too)

One of the most important principles of football is moving the ball forward. As an invasion sport, the eventual aim of any play is to reach the opposition’s end of the pitch and score. With the rise of ever more advanced pressing and counterpressing schemes, it is increasingly difficult to do this.

Every team utilises different build-up patterns in order to move into more advanced areas of the pitch. These differing principles vary widely depending on each coach and the players at their disposal. But one such tool that many teams utilise is the use of vertical passing in the first phase of build-up. If completed successfully, this allows for instant progression of the ball into a more advanced area of the pitch and past one, or sometimes two, lines of opposition pressure.

Basic example of vertical passing in first build-up phase

Whilst this type of pass can be a good way to advance play, it is often difficult to complete for a number of reasons. It has to be deliberately created by the team in possession. There are a number of ways to do this, such as quick horizontal circulation. But regardless, if there is not a suitable support structure around the receiving player, then they will find it hard to retain possession.

The other factor to consider is the field of vision of the receiver and supporting players. Because of the nature of the pass, the receiving player will often be facing towards their own goal. This is not a problem if the play is in that direction, but it limits ability to transition and progress play quickly. One of the main advantages of a vertical pass in initial build-up phases is that it breaks two lines of opposition defense, meaning the opposition midfield are in front of the ball once the pass reaches its destination. This presents a potential transition chance; but this window of opportunity can quickly close. If the forward receives the ball with his back to goal, and is expected to turn past a defender behind him, the opening for transition may disappear.

If the centre back plays the ball into the forward in this situation, it’ll be received in a 4v1 and they can say ‘bye bye’ to possession.

In order to stop an immediate loss of possession, the receiving player will need a suitable support structure around him. What this structure is comprised of depends on a number of variables. For example, the individual profile of the receiving player can alter the optimal structure. Some players are comfortable receiving the ball with their back to goal and changing direction in one fluid movement. In these cases, his teammates may focus on maintaining a larger distance away to create space for a 1v1 opportunity with the opposition CB. But if the receiving player is less mobile, nearby players with a forward-facing field of vision will be more helpful.

This type of pass does more than merely winning space in an advanced area. If the nearby players are well structure in accordance with their skillset, then it allows a number of following options. Because it can allow for a number of options that the receiving player can utilise, it is a useful tool for teams utilising positional play. Whilst some teams may use it to create third man runs, others may look to create dribbling opportunities or combination play in a dangerous area behind the opposition midfield.

Speed and accuracy of the pass

Even with a good support structure, one of the most important features of a positive ball progression is the pass itself. The pass can be particularly important if the receiving player has his back to goal or a limited field of vision for any other reason. This is because it can act as a form of non-verbal communication, potentially giving an indicator of the situation that is out of view of the receiving player.

If the player that drops back from the front-line to receive the pass is being tightly followed by a man-oriented opposition defender, a pass hit with slightly more power could signal space in behind. The increased pace on the ball makes it easier to turn and begin moving around the defender in one fluid movement. If the defender hangs back and the forward drops into an area with more space, a slower pass would make it easier to control and signal to the receiving player that he has more time to turn. A slower pass into space also suggests the receiving player move into that space to receive the ball.

In a similar way, the accuracy (or aim) of a pass allows the receiving player to act differently based on very fine margins. A pass played with power outside the receiving player’s feet will almost always force him to turn in that direction, unless he is particularly skilled at manipulating the ball. This is useful if the player can quickly turn that way and manoeuvre his way past the defender. But a pass played with large power towards a player’s feet allows him to trap the ball aggressively towards a nearby teammate, merely altering the initial passes direction rather than creating more power on the pass.

This combination of speed & direction creates many different permutations. Even then, the receiving player’s interpretation of the pass should also be considered. The same pass may have different meaning to a different receiving player, who will interpret it with his own skill-set in mind. If Andy Carroll receives a ball outside his left foot at pace, it’s unlikely he’s going to turn him and sprint in on goal.

As well as using the pass as a signalling tool for the receiving player, nearby teammates can also adapt based on the speed and accuracy. Whilst a pass is generally completed in less than a second, this still allows the opportunity to alter body positioning and move a few valuable yards. This can make a big difference, particularly against a compact defense.

When combined with certain needle moves from the receiving player, this can even be used to fool nearby defenders and create an extra yard of space. Because it is understood that a strong pass to the right makes it easier for the receiving player to turn to his right, many defenders will react as if this is likely to happen. If the receiving player does a simple drop of his shoulder to feint a movement in that direction, it is almost instinctive for the opponent to go that way.

In the same way, the player making the pass can utilise different body positions to manipulate the opponent’s movement. Players will make judgements on the potential destination of a pass before the pass is actually made. This can be achieved by looking at the player’s body & leg positioning and field of vision. In many cases, players at the top level will hypothesise the direction of a pass before it is even made, as the passing player’s body, leg & eye positioning suggests it. However, when this does not happen, it gives the defenders less time to anticipate and make a decision. In some cases, it may even fool them entirely into moving the wrong direction.

Sergio Busquets is the master of creating the illusion of passing in one direction before actually passing in another. His head & body are positioned in such a way that the opposition believe he is passing into the ‘fake’ passing lane; this shifts them to the side and creates space for him to pass into in a more dangerous area.

Lección 1: Esconder el pase para romper líneas. Por el profesor Sergio Busquets. pic.twitter.com/GSDtFERycF

— Pizarratáctica(?)AFA (@ptdfa_ok) January 4, 2016

If the nearby teammates are well-positioned, the players should be able to react in a number of different ways based on the speed & accuracy of the pass as well as the decision making of the passing player. This creates a dynamic support structure that the team can collectively adapt to whilst the pass is in motion and at the whim of the passing & receiving players. This allows a number of different options for the receiving player, and a huge number of potential patterns of play for the team in possession.

Here Bender is temporarily not available for a pass, but he will be open as soon as Gotze receives the ball. Hummels fires a quick pass to Gotze’s right foot; the speed of the pass and aim towards Gotze’s right makes Kacar believe that Gotze is turning that way. Kacar comes sprinting in, but Gotze notices this and fakes to his right before passing to Gundogan and moving into a more advanced space himself. Kacar attempts to close down Gundogan, but this temporary 2v1 makes it too difficult for him to regain possession. Gotze receives the ball again, combines expertly with Lewandowski, and scores.

pic.twitter.com/xtLhBcE7wP

— Ed (@edAfootball) April 19, 2016

Increased speed on the pass from Hummels presents potential options for Gotze that would otherwise not be available. Specifically, the feint to his right would be much less effective if Hummels had played a slower pass. It is for this reason that passes hit with increased speed (but still with good accuracy) are an extremely valuable tool in any build-up play, vertically-focused or otherwise. Indeed, when Thomas Tuchel began his managerial stint at Dortmund, his initial training sessions were focused explicitly on passing speed. In some cases, he even modified the ball-striking technique of some of his players. Since then, Dortmund’s build-up has improved massively.

The Gotze goal is also an example of why a more direct pass in build-up is so effective against man-marking. Kagawa drags his marker wide to create the space for Bender & Gotze, who has himself drifted in from the right to lose his marker. This effectively leaves Kacar alone in the centre of the pitch to defend three players by himself.

Whilst there are a number of different variations, man marking is an inherently reactive strategy – it involves mimicking the movements of the opposition. This allows the team in possession to dictate the tempo of the game, and also makes it easier to create large open spaces, or a large amount of smaller spaces to turn into. This is helpful for teams hoping to integrate vertical passes into their build-up scheme.

Timing of the pass

This leads onto another important facet of the pass: timing.

Because of the nature of football, any defensive scheme (man marking or not) will leave a gap somewhere. In order to create the strongest scheme possible, teams will attempt to ensure these gaps are in the least dangerous area. One such area that teams do not often prioritise against is central defenders and their passing. This means they have more time on the ball than any of their teammates, giving more opportunity to assess the situation in front of them and play the optimum pass. It also gives them a greater chance to alter the timing of their pass to suit the receiving player. Altering the timing of the pass by half a second will be pivotal in determining the success of a pass.

pic.twitter.com/zzuoA6UpiS

— Ed (@edAfootball) April 20, 2016

Despite (some) pressure from the opposition forward, Blind holds onto the ball a few seconds longer to ensure Lingard receives the ball at the perfect time.

This pass is played by Blind into an area with no support structure. It is therefore imperative that the run from Lingard is co-ordinated perfectly with the pass. If the pass reaches Lingard too early, then he will be running quickly towards his own goal. Combine this with few potential passing options for him, and it will be tricky to retain possession. If the ball reaches him after the ‘peak’ of his run, then he will be facing the opponent’s goal and the ball will be more difficult to control, particularly whilst running at speed.

These same principles apply to more team-oriented build-up plays too.

From TP’s team analysis of Hertha Berlin: the timing of the pass from the GK is vitally important in allowing Darida to receive the ball in space. If he releases the ball too early, then Skjelbred will still be blocking the potential passing lane. Too late, and the opposition will have time to react, and can limit Darida’s space.

On-ball forward movements from central defenders

Because central defenders (and goalkeepers) are generally given more time to play the ball, there is often room for them to move into with the ball (maybe not goalkeepers). In order to leave a man free at the back themselves, the man-marking team will task their striker with man-marking both of the opposition central defenders. Depending on which player has the ball, the striker has to shift laterally to defend that player. Not only can this be tiring and inefficient for the individual, but it can also create serious issues for the defensive structure if the in-possession central defender utilises a sharp forward movement with the ball.

The principle of provoking the press (or ‘Andribbeln’) is a vital feature of positional play, and a key aspect of German coaching education. This concept is easier to initiate against a man-marking system in this way. This is because if the initial sharp movement forward from the CB is successful, then they can advance into midfield and create numerical superiority. This forces a midfield player from the opposition to make a decision: stay with your current marker, or confront the new opponent. Both options are dangerous. If they choose to move away from their direct opponent to confront the onrushing CB, then they risk leaving that player free in space. If they choose to stay with their direct opponent, then that player can merely drift away from the CB’s potential dribbling lane, meaning he can continue progressing forward into an even more advanced area.

Assuming that merely allowing the CB to move forward is not a suitable option, the two most efficient ways of dealing with this for a man-marking side are both difficult to perform.

1) Perform a switch of direct opposition to mark. When the CB progresses with the ball, a midfielder confronts him, and the striker (originally tasked with marking the CB) moves back to cover the opposition player left free. This still relies on larger backwards movements from the striker, meaning he is out of position for a quick transition if possession is regained. As well as this, it also means the other CB is available for a quick outlet pass, and the process can begin again. This creates huge [often unnecessary] physical demands on the striker in question.

2) Rely on the onrushing midfielder to confront the forward-moving CB *and* close the passing lane to the player he was previously marking. Considering the CB is moving at high speed to evade the striker, and the previously-marked midfielder may make a lateral movement at any moment, this is very difficult to perform successfully.

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— Ed (@edAfootball) April 21, 2016

Pep Guardiola aggressively utilised this strategy against Bielsa’s man-marking Bilbao team. Here, Mascherano steps past Llorente, and moves into midfield. Bilbao are able to perform a switch of markers between Llorente & Muniain, and the build-up play does not break through the midfield. But no problem. Recycle back to Geri Pique, and more of the same. Poor Llorente.

This aggressive forward positioning from his central defenders (Mascherano particularly) was mentioned in Marti Perarnau’s book ‘Pep Confidential’. Guardiola was explaining to Javi Martinez how he attempted to get Messi into space in dangerous areas by moving Mascherano forward, forcing one of the Bilbao markers to abandon their man and move towards Mascherano. Messi would then drop into the vacated space, and offer himself as an immediate passing option. Even if Messi were not available, someone else would be.

The build-up to Hummels’ assist for Reus during the turbulent Europa League match between Liverpool & Dortmund. Liverpool’s situational man-marking means it only takes one pass from the central defender to the striker (and then… to the net).

This relies on good passing speed in the horizontal passes leading up to the forward movement from the central defender, to ensure the striker does not have time to adjust. The same principle applies when facing a zonal marking system, especially if the opponent are particularly ball-oriented. A quick lateral shift in play may create space in a more advanced area by disrupting the horizontal compactness in the opposition block, unless they are all able to maintain equal distances whilst shifting.

For obvious reasons this is more difficult to achieve if the opposition’s first line of pressing has two players, but in these cases there are potential for overloads elsewhere and the need for a central defender to move forward is lower. Although, this also presents the opportunity for a move to a back three with the free man again advancing to create a situational numerical overload in midfield. This is also a tool that Guardiola has utilised, with David Alaba being played as a ‘box to box CB’. This can also be achieved with a situational back three with a midfielder dropping into the first build-up line, or a full-back moving into a more central position.

Of course, there are enough potential combinations for any attacking system and the resulting man marking response for a whole other article. But these principles generally apply regardless.

Breaking down zonal marking systems using vertical passing is slightly more difficult because these free spaces cannot be created so easily. Whilst it is easy to break down a man-marking system before the initial vertical pass is even made, playing against a zonal system also necessitates an adequate response to the pass itself and therefore the following support structure is vital.

This can be achieved, for example, through the use of a basic one-two pass. For obvious reasons, most central defenders do not have the luxury of following their pass with an off-ball movement. But midfielders, who have more license to move into advanced areas, can combine passing accuracy & aim with runs of their own. This creates a number of different passing options and combinations, which present the chance to break down even the most well-organised & compact defense.

Utrecht attempt to break down a compact man-oriented zonal marking system from Groningen. Because of the well-spaced triangle formed in the centre of the pitch, there are a number of off-ball movement options for each player. The receiving player has an inward-facing field of vision, so the passer opts to aim the pass at his right foot and makes the movement inside.

The forward movement of the initial passer creates a temporary overload if the midfield fail to adjust to his new positioning. This overload of the zone where the ball will be immediately after the vertical pass is a key way of exploiting the space between the lines that is more apparent in zonal marking systems than man marking. When this temporary overload is combined with a number of potential movement options and a variable support structure, more potential combinations of play and movement patterns are created. This makes the attack more fluid, less predictable, and harder to defend.

Utilising support structures to facilitate re-circulation

Creating a suitable support structure prior to the vertical pass from defense is one key way to overload a zonal marking system. Because of the nature of long, vertical, ground passes, the opposition needs to be well-covered in a number of zones to defend them successfully. It is difficult to balance a high press with successful deep coverage within one system. Generally, there is more space deeper in the opponent’s midfield if they are attempting to press high as they attempt to utilise their players in more advanced areas of the pitch. This leaves less players to cover a larger space in deep areas.

If the opponent is attempting to utilise a high line to facilitate a compact shape *and* high press, then this leaves space in behind. As mentioned earlier, a pass hit with slightly more power may allow the recipient to make use of this space more easily. Ideally, the primary supporting player will be positioned so as to be able to make a movement in behind the defense, or into the space between the lines, depending on the pass.

“In all of these situations the first decision for the player getting free is if he’ll run into the gap or if he’ll already be positioned. The first decision helps him in terms of visual field of opposition who either don’t see him or have to lose eye contact to the ball carrier. In the first picture left he drops and receives between opposition, so he has more space to turn into. In the second picture he goes into depth, so he can either break through or lay it off to his team mate – who is positioned in a way that if he gets pressed he can get his body between ball and opponent most easily. In the latter he moves centrally in between these four which gives them a tough decision who will push out to press (or if it will happen).” – RM in his article on creating a game model.

When these principles are utilised collectively by a team, it can create a support structure with huge variation. If the ball is lost, then it is important to complement this structure with an aggressive challenge for second balls. An additional advantage of having a temporary overload in an advanced area of the pitch is that there is an immediate opportunity to counterpress and regain possession quickly.

The fact that these vertical passes can break two lines of opposition pressure instantly progresses play forwards and deep into the opposition’s block. Whilst this presents potential for an immediate transition into even more dangerous situations, there is no need for the team to be too aggressive in their decision-making. Much like in the previous example when Mascherano was unable to break through the opposition’s midfield, a sharp vertical movement presents opportunity for all of his teammates to move forward. When the ball was returned to Gerard Pique, he was 20 yards further forward than when Mascherano began his movement. This same principle can apply to the use of vertical passes.

Whilst this is not the perfect situation for the team in possession, it offers a handy failsafe should the initial attempt at penetrating the opposition defense fail. They attempted to aggressively attack the lack of compactness in Team White’s midfield, and when this was unsuccessful (perhaps due to poor passing speed or any other reason), they were able to recover and regain possession.

For some teams, this recycling of possession into a more advanced position can be the end-goal of this type of pass. Instead of aggressively pursuing combination play behind the opposition midfield, their aim will be to ensure they are well structured for build-up when the ball is returned to the defenders. This might mean, for example, that a winger in a 4-4-2 shape would stay wider rather than move inside to involve himself in potential combination play. Instead, remaining wider would allow for a route out of the inevitable pressure that will come from all directions once the initial vertical pass is made. Once the vertical pass is made and the opposition midfield attempt to move behind the ball. This allows the first build-up line to collectively progress into a more advanced area utilising positional play.

Using the vertical pass to move first build-up line forwards: Team White recover their lack of compactness quickly, and Team Red are simply able to recycle possession in a more advanced area.

Some teams may use longer diagonal passing in much the same way. This has the added advantage of being even more separated from the high press of the opposition, and gives more opportunity for added overloads. It does also run the risk of separating the players involved from the play if a long diagonal is not utilised, though.

Deliberate deepening of play

It can also be effective to utilise the exact opposite of this strategy: moving the ball backwards to provoke the press and disrupt a compact opposition shape. When confronted with a team who is well-drilled at shifting sideways to adjust for horizontal ball circulation, provoking the press may come in the form of disrupting the opposition’s vertical compactness.

Shifting the ball backwards can disrupt the distances between the opposition forwards and midfield. If an opposition forward moves to pressure the ball-player, a well-structured backline will often have a spare man (particularly if the goalkeeper is utilised as part of the first build-up line). This 3v1, 3v2 or 4v3 can be punished with a pass to the open man and a quick circulation of the ball into a more advanced area of the pitch.

Whilst the ball may end up in the same space that it was in before the backwards pass, the opposition defensive block will be stretched and there will be more space for the receiving player. This can present immediate transition opportunities if the team builds with good passing speed and is well-structured in advanced areas of the pitch.

Badly executed pressing from Ingolstadt, too easy for Neuer to find Müller in the halfspace. Nice ball circulation. pic.twitter.com/adHIbFm19y

— István Beregi (@szteveo) May 9, 2016

Ingolstadt shift well horizontally, but the diagonal-backwards pass from Kimmich to Neuer creates a more complex set of movements to collectively co-ordinate. The vertical compactness is broken and many spaces open in midfield for Thomas Müller to feast on.

Effect of passing angles

Passing angles also alter the effectiveness of build-up play for ground passes too, and diagonal passes in initial build-up phases are often preferable to horizontal or vertical passes. As well as the field of vision benefits mentioned previously, they also combine some of the best features of each pass type. Much like vertical passes, they progress play into a more advanced area and often break opposition pressing lines. They also contribute to shifting the opposition sideways, potentially creating space between players and breaking horizontal compactness. Against zonal marking systems, disrupting the opposition’s defensive spacing can be key to finding the space needed to break through.

Whilst having more strategical advantages, these diagonals are also more difficult to play. Man-marking systems can be manipulated into creating space, but well-spaced zonal marking systems are generally able to better close diagonal passing lanes. This is where passing speed becomes increasingly important. As well as this, some players have developed individual styles to open passing lanes that may not be available to others. As mentioned previously, Busquets creates the illusion of passing in one direction before actually passing in another. Mats Hummels seems to have mastered an outside-of-the-boot through ball into the left halfspace, allowing the runner to receive the ball curving towards goal. Leonardo Bonucci is capable of chipping the ball over one line of pressure but dropping it into a small space, often rendering cover shadows meaningless. Xabi Alonso has developed a bullet pass that skids along the ground at huge speed, making it difficult to intercept. These individual skillsets can alter a team’s build-up style quite significantly because of the additional passing lanes they create.

Pass locations

By the very nature of the vertical pass, the first supporting player cannot be in the same vertical line as the player receiving the initial pass; otherwise they’d be in the way. Because of this, the first supporting player will have a tilted field of vision towards the play. If this pass takes place in the halfspace, it allows the player to have an improved view of the play.

This same principle applies for players receiving a vertical pass in the halfspace and then immediately turning inwards towards play rather than playing a wall pass to a nearby player. If this happens in the centre, they have to turn in one direction, meaning they cannot immediately see the other side of the pitch. But in the halfspace, this means they are temporarily oblivious to merely part the wing area.

However, it should be noted that if this logic were extrapolated, it would indicate the wing is the ideal area for the vertical pass (as they can see the whole pitch from the wing, right?). This is clearly not true. It is important to manage the benefits of a clear field of vision with the increased number of potential passing options and strategic advantages that the halfspace offers. If the initial vertical pass is made into the halfspace, and the receiving player has limited options in the centre, then it’s likely there will be space to utilise wide. But if the initial pass is made into a wide area, there is only one direction to move.

This also highlights the advantages of diagonal passes into the halfspace from the centre for players attempting to turn quickly. The player receiving the ball will have an inward-facing field of vision, allowing for more of an immediate view of play. It also means they have to perform a half-turn rather than a full 180-degree rotation to move towards the opposition goal. Some players are even capable of performing a half-turn before the ball gets to them by altering their body positioning whilst the pass is in motion.

pic.twitter.com/XbSQlvINmL

— Ed (@edAfootball) April 21, 2016

Gotze checks behind him before the pass, and then opens up his field of vision whilst the pass is in motion. As the pass is being played, he is facing Alonso completely. By the time he takes his first touch, he is facing horizontally. Finally, his second touch completes the rotation. Beautiful. The firm pass from Xabi Alonso further aids this process, and the natural pace on the ball forces Gotze that way and into the open space.

If the receiving player is on the end of diagonal balls from the centre to the halfspace, and has this ability, it can allow for halfspace penetration even without a necessary support structure. It goes without saying that this can greatly increase the build-up possibilities for a team.

As the competition has progressed, we have been able to witness a number of tactical trends shared by many teams in the tournament. Whilst there hasn’t been a particular pattern in terms of formations like we saw with the back 3 in the 2014 World Cup, there have been clear trends in marking schemes, attacking strategies and other tactical features.

In this article I will be taking a look at the two most prevalent themes we have seen in this year’s international competition.

Man-Oriented Defending

Orientation is one of the most basic actions in football, entailing how you act in accordance to certain reference points. From a defensive perspective, it is one of the most decisive factors in how a team decides to organise itself against the opposition. There are generally four reference points in football – the goals, the ball position, the opposition and your teammates. The ball and the goal are the two base orientations as the aim of football is to score by putting the ball into the opponent’s goal whilst stopping them from doing the same to your own. The opposition and your teammates are, on the other hand, more dynamic and complex.

If you’re wanting to learn more about the different orientations I recommend reading RM’s excellent theory pieces on man-marking and zonal-marking.

In a position-oriented defence, the team maintains its shape as it shifts across the pitch.

For example, if a team defends with a position-oriented zonal marking scheme, then their primary reference point for their positioning is the position of their teammates. They maintain their shape against opposition movement and act in a closed block without moving out to follow attacking runners. A prime example of this was Lucien Favre’s Gladbach side, or the current Villareal team.

Throughout the EURO2016 competition, the most common defensive orientation has been the opposition’s positioning, or a man-oriented defence. When acting from a zonal base position with such man-orientations, this consists of a team marking zonally where the players will orient themselves to cover an opponent if they come within their space.

In a man-oriented defence, the players flexibly cover nearby opponents.

In the above scene, the ball is played to the right-back and the defenders react by covering any nearby players. The ball-near 8 positions himself to cover the opposition’s right 8 whilst the ball-far 8 is covering the striker in the middle. Whilst they cover the opponents in the centre, the ball-near winger moves up to close the ball down whilst the striker blocks access into the 6.

Note the key difference to the more rigid man-marking approach. Instead of following the individual players closely and standing on their feet, the defenders are flexibly positioning themselves so that they can cover the player without being on top of him. Because of this, they can maintain a more suitable defensive position and aren’t dragged out of position as much.

Compared to the more ‘extreme’ ends of position-oriented and man-marking, this scheme is somewhat of a medium between the different ways of defensive orientation. It allows a team to have a more consistent and stable shape compared to man-marking as their positioning isn’t as affected by the oppositions’. On the other hand, they are more able to press effectively than a position-oriented approach due to the closer proximity to the opposition players.

This flexibility is possibly a significant reason as to why so many teams have defended in this style throughout the tournament. A man-oriented approach can suit the needs of many team’s defensive strategies as on a theoretical level it allows them to maintain a stable shape whilst having access to apply pressure on the ball. It’s a fairly good mid-point between the two extremes of zonal and man-marking and (if executed effectively) can combine the advantages of both ends.

Aside from this explanation, a man-oriented approach allows a team to mask the negative effects of the minimal training time spent as a group. A more simple approach than something such as a position-oriented block, it requires a lesser level of cohesion and synergy from the players – something which sides have clearly lacked throughout the tournament. With players coming together for such a short time before the tournament begins, its very difficult for managers to have the players operating in a complex system.

Many teams, such as Portugal and Croatia have exercised these man-orientations out of possession. Against Spain, Croatia used the tactic to try and force 1v1 situations and challenges to regain the ball high up the pitch. By closely covering the opposition players whilst defending, Croatia were able to apply pressure individually and thus create unstable 1v1 situations which suited their plan. With a reduced ability to combine as a group, Spain weren’t able to make the level of ball circulation which they are famed for in order to work around the press. Croatia executed this defensive strategy effectively in their late win and came close on a few occasions after winning the ball within Spain’s third.

Croatia used man-orientations against Spain to generate access and force 1v1 defending.

On the other hand, Portugal used this scheme in a more defensive-minded approach against Croatia in the first knockout round. Players covered their man in the midfield as they looked to block passing options into the centre and benefit from the above-mentioned defensive access. Through doing so, their pressure in midfield made it difficult for Croatia to play through their midfielders down the middle. In specific cases they took it further, situationally using man-marking to stop key players such as Modric and Rakitic from having their usual influence on the match.

Portugal covered their man closely against Croatia in order to restrict the influence of players such as Luka Modric.

Examples can be seen all over. In Iceland’s upset win over England, the two forwards positioned themselves flexibly when pressing to cover any passes into Eric Dier who was England’s lone 6 to begin with. Although it was done situationally, they generally wouldn’t directly mark Dier but instead maintain defensive access from close-by positions, giving them greater flexibility whilst able to intercept any passes into the gap in-front of the midfield.

In deeper positions, the narrow bank of 4 in midfield would adjust according to the presence of both Rooney and Alli and whilst the former was fairly dynamic in his movements, they restricted his influence in high positions whilst maintaining the defensive stability which significantly blunted the English attack. Through this defensive scheme, the minnows were able to keep a stable defence which rarely lost its shape whilst England failed dramatically to open spaces through the middle of the pitch.

Issues

Whilst some teams have had success when defending in such a manner, many teams have been largely inflexible in their man-oriented approach. The players stick to their opponent very closely and as a result can often be dragged out of position as the defence loses its shape and stability.

• Reactivity

One of the biggest limitations which comes with this type of defending is the reactive nature. When sticking close to your opponent and following his movements in defence, your actions are entirely reactionary as you’re copying what you see your man do. When taking a player’s reaction time into account, this can become problematic as it inevitably means that the defender is a step behind his opponent.

Obviously, an attacker knows his movements before he executes them and thus can make prior planning according to the contextual information and his tactical understanding. Meanwhile, a following defender must wait until the attacker makes his movement and he can then read the situation and take the appropriate reaction according to the context and his understanding. In this reaction time between seeing the attacker’s action and making his own reaction, the forward can gain valuable time which can give him the space to inflict damage. Although a footballer’s visual reaction time is fairly short, these milliseconds can make all the difference in tight situations, especially if Otto Porter ever decides to make the step over from the NBA.

Aside from the actual reaction time, the reactivity of man-marking is problematic as your defensive shape becomes determined by the opposition’s positioning. It’s a perfect invite to the attackers to destabilise the defensive block by dragging players out of position. If implemented well, then the flexibility of a man-oriented scheme means that this won’t happen against opposition movement. However, once the defenders start too-rigidly sticking to their man as has commonly happened in the EUROs, the shape can be lost. 

A man-oriented defence without flexibility can result in a unstable shape.

• Flexibility and Individualism

Another issue if a man-oriented defence becomes too close to man-marking is a reduced flexibility. If a player so rigidly uses the opponent as his primary reference point, then it becomes difficult for him to account for other factors which require some extent of attention. Players can become focused on their assigned opponent and ‘tunnel vision’ reduces their ability to pick up on other important tactical cues which can instead go unnoticed.

If a player is tightly covering his man, he’s less able to support teammates and cover space.

A player’s fixation on his opponent means that he can often have a reduced ability to cover space, or switch onto another forward for example. This rigid defensive approach can lead to a robust nature for the individual player as he is assigned an opponent and no more. If his responsibility is simply to follow his man and stop passes into him, then the defender will not be able to effectively cover space or teammates when its required of him.

Another characteristic of a defensive approach too rigidly focused on the opponent is the individualistic nature it entails. Similarly to the above point, if a player is too focused on their own responsibilities then their ability to support teammates is lessened. This not only gives the defence a lesser level of flexibility, but generally means that inter-player support is difficult to make.

Contrast this to a better-executed man-oriented scheme and the differences are clear. With defenders flexibly covering their opponents whilst maintaining their position in the shape, they can help to cover open gaps or support teammates with their roles out of possession. As a result of this given flexibility, the defence becomes more adaptable against the opposition and can thus be more stable in maintaining control out of possession.

Situational/Specific Man-Marking

Alongside this man-oriented defensive scheme, a significant number of teams are also using situational man-marking to counter specific scenarios. When greater defensive pressure is required, a key opponent is needed to be followed closely or simply a more basic role is required of a player, this can be used to achieve any specific aims of the defending team. In the example I gave above, Portugal used situational man-marking in the midfield in order to stop Modric, Badelj and Rakitic from influencing the game.

Many teams shifted to pure man-marking when pressing higher up.

Many teams shift into a more man-marking-based defence when looking to press high up into the opposition’s half. The individual forwards cover a man each and they block any passing options for the player on the ball whilst pressing up the field with the intentions of forcing turnovers. In many cases they’re able to split the moment up into individual battles and isolate players away from the ball-carrier in order to disrupt the opposition’s build-up.

In a number of teams this is extended to the basis of some players’ entire defensive roles. Players are given specific responsibilities in defence which are outside of the collective scheme; whilst their teammates are more flexible, they much more rigidly follow their opponent in a man-marking style of defending. You’re most likely to see this in the wide areas in the role of the wingers, who are told simply to follow their opposition full-back and the runs they make down the touchline. If the full-backs are particularly attacking, it can often lead to the defence forming a 5 or 6-at the back with the wingers dropping into the defensive line alongside the their own full-backs.

Slovakia moved into a back-5 due to the man-marking of the wingers in deeper zones.

Without the supporting presence of the wingers in the midfield zones, this can create quite an unstable defence which is weak centrally. Often taking up a 5-3-2 or a 6-3-1 shape, the defensive cover of the wingers (who would alternatively be in their respective half-spaces) is lacking and the central midfielders can become exposed without this help.

As a result of the lack of support from the ball-near winger, the defence’s coverage of the ball-near half-space is quite minimal. The central midfielder is often the only player occupying this zone and is therefore prone to become overloaded during attacks down this side. From the half-space, the attacking team can benefit from the greater time and space by making diagonal passes back inside towards the goal.

If both full-backs drop into the defensive line and a 6-man chain is formed, then the attacking team can look to exploit such situations with switches of play. By switching the ball from one half-space to the other, a team can exploit the uncovered space on the opposite side of the pitch due to the defending winger’s deep position. It is a good method of opening passing lanes as the defenders are still shifting to regain defensive access and through this they can break through.

In England’s clash against Slovakia, this was a common sight when Hodgson’s team had the ball within the opponent’s third. When either Bertrand or Clyne moved into advanced positions, their opposition wingers would follow them closely and drop back deep into the defensive line. Through this they enjoyed greater space in the centre of the pitch and dominated the game well, creating 2.1 expected goals throughout the 90 minutes.

Structural Issues

A common theme for many sides both elite and smaller in the tournament has been a weak level of spacing in possession of the ball. The positional structures of teams are often unbalanced with key areas of the pitch left unoccupied which has a harmful effect on their possession games. When in possession, players display the lack of synergy and understanding which is common at international levels and as a result, the level and quality of connections within the attacking structures are often insufficient.

Positioning is one of, if not the, most important parts of football and is crucial in determining how and how well a team attacks. Their structure should be suitable for their attacking strategy whilst allowing for some level of ball circulation at the same time.  In order to effectively create and open space, a team generally needs to be spaced well across the pitch with good distances between teammates. Despite its importance, many teams have failed to do this in the tournament with a poor distribution of players across the width and height of the pitch.

Creating and Using Space

One of the key benefits of a strong positional structure is, as I mentioned above, that it allows a team to maximise the usable space. This does not mean simply stretching the opposition from both touchlines, but occupying the key spaces inside too. If there are wing-backs stretching but no-one offering in between the lines centrally then the advantage of width is largely wasted. By being spaced well on the pitch, a team can have strong connections between teammates whilst distancing themselves from opposition defenders in order to create space for the individual. Through this, a team automatically has a greater capacity to generate gaps between the opposition defence and in areas across the width of the pitch.

Although it goes without saying, such benefits means that attacking automatically becomes a more easily-executed process. Ball circulation is aided through the increased space for the team and the individual whilst the efficient spaces between players makes the actual movement of the ball cleaner and faster against the movements of the defenders. Through occupying varying horizontal and vertical positions on the pitch, a team is also more able to generate triangles and other shapes to aid combinations, as well as finding gaps between the lines of opposition too.

Russia’s attacks were often severely disconnected.

A side who particularly struggled to do this was Russia. One of the most disappointing teams in the competition, the side often left large spaces uncovered in attack which made for quite a dysfunctional side. With these gaps unoccupied, they obviously weren’t able to attack using such areas and not only did this result in a weaker attack, but it allowed the defence to focus on other areas too.

As a result of the sizable gaps left open, not only were Russia unable to use them but it also meant that their attacks were often disconnected. Without players in between gaps to connect the shape, possession could often be isolated on one side of the pitch with no way of progressively switching the ball.

In the example to the left, Russia have to resort to a long switch to an isolated area of the pitch because they have zero progressive passing options through the middle. With no-one to pass to within the Slovakian lines of defence, they have to try an ultimately unsuccessful long ball towards the left flank. With the striker poorly positioned, the full-back easily intercepts the lofted pass with his teammates providing greater support than his opponent’s.

Protecting the Transition

Another important benefit of a good positional structure comes after the ball is lost. With the opposition’s counters in the back of most teams’ minds, a strong positional structure is important in preventing or at least slowing any breaks from the opposing side.

If you’re looking for extra reading into the concept of ‘counterpressing’ after losing the ball, RM has another great theory piece on the topic.

Having strong numbers around the ball upon turning it over allows for a stronger counterpress.

The concept is rather simple – if you have players covering the key midfield zones and spaces around the ball when you have it, then they will be in a good position to defend them if a turnover occurs. Surrounding the ball with players allows for a stronger counterpress to be made, whilst extra bodies covering the important midfield spaces means they can protect these gaps against an opposition counter-attack.

Having a strong positional structure with a high ball-orientation is important when it is time to counterpress after losing the ball. As shown above, the high number of players close to the ball means that one can apply greater pressure and as a result, have a higher probability of regaining the possession quickly.

Counterpressing itself is very beneficial from both a defensive and offensive perspective.

The immediate defensive pressure can work as a means of slowing any opposition break. By pressing immediately once the ball is lost, a team can force the opposition away from their own goal and slow down any potential fast break. Through covering any immediate forwards passing options for the ball-carrier, the now-defending team can stop their opponents from being able to progress the ball straight-away after winning it and instead forcing either a less-effective dribble or a pass backwards. It can also be used to force a clearance (and thus a regain in possession) through the immediate pressure of the opponent. Because the ball is won deep within the opponents half, they are likely to not want to risk losing it again in such a dangerous position and will opt for a safer option in a clearance.

Moreover, once the ball is regained via counterpressing in higher zones a threatening counter-attack can be made. The opposition is often unstable as the players have begun to move forwards in order to support the counter. Because of this, the counterpressing team now have open spaces to attack into after regaining the ball in an already advanced position. Liverpool coach Jürgen Klopp has described counterpressing as “the best playmaker in the world” due to the offensive potential found in pressing upon losing the ball.

Due to their disconnected attacking shape, Hungary were exposed on defensive transition.

Hungary were one of the many teams throughout the tournament who often failed to counterpress effectively, and not least in their heavy defeat to Belgium. The main reasoning behind their inability lay with their weak positional structure when in possession, which then translated into a weak position to counterpress from when inevitably turned over the ball. Not only did their attack carry little threat without strong links through the attacking shape, but once they conceded possession, their midfield was open too. Due to their disconnected shape, the fast attackers of Belgium were able to quickly break into the upon gaps upon regaining the ball.

The scene to the left is a prime example of Hungary’s shortcomings in their 4-0 loss to Wilmots’ Belgium. The Hungarians’ cover of the centre of the midfield is almost non-existent and after unsurprisingly turning the ball over, Belgium immediately have inviting space to break into.

Player Integration

A third key factor of a strong positional structure is its importance in getting the most out of the players within it. Nearly all things in football are aimed in one way or another to maximise the actual players’ capacity to execute an action. In terms of spacing, it is often a matter of creating space for the player, or putting them in a position on the pitch which best suits their skill-sets. For example, a player such as Mesut Özil is one of the world’s best in the central attacking midfield position. From this area he has strong access to other areas on the pitch and is better positioned to connect with other forwards as he does so well. However, if you put him on the touchline, he suddenly has less space, is more isolated and the chances are that there will be fewer teammates within his reach.

A large part of football is down to putting the players in a position to succeed and this can often be done as part of a larger-scale positional structure. Although the act of ‘putting round pegs into round holes’ is a rather simple one, it isn’t always done on the pitch, as we saw in this tournament. Without the players acting in their favoured spaces, their ability to shine and influence the game won’t be seen at its full potential. An example of this can be seen in Wayne Rooney, who was commonly positioned as the second deepest midfielder during English build-up and the excellent player wasn’t able to use his skill-set to maximum effect so far away from goal.

Austria’s disconnected attack.

Another team who were weak in shaping themselves in possession were Austria, who despite possessing a talented squad were one of the most underwhelming sides in the tournament. The star of the team David Alaba, had a particularly poor tournament and was especially absent in their loss to Portugal. Far away from his more natural deeper role, the Bayern player is one of the most versatile in the world yet struggled as a 10 in this match. Although alternative factors were influencing, such as the team’s disconnected attacking shape and direct play, the midfielder struggled in an advanced position.

As illustrated by the graphic from @11tegen11, Austria had a stretched shape which saw many direct passes from deep positions. With Alaba isolated and unable to influence the build-up, he wasn’t as impactful as he could have been whilst he became rather anonymous higher up the pitch. Although he saw the ball to some extent, he rarely was able to successfully continue the attack which was largely due to the direct nature of the passes and defensive pressure.

Aside from Alaba, both Marko Arnautovic and Marcel Sabitzer were constantly too wide to either support teammates and be an active force on their own. The front four were all noticeably stretched in attack with the width of the pitch covered yet no connections across the front-line. Pair this with the vertical disconnection as a result of the deeply-situated Ilsanker and Baumgartlinger and Austria unsurprisingly struggled to formulate meaningful attacks.

In some ways, the Austrian positional structure is representative of their attacking strategy. They commonly looked to build in a direct and vertical manner with lots of direct balls being played into the front four, which somewhat explains the sizable gap between the two pivots and the attackers. However the positional structure nonetheless had a significantly negative impact on their play. The vertical distances were often insurmountable even with their direct passing whilst the front four were too disconnected to enable the side to consistently challenge for knock-downs and the second balls. When they did concede possession following these long balls, the disconnect in midfield meant that effective pressure in the counterpress was also difficult to generate and the opposition could start developing possession themselves.

Creating Situations of Superiority

A final key factor of a positional structure is its ability to create situations of superiority for the (in this case) attacking team. With a similar level of importance to the above areas, it’s another major aspect of spacing and football in general. If the attacking team can create a moment superiority in any way, then they obviously have an increased capacity to cause defensive instability in this scene.

Numerical superiority is one of the most commonly and most easily formed levels of superiority through a positional structure. It largely consists of creating overloads in certain areas of the pitch which can help the attack break through – often by finding the free man who is the extra in a ‘4v3’ for example. Often in areas close to the ball, a team can look to focus its shape to create an overload in these spaces. By doing so, they have support around the ball but also can potentially outnumber the defenders and, as long as the players are distanced well, a player is likely to be open. Spain are a team who did this often in the left half-space, with Silva often coming over from the right to act as that open player.

Another way to create such profitable situations is by emphasising the individual qualities of the players. Whilst this can be done as mentioned above, by fitting ‘round pegs into round holes’, it can also be exaggerated through creating isolation situations. By creating a 1v1 moment, a team can more purely (in that there are less influencing factors on the moment such as teammate support) pit one players’ individual attacking ability against an opponent’s individual defensive ability. Obviously, if the attacker is notably better than the defender, then this creates a beneficial situation for the offensive team.

‘ISOs’ are commonly utilised in basketball, when the attacking team has a mismatch. This can be done when a smaller, more technical player (such as a PG or SG) is matched up against a larger and slower defender (PF or C). During such an isolation, the attacker can use his strong ball-handling ability to exploit the big man’s lack of mobility and qualitative superiority is created through the mismatch.

An example of such an isolation was seen in the build-up to Germany’s second goal against Slovakia. Löw’s forwards often looked to use this strategy in order to emphasise their superior ability to that of their Eastern European opponents. In this case, Draxler moved towards the byline and through doing so created a 1v1 situation with his defender. From this, he used his strong dribbling ability to beat his man and open space to make a short cut-back for Mario Gomez who doubled Germany’s lead.

Considering that spacing is such an important factor in a football match, why was it that so many teams struggled to have an effective positional structure?

Training time and non-verbal communication

One explanation for the teams’ downfall is their lack of training time together. With just a few weeks preparation after the curtains are drawn on the domestic season, it’s very much possible that the teams just don’t have enough time to train their spacing. The concept can be complex in many cases and the fact that it often involves the entire team makes cohesion, something rare in international football, almost a necessity.

It’s no surprise that teams such as Germany, who have numerous players who play for, or have played for, the same club are one of the best positionally. They show levels of non-verbal communication which is lacking across the rest of the tournament as players show a high level of understanding with one another.

This suggestion also has evidence in the development of teams over the course of the tournament. Whilst France were somewhat disappointing on the opening night with a poorly-shaped attack, it was their dynamic spacing which was key in their quarter-final demolition of Iceland. With teams improving over the short-lived competition, it could well be that their cohesion is increasing and the non-verbal communication is of a higher level and their collective positioning improves with it.

Although not in the EUROs, one of the biggest exceptions to this issue is Chile. However, once you begin to consider the background of the team then it begins to clearly make sense. For over a decade now, the South American outfit have been playing a very similar style of football which was ingrained by Marcelo Bielsa. Because of the consistency of their style of play, their familiarity with the positional side of their style of play is much greater than the average national team. If you contrast this with many teams of the EUROs, who have inconsistent playing styles (if they have one at all), then the difference is understandable.

Fatigue

A second explanation for this issue of spacing is a physical one. The large majority of players are coming off of the back of a physically-debilitating domestic season and enter the tournament in sub-optimal fitness levels. Whilst this obviously has a direct impedance on their ability to perform, it extends itself to a collective issue too. With the decreased levels of energy, we often see players moving rather slowly off of the ball in a somewhat lethargic manner. Because of this, many teams make ball-oriented shifts (the act of moving in the direction of the ball, often horizontal to follow the ball circulation and maintain support) in a too-slow manner to maintain support in the spaces around the ball.

As a result of fatigue, players aren’t able to constantly offer the support and connections around the ball which they had done for their club sides. They can’t follow the movement of the ball which almost inevitably means that support to the ball-carrier will be lost during a possession.

Conclusion

Whilst both lack of training time and fatigue are explanations for the poor spacing we’ve seen, it is also a factor in what has been an underwhelming tournament. As is common in international football, the level of play was rather disappointing and lead to many dull and boring games throughout the tournament. The individual players themselves were hindered by a full season just passed as they came into the tournament understandably fatigued, whilst their play between teammates highlighted their lack of familiarity and training time to form a cohesive understanding.

Even in the final match, we saw two teams with distinct tactical flaws. Despite Portugal’s defensive block lacking stability with gaps opening due to their man-oriented nature, France were only able to truly exploit this late after the introduction of Coman, as their shape prior had been too dysfunctional itself.

Despite the low level of tactical play, we did see some success for the smaller sides of the competition. Teams such as Iceland and Wales were able to overcome stronger opposition through the implementation and execution of a clear and effective game-plan – something which many teams seemingly lacked. However, the tournament predominantly served as another example of how important team synergy and understanding is in the effectiveness of a playing strategy.

“Perception is reality” – Lee Atwater

In football one of the most underrated and yet most important aspects is perception and how it affects decision making and the execution of actions in all phases of the game. However the importance of perception is inherent given that every action on the field is influenced by what the players perceive. The most important and most commonly used dimension of perception in football is vision. Whilst players at times use other senses, the ability to view things such as the ball, team-mates, opponents and their positions on the pitch is vital.

Humans have a field of vision ranging from about 180-200 degrees horizontally which is arrived at through a combination of the foveal and periphal visions. This means that at any given time there are between 160 and 180 degrees that a player is unable to view. With the range of degrees that a player cannot see being almost equal to the range that they can, the part of the field a player cannot see is also a key facet of the game. This area that a player cannot see is what is known as the “blind side”. How teams manipulate its qualities to their advantage is a key aspect of the game that impacts several phases in different ways.

Blind side positioning

One key characteristic of effective offensive play is knowing what an opposing defence focuses on to function effectively and making it as difficult as possible to focus on these things. This is why quick and effective ball circulation is more important against a zonal defence whilst quick and effective player movement is more important against a man-oriented one. This ability to make defensive reference points difficult to focus on, is the main strength of blind side positioning. As the name suggests blind side positioning is simply where one positions themselves on the blind side of an opponent.

Regardless of their defensive system, the players in a defending team need to be able to see the ball. The position of the ball including its proximity and the speed it is travelling at gives various cues for defenders in terms of their positioning, the timing of their actions and the level of danger an attack poses. Direct view of opponents is also important for defenders giving many similar cues to the ball. Although this is more system dependent given that it will be more important for a man-oriented defence than a zonal one, it is still important for all defenders.

The major issue that blind side positioning causes an opponent is that it essentially requires them to prioritise in terms of their field of vision. With a player positioned on the blind side of their opponent, they force this opponent into choosing between being able to see either the ball or the “man”.

Louis van Gaal is one manager known to use the blind side strategically and this use is inherent in his “contra” concept.

“he has to run always “contra”… “Contra” it’s not in front of him (opponent midfielder) because then he can see the pass line… the ball and his opponent. When you play like that, he can’t see the ball and him… so that’s contra… very important what I’m saying now.”

In the above quote LvG refers to a number of interesting factors. One of these, as I mentioned before, is one of the main benefits of blind side positioning, the inability of the defender in question to view both the ball and their opponent.

If the defensive opponent chooses to view their opponent exclusively, the ball carrier can move with the ball and the situation around them can change pretty drastically by the time he next sees the ball. This means the defender’s choice to keep their opponent in sight could be rendered useless anyway. The alternative, consisting of prioritising vision of the ball, means the player on the defender’s blind side can move off potentially unopposed which is almost equally dangerous.

As a further part of his contra concept, van Gaal instructs his attacking midfielder to move in the opposite direction to the ball. This creates interesting possibilities in penetrative passes.

With the player in question moving in the opposite direction to the ball they create a diagonal distance meaning the passing route is of a diagonal nature; the benefits of which have been extensively analysed here on Spielverlagerung.

Not only does it create the potential for diagonal passes to break the opposing midfield line. But due to the recipient moving against the grain (in the opposite direction to the opponents) this simple mechanism can create dynamic superiority.

Initially the two forwards are doing a good job of covering the opposing double 6, however as the ball is switched to the LCB the left sided 6 drops into the defensive line taking the forward with him which allows the LCB to take the ball forwards. The ball-near central midfielder pushes up to engage the LCB. As the red LCM narrows in to provide cover and the winger to his left does not adjust enough, a little disconnect is created, allowing the space for the diagonal pass into the number 10.

With the opposing defence shifting towards their right in relation to the ball and the number 10 moving in the opposite direction he has a potentially crucial temporal advantage ahead of his next action. This advantage is created by the need for the defenders to stop and change direction before moving towards the ball carrier whereas the ball carrier should be able to immediately continue in the direction they wish to.

Positioning players on the blind side of an opponent can create several other issues on a deeper level.

On an individual defensive level the perceptual focus points have been split in a way that makes it difficult to act on both. However in order to defend well that is exactly what they need to do; essentially multi task in terms of what they are focusing on. To cope with this the defenders in question need to constantly check their shoulders to be aware of slight movements behind them and any changes to the ball’s location in front of them.

With multi-tasking comes another problem; attention. Continuous partial attention theory is one way of describing how the human brain copes with multi-tasking. Essentially it argues that the brain can only give each task partial attention meaning we run the risk of missing relevant details. In this case this is dangerous due to the dangers that both the ball carrier and the opponent on the blind side can pose in the short term. Of course this is just one theory but it shows the inherent difficulty of multi-tasking.

On a collective level blind side positioning can force your opponents to over compensate defensively, opening up space in other areas. Defensive movements against the 10 space are a good example of this. When faced by opponents overloading the 10 space many teams’ midfield line react by moving deeper and narrower. If they become too deep and narrow they will lose access to defend the space in front of them and the flanks thus making themselves vulnerable to progressions from these areas.

As we can see blind side positioning can cause defenders major issues, so how can this be used strategically to increase the potency of attacks?

Blind sides in build-up/as a mechanism to beat pressing

Strategic use of the blind side has a lot to offer in a team’s build-up phase. Passing to the blind side of an opponent is somewhat inherent in vertical passing. A common example is when a striker steps forwards to press a defender and the defender passes vertically into a midfielder. In this situation the defender has passed to the forward’s blind side. So how can this be beneficial as a strategic tool in build-up?

As mentioned previously, in football the ball is a massive defensive reference point, not only in terms of positioning but even more in terms of perception and actions. The position of the ball indicates to the defending side how immediately dangerous the opposition attack is and what actions to carry out to minimize any potential threat. If we reduce defending to its most basic aim which is simply to stop the ball from ending up in the net, the importance of seeing the ball is self-evident. It is no surprise therefore that most defenders prioritise being able to see the ball.

Of course different teams and players respond to certain events differently based on their team’s tactical approach, mentality, game state and several other factors. However passing to the blind side of an opponent often forces the said opponent to “turn out”. By this I simply mean they must re-adjust their body position to regain vision of the ball.

Knowledge of this enables a strategic manipulation of the opponents’ focus and, in turn, coverage. An advantage therefore of blind side usage in build-up is the ability it gives to generate free men. By moving the ball to alter the opponent’s visual focus a team can create the necessary separation to allow one of their players to move without being tracked or reacted to.

A simple combination of a vertical pass followed by a backwards pass to the same player is enough to momentarily generate a free man against most teams. Returning to our earlier example, the ball-focus will distract the opposing forward inviting him to press and leaving the centre back free to receive a return pass. However with the most basic usage it is not truly advantageous as the ball returns to a similar theoretical starting point with little progress made.

As the GIF above demonstrates, passing to the blind side of the initial presser makes the initial ball-carrier a temporary free man. However in this case the use is not strategically valuable with the ball returning to a very similar situation as it started.

Example from Napoli’s 5-1 win over Empoli in January

However with strategic use comes a different set of actions, different results and greater potential. The initial ball carrier uses his time as a temporary free man to move into space to receive a return pass and help his team break out of the press.

Passing to the blind side of the opponent can be difficult given that the presence of the opponent can, if used well, block passes to this area. Therefore one may need to manipulate their opponents’ positioning to create the space to play into this area. To do so effectively one has to shift their opponents’ reference point.

With the ball being a reference point, shifting the ball between feet one can also shift an opponents’ positioning slightly and thus create the space to pass behind them.

Another reference point is the body positioning and eyes of the ball carrier. Defenders naturally use this to anticipate what their opponents are likely to do next and using this strategically has vast potential. Sergio Busquets is one player who frequently uses this to his advantage with his exquisite fake passes. He manages to separate defenders, pulling them out of position simply by using his eyes to indicate that he intends to pass into a certain area.

Happy birthday to Sergio Busquets. The master of time and space. pic.twitter.com/HQX5GiaDIl

— WM Formation (@TheWMformation) July 16, 2016

Wall passes are an increasingly common method of bypassing cover shadows. Wall passes are first touch passes where a previous pass is simply re-directed by the recipient without any additional force. This of course means the pace on the previous pass is used for the wall pass. Essentially this makes use of the fact that one opponent can only cover a player from one direction, the key therefore is to create an alternative passing route to the team-mate. The alternative passing routes can only be created effectively if the ball can be moved into another position quicker than the opponent can re-position themselves. Therefore it is vital to create a passing option in close proximity to reduce the opponents’ time to react.

This is often seen in build-up situations when opposing forwards use their presence to block passes from the defenders into a holding midfielder for example. In response another midfield player often drops to provide an alternative route to the holding midfielder who can now be accessed with a first time pass. When executed well the recipient of the wall pass should be able to receive the ball in front of their direct opponent and advance.

Example from Spain’s 2-1 loss to Croatia. Thanks to TP for the image.

Another method is a strategic usage of one’s own blind side. A player receiving the ball with a bad field of vision is a well known pressing trigger for several teams. A good example is when a player receives the ball whilst facing their own goal, they will usually be pressed quickly to prevent them from turning with the ball and advancing towards the opposition goal.

Therefore by passing to players facing their own goal a team can draw an opponent forwards. With a quick lay off the original ball carrier could be able to access the space left behind. This can be a particularly useful tool to evoke pressure from largely passive opponents and access the space between their lines of defence.

Napoli using Jorginho to attract the opposing forwards and open the passing lane from Koulibaly to Hamsik. pic.twitter.com/iyG8s57v70

— Judah Davies (@1415football) March 26, 2016

Blind side Movement

In crosses

Positioning an attacker on the blind side of a defender in crossing situations is one of the more commonly exploited possibilities of the blind side.

In crossing situations, like most defensive situations, defenders need to see the ball which is vital in preparing not only their actions such as whether to jump and what direction to move into but more importantly when to do these things. They also need to see any opponents to anticipate or react to their movements and generally to decide on how best to prevent them from getting to the ball. When a striker positions himself on the blind side of a defender he essentially takes away this possibility for the defender.

Furthermore such positioning gives the forward what can best be described as potential superiority. If the cross is deep the defender is likely to have to turn out at some point to avoid having to head the ball backwards, and this gives the attacker an advantage. Whilst turning out the defender’s focus is split and due to the action he is performing, challenging for the ball is not always viable.

Therefore the timing of turning out is essential for the defender. If this is done whilst the ball flies over the defender’s head they cannot effectively challenge for the ball. This also gives the attacker an advantage in terms of the positions they attack the ball from.

If the defender turns out before the ball reaches the target, the process of judging the flight of the ball becomes very difficult. When the defender finishes turning he will have momentarily lost his orientation, and he may not be able to recover it in time to defend the cross.

Gonzalo Higuain scored numerous goals from these positions for Napoli in the 2015/16 season, with several defenders ultimately unable to track his movement off their blind side.

In these situations it is vital for the defender to assess the flight of the ball quickly and, if needed, turn out with enough time to read the flight of the ball and prepare their action.

In through balls

Whilst the characteristics of blind side movement in through balls possesses many of the same characteristics as it does in crossing situations, ground through balls have one major difference by the very nature of them going along the ground.

Body positioning when defending against through balls is hugely important for defenders as they seek to occupy a position that will allow them to see the ball, maintain mobility to defend against the ball & the opponent and, significantly, give them the possibility to intercept the ball amongst other aspects. Combining all of these aspects in such a short space of time is of course incredibly difficult.

There is a rather common situation whereby defenders are particularly concerned with maintaining view of the opponent whilst viewing the ball from a side-on position. In these situations defenders often remove their own capacity to intercept the ball by virtue of their body positioning. With their body facing the opponent they may decrease the range of the passing lane in front of them, however they open a massive passing lane on the other side.

With the feet of the defender facing the attacker a through ball that goes past the back of the defender will be severely difficult to intercept for a number of reasons. Firstly the defender is likely to have most of their weight facing the opponent and will thus take a relatively long time to completely turn and create access to the ball. Secondly this process of turning will mean temporarily losing vision of the ball and the opponent. Furthermore if the pass and the run are co-ordinated well they can direct the attacker across the defender which will give the defender a certain distance to catch up after completing their turn.

Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona and 2013/14 Bayern sides often made great use of the blind side with their aerial through balls to create chances. One fairly common chance creation method they employed was an aerial switch from a half space to the opposite half space to meet an onrushing full-back. This was often effective at accessing the space behind deep defensive opposition, from this position the full-back could then square the ball across goal for runners into the box.

The fact that the ball was being switched from one half space to another forces the opponents to re-adjust their body positions and on-pitch-positions in order to trace the ball’s movement and be in position to defend it. The players on the opposite side of the ball’s initial position will need to turn nearly 180 degrees as the ball flies over their heads. This needs to be done quickly in order to have access to the ball upon it’s landing and prevent the ball back into the box.

Once the ball is crossed back into the centre by the full-back the players who just recently turned out to face the ball find themselves having to re-adjust their body positions again. The constant re-adjustment that the move requires, reduces the defenders’ capacity to track opponents’ runs. It is no surprise therefore that the attackers are often free in the box to convert the subsequent cross.

Barcelona’s 4-1 Copa Del Rey win at Levante in January 2014 is a good example of the how potent the blind side can be in through ball situations. All four of Barcelona’s goals came from a very similar movement scheme which consisted of Messi’s diagonal through balls and Tello’s blind side runs.

Barcelona using Tello's blind side runs and Messi's diagonal through balls to beat Levante in January 2014. pic.twitter.com/8gIr7XcWOk

— Judah Davies (@1415football) September 2, 2016

These situations have interesting implications for ball-far full-backs. Due to the opponent being closer than the ball, the greater focus needs to be on the opponent, thus longer time intervals should be spent watching said opponent. With brief glances to trace the ball’s movement the defender can maintain awareness of the flight of the ball, the approximate landing time and location and adjust their positioning accordingly. However such brief glances may not be enough to track the opponent.

Once the ball is played it is unlikely to change its path drastically unless there is extreme wind, however the opponent can do exactly this. For this reason it is far easier to lose track of the opponents’ movement than the ball’s once it has been played. As such it follows that one needs to pay greater attention to the opponent. Furthermore adopting the body position facing the opponent earlier will help with defending the situation once the opponent receives the ball. Whereas if the defender is still in the process of turning towards the opponent once they receive the ball they are already at a disadvantage.

In connections

In possession a connection is simply when team-mates possess the capacity to pass to one another through their positioning. Since this is an objective of the team in possession; namely to create as many positive connections as possible, one objective of defending is to prevent this. Thus when a team is circulating the ball it is a game of acting and reacting not only to team mates but opponents as well as they aim to create or cut connections. Blind sides are a great tool to gain the advantage in these situations.

One particular area it has great value in is in connecting possession from the flanks back into central areas. With the flanks being a notoriously more unstable location for possession than the centre and half spaces, it is no surprise that several teams use the flanks for pressing traps to regain possession. In these situations it follows that those actively pressing the ball leave space behind them as they press from central areas towards the flank. If the trap is not well prepared and there is a lack of support behind these players what follows is a large area to exploit behind the press.

In these situations the movement of the players in more central areas is crucial and can render the opponents’ pressing efforts useless.

In the GIF above the red teams’ left back is being pressed by 3 players from 3 different angles. The support behind the blue players that are pressing is poor and for that reason there is space behind the press. Although they are initially covering the nearby passing options they are vulnerable to blind side movements. With a simple movement into the gap between the pressers the midfielder creates a connection back into the centre of the field and beats the opponents’ trap.

Timing

As with any action on a football pitch, the timing of movement is vital here. When moving off an opponents’ blind side there is an added element that makes for good timing. With the opponent checking their shoulders to see the attacker at certain intervals, it follows that there are periods where the defenders’ focus is elsewhere. In terms of getting free the best timing of these movements is of course during these periods. Furthermore to gain the biggest time advantage attackers can begin their movement immediately after a scan from the opponent in their direction.

When the defender scans quickly to maintain awareness of the attackers’ positioning they believe they have the best possible awareness of their opponent’s positioning. Immediately after the defender has glanced in their direction, the attacker has a small time frame to make a movement without being tracked before the defender scans again.

Within one minute of coming on, Weigl did this against a midfield which #BVB were struggling to break through. pic.twitter.com/OQmSB2t9wK

— Tom Payne (@TomPayneftbl) August 29, 2016

Watch in the video above as Weigl begins his movement immediately after Malli glances in his direction. Read more on Weigl’s genius here.

Blind side of team-mate/Blind sides in combinations

Regardless of a team’s tactical set up a major orientation point for defenders is the body position of the ball carrier. This indicates to the defenders the more immediate danger as it shows, more often than not, the areas the ball carrier is more likely to act in the immediate future.

With this in mind positioning and actions that occur on the blind side of the ball carrier are less likely to be well reacted to, prepared for and ultimately covered. This creates interesting attacking potential and is key to some common offensive combinations; namely one-twos and 3rd man runs.

A “one-two” is simply where the ball carrier passes to a team-mate and moves before receiving a return pass. They are commonly used in offensive situations to create separation from markers and bypass several opponents to create goal scoring chances. But why are they effective so often? Essentially there are two reasons behind this; the perceptual reference points being split and the speed of the actions.

With the ball’s location moving at the same time as the opponent’s, the defenders’ main visual reference points are effectively being split. For this reason it is not possible for them to act on both simultaneously. Focusing on the ball alone risks leaving the opponent free to run behind them, whilst focusing solely on the opponent may mean not being able to track the direction of the return pass.

The aspects mentioned above inherently refer to the other main reason one-twos can be effective which is the speed that they take place at. Whilst it is difficult for defenders to track both the movement of the ball and the runner this is only the case if the actions take place at speed. With a one-two taking place at speed the defenders will have to prioritise quickly making them more prone to errors of judgement.

Being a more complex version of a one-two there are more reasons why 3^rd man runs can be so effective. One relates to the point made above about the body position of the ball carrier. This body position suggests to the defenders that he will interact with the “2^nd man” and they prepare their actions in relation to this possibility.

With their focus on the ball carrier and the “2^nd man” the 3^rd man’s movements are not prioritised or prepared for. This means the 3^rd man’s initial actions are out of the immediate perception of the defenders. This is particularly the case when one considers the processing limitations of the human brain.

Some psychologists believe the brain shows a “response selection bottleneck” taking time to prioritise and then process when asked to perform several tasks. Others believe the brain shows “adaptive executive control” which immediately prioritises the tasks at hand. What is clear is that the brain cannot process numerous tasks or pieces of information simultaneously. Yet this is what defending a well-executed 3^rd man run requires.

Of course no single defender is required to defend against both the ball carrier, the 2^nd and 3^rd men. However from here arises two issues. Firstly the defenders who will have to defend against the 3^rd man are far less likely to be aware and anticipate danger due to both the body position of the ball carrier and the position of the ball. Secondly the whole sequence has implications in terms of how best to defend against it. This is problematic because those who are required to defend against the 3^rd man are likely to be less focused at the start of the move.

Once the movements of the 3^rd man are reacted to by the defenders he often has significant dynamic superiority due to starting his run far earlier than the defenders started tracking it. This makes it severely difficult to properly track the run being made.

Furthermore if the 2^nd man acts quickly enough he can release the ball to the 3^rd man whilst the opponents are putting structures in place to press him which will increase the space for the 3^rd man to operate in the next phase.

A well-executed 3^rd man run combination thus exploits another weak-link of humans’ processing capabilities; namely the slow reactions to a 2^nd stimulus. If the initial ball-carrier and the interaction with the 2^nd man provides defenders with the initial stimulus then the interaction with the 3^rd man provides the 2^nd stimulus. Psychological research has shown that humans are slow to respond to a 2^nd stimulus that comes so quickly after an initial one as they are still processing or in the act of reacting to the first. This phenomena is known as the Psychological refractory period.

Since humans are slow to react to a 2^nd stimulus it makes sense to increase the amount that they have to do or react to in these situations. The advantage of this can thus be felt most strongly when the pass to the third man is in the opposite direction to the pass before. Such combinations mean the defenders will have to prepare and begin shifting in one direction before quickly needing to move in the other. Since the reaction to this will be slow the 3^rd man can be released in a situation where they are almost totally free from defensive pressure.

This change of direction exists in both a horizontal and vertical sense. In a horizontal sense this direction change is manifested in 3^rd man combinations that switch the point of attack from one side to the other. In a vertical sense, the “up-back-through” combination where the ball is played forwards, laid back and then played through can help a team reap the benefits of the change of direction.

These human processing limitations and the dynamic advantages they can so frequently generate are a major part of what makes well-executed 3^rd man runs so effective at creating goal scoring chances.

One-twos and 3rd man runs can be effective in creating goal scoring chances. pic.twitter.com/5Pqqa911N9

— Judah Davies (@1415football) August 24, 2016

Foggia chance creation part II: low passes into the box, (through balls, one-twos, third man runs) #DeZerbi pic.twitter.com/7uWZ7orSiz

— Alex Belinger (@AlexBelinger) September 4, 2016

Inherent use in Juego De Posición (?)

Through analysing some of the concepts of Juego de Posicion and how they interact it is clear that a strategic use of the blind side is an inherent aspect of the game model.

One of these concepts is the necessity of retaining presence between each oppositional line of defence. This is vital for creating the conditions to progress attacks both directly and indirectly. This positioning behind lines of defence already implies blind side positioning, and when we combine this with the necessity of positioning in the gaps between opponents we arrive at blind side movement. Given what we know about the presence of defender’s being able to block space directly behind them, players positioned behind lines have to move and constantly react to the opponents in front of them to create the connections and angles for progression. They are therefore engaging in blind side movement.

Furthermore the central tenant which is the strategic use of possession as a tool to destabilise opponents inherently hints at a focus on disrupting the visual field of opponents. The reason possession is focused on as a tool of generating advantages is because of the importance it holds for defenders as a reference point in body positioning and on-pitch positioning. This knowledge is behind the idea that shifting the ball quickly will require frequent changes to the positions and fields of vision of defenders until a point where it becomes too quick for them to adjust.

Defensive potential

Cover shadows a means of blind side defending

Although the blind side can cause significant issues for defenders it can, and often is, also be used to their advantage.

Out of the blind side spawns a defensive technique that is vital to most defensive systems; cover shadows. Cover shadows are essentially when a defender positions themselves between the ball and an opponent thus cutting off the passing lane to the opponent, in effect covering the pass with their “shadow”. Whether explicitly or implicitly cover shadows are used in almost all defensive systems, man-marking is the main exception.

Strong usage of cover shadows allows a player to defend against two opponents. The merits of cover shadows in pressing as opposed to man-orientations are easily demonstrable.

In the first image above the lone forward attempts to prevent the opponents from building through their defensive midfielder by situationally marking him. While he is likely to be successful in his objective there are still alternative viable build-up methods available to the ball carrier. Furthermore the blues will lack access to regain possession due to the lack of pressure on the ball carrier who will be free to progress and prompt one of the opposing midfielders to move out of position.

In the next image the forward presses the ball carrier whilst using his cover shadow to prevent the pass into the holding midfielder. The advantage is clear as his team can maintain the access required to force the ball carrier into an action whilst simultaneously preventing them from building through the defensive midfielder.

Furthermore with the man-orientation on the left the defensive midfielder can potentially still be used for a wall pass as he remains closer to the ball than his opponent and therefore retains the ability to receive the ball. With the cover shadow however the pass into the defensive midfielder is simply not viable and attempting it is highly likely to lead to a turnover of possession.

The merits of cover shadow usage are equally demonstrable in deeper areas of the pitch and huge variation is often visible in the way different teams defend the ten space.

Whilst it is difficult to predict all these movements with any certainty, and the speed is exaggerated, this shows how simply imbalances can be created in a man-oriented defence

The blue side are very man-oriented particularly against those trying to play between the lines. There are several issues with such defending which have been covered extensively on this platform. However in this case the most obvious issues are the large distances between the players which mean they cannot offer defensive support to one another.

Another is the need to have an overload at the back for some element of stability, this means they have an underload further up. The opponents use this well to sequentially draw out the defenders and destabilise their structure.

By contrast the reds use their cover shadows to protect the space between their lines which has numerous benefits in comparison. As mentioned above, they maintain access to the line of opponents in front and can cover the opponents in the line behind simultaneously. Essentially meaning the forwards and midfielders can defend against two players each.

Furthermore they maintain a cohesive defensive shape meaning they can support each other in defensive actions and exert control allowing them to force the ball away from dangerous areas. The same centre back switch and vertical pass that destabilised the man-oriented defence is easily dealt with through strong defensive support.

Going back to the attentional issues a defender faces with players positioned on their blind side, there are ways around this on both an individual and collective level. Psychological research has shown that training allows the automatization of processes which in turn means the tasks will require less attention. With less training, defenders may require a longer time to recognise their opponents’ positioning and align themselves in the desired manner. Whereas a highly trained individual who has learned the skill of shoulder checking will take far less time and far less attentional focus to do the same task.

The benefits are clear, with less time required to pick out the relevant details upon checking their shoulder the defender will be able to attend more closely to the ball carrier.

The burden of blind side defending can be reduced through strong defensive support. Through strong compactness and the dynamic element of keeping pressure on the ball, teams can retain a stronger capacity to defend against players positioned behind them. Although the individuals will still need to be aware of what is behind them, it becomes far more of a group effort with the players sharing responsibility for the space between them.

The benefits are retained even when the coverage of passing lanes is not perfect as the high level of defenders in the vicinity can make opponents hesitant to pass into such areas. Furthermore the ball can be forced away from the area with the distances between defenders allowing them to outnumber opponents within their block.

Blind side pressing

In pressing situations approaching the ball carrier from their blind side is a potentially very effective method.

The main issue here for the ball carrier is that they cannot see the opponent who is approaching them meaning they are often not aware they are being approached. This causes the ball carrier significant issues. Of course if they do not know a defender is approaching they may proceed as if they have time and space and risk being caught in possession.

Furthermore even if they are made aware of onrushing defenders they will find it difficult to know which angle they are being approached from without seeing the opponent. This makes the selection of actions far more difficult. Decisions such as what direction to pass in or what direction to move in become almost impossible to make well without this vital awareness.

Defensive blind side usage is inherent in backwards pressing. Backwards pressing is essentially the act of pressing an opponent who is already behind your position on the pitch.

The GIF above is a hypothetical pressing trap with strong use of the blind side. The two forwards situationally mark the opposition centre-backs to force the keeper to play into the defensive midfielder. The pass is left open intentionally as it goes into an area where they can create a defensive overload and outnumber the ball carrier 4v1.

The ball carrier is approached from two almost opposite angles which makes his life particularly difficult. He needs to check his shoulder to be aware of the direction and speed at which he is being approached from behind him. However doing so will mean temporarily taking his eye off the opponent approaching from the front which makes him vulnerable to an attempt to regain the ball. These structural advantages in the press make recovering possession far more likely.

Slight movements to the ball carrier’s body position will change their field of vision and in turn their blind side. In these situations teams that strategically use this to regain possession can be seen curving their angle of approach in order to remain on the ball carrier’s blind side.

Blind side pressing infers approaching an opponent from behind and this of course has different characteristics to more traditional tackling. When making an attempt to regain the ball from behind an opponent there are a number of differences in the characteristics in the actual tackle to more conventional challenges. Of course tackling directly from behind is hardly viable due to the need to go through the opponent and the rules surrounding this. Therefore the approach must be made from the side. When tackling from the side the aim is often to flick the ball away as the tacklers take care to avoid the forward motions of the ball carrier.

The timing of the challenge can have a big influence on the subsequent events. For example making the challenge immediately after a loose touch from the attacker can create a clean regain where the tackler either goes straight into a dribble or passes the ball in the same action as the tackle.

However making the tackle whilst the ball is close to the opponent and they are in the process of an action has high potential for winning fouls. As the ball carrier swings their foot back before an action (be it a pass, shot or clearance) they temporarily leave the ball uncovered which can create space for a tackle to be made. Furthermore this is a good time to make the challenge as the focus of the ball carrier will be almost entirely on the pass, shot or clearance they are in the process of making. This is used at times by attackers to win penalties; by approaching defenders as they are about to clear the ball, they can take the ball away and take the hit of the defenders’ swinging motion.

Blind side pressing lends itself more naturally to counterpressing situations for a couple of reasons. Firstly the team that just regain the ball often pass vertically in order to make a quick progression towards the opposition goal. Depending on the distance and speed of the pass this can force the player to receive the ball facing their own goal. In addition to this, those who are tasked with blocking his route to goal are usually stationed behind the first receiver. In these situations if the defenders move forwards to challenge the ball carrier they will automatically be approaching the attacker on the blind side.

Sergio Busquets is an example of a player who does this well. With his strong positioning and anticipation Busquets is often on hand to press the first receiver who is often still facing his own goal at the time.

Sergio Busquets often approaches opponents on the blind side in counter pressing situations to win possession back. pic.twitter.com/gIXaJUsAm2

— Judah Davies (@1415football) September 2, 2016

Is it possible to have no blind side?

Technically the answer here is no due to the natural limitations of humans’ viewing capacity. However with effective scanning it is possible for a player to have a 360 degree picture of what is happening on the field and thus have no blind side. The idea of pre-orientation, post-orientation and orientation during a football action were conceptualised by Marcel Lucassen at the DFB, for their coaching education and elite player development.

Essentially this refers to scanning the field before, during and after a football action to maintain a good awareness of the game situation around a player. This enhances the players’ ability to select an appropriate action by giving them information on the positions of the ball, team-mates and opponents.

Conclusion

Whilst this piece has covered the main aspects and potential advantages teams can benefit from with strategic use of the blind side there is still further scope for discussion and analysis on this topic. Aspects such as the use of the blind side in defence to prevent opponents from turning towards goal, the potential attackers have to use this to turn and the use of scanning in all phases of the game are possible topics for the future.

As you can see the blind side is an aspect that has an influence on every phase of the game. Whilst they are occasionally referred to by pundits, commentators and other football people, the full potential that comes with it is not often recognised or understood. Furthermore some of the aspects detailed in this analysis are referred to or mentioned without the understanding of the processes. It’s not uncommon to hear a commentator blast a defender for “ball watching” but does that simple criticism reflect the true difficulty of these situations?

Pressing, counterpressing, and counterattacking are three very popular concepts that are associated with the most exciting and dominant teams in modern football. Pressing and counterattacking are perhaps the more “classic” ideas in football tactics, while counterpressing is a buzzword which has become quite popular over the last five to six years – despite having existed for decades. But what do these terms really mean and why are they so important to modern football?

This tactical theory article was originally posted on June 1st, 2015 for martiperarnau.com. Because it is partially covering topics which we have already visited here on Spielverlagerung.com, it may be redundant in small parts for our avid readers.

However most of the work is interesting and detailed content which has not been covered on this site before. It covers definition, philosophy, strategy, tactics, techniques, and psychology of the topic in a football-specific context. I have decided to repost the piece here for your enjoyment!

Pressing

Pressing can be defined as creating tension with the intention of getting the ball back. This is sometimes confused with pressure, which is the tension itself. Pressing is the application of the pressure with a specific intent. Every movement on the pitch creates some sort of pressure or tension somewhere on the field. Without any pressure or tension the opponent could walk straight upfield and shoot on goal every time.

So, what distinguishes pressing from a defense that doesn’t press? Intent. When pressing, a team is actively trying to win the ball back through pressuring the opponent and by moving out of or within its formation. When a team isn’t attempting to win the ball back, but to contain the opponent’s offense – then that team’s intention is to defend the goal by stopping the opponent from creating chances without taking the ball from them.

For example, Mourinho’s Inter Milan in the second leg of the Champion’s League semi-finals against Guardiola’s Barcelona didn’t want to win the ball. They only ever had the ball because they had to – because if Barcelona lost the ball trying to create a chance it meant that possession had to change into Inter’s hands. Mourinho’s men immediately rid themselves of the ball in transition in order to avoid any sort of disorganization which would stem from being counterpressed or losing the ball after a counterattack. Mourinho said after the game that he didn’t want his side to have the ball:

“We didn’t want the ball because when Barcelona press and win the ball back, we lose our position – I never want to lose position on the pitch so I didn’t want us to have the ball, we gave it away, I told my players that we could let the ball help us win and that we had to be compact, closing spaces.”

Pressure is one characteristic of the atmosphere around the ball which creates conditions in which the opponent can no longer properly control the ball and is ultimately forced to lose possession. Pressure forces an action to occur rather than allowing it to occur based on the will of the opponents. When an action is forced in a pressured atmosphere, every aspect of that action is made more difficult. An action consists of both a decision and the execution of that decision – if these two aspects can be manipulated correctly, the opponent will lose the ball.

The red/orange third is the attacking third, the light/dark green is midfield, and the yellow/olive is defensive. The colors within them represent the split into high and deep zones (for example, red = high attacking press, orange = low attacking press).

The German football association’s model for distinguishing the different types of pressing is quite good. The field is split into three horizontal thirds – the attacking, midfield, and defending thirds. Attacking pressing occurs in the attacking third, midfield pressing occurs in the midfield third, and defensive pressing occurs in (you guessed it!) the defensive third. However, the German FA divides the thirds even further by assigning each one a high and deep zone.

This means it’s possible to have high-attacking pressing, deep-attacking pressing, high-midfield pressing, deep-midfield pressing, high-defensive pressing, and deep-defensive pressing. A good way to think of it is to just split each third in half horizontally and call the top half high and the bottom half deep.

The most fundamental component to pressing is being able to press. In other words, you have to establish access to the ball in order to be able to exert pressure upon it. This concept goes hand in hand with the preparation for pressing, meaning that every action must be prepared for (in this sense positionally, but it can apply to psychology or other aspects of football) – including the pressing itself. If a pressing action is prepared for properly then the pressing team will have proper access to the ball.

Poor preparation for a pressing moment.

Poor preparation leads to a poor press and access.

If there is access to the ball the entire dynamic changes in comparison to when there is no access. When a team is able to pressure the ball it allows the rest of the team in the deeper layers to push towards the ball and leave space on the far side of the field open. If a team played with a high defensive line but didn’t pressure the ball they would concede a lot of goals because of allowing long passes into the space behind the defenders. If a team which played very horizontally compact didn’t pressure the ball they would have a very hard time defending because every switch of the ball would expose the underloaded far side.

If there is no access to the ball then the defensive team must answer the obvious question: How do we re-establish access without being exposed? There are multiple ways to do this. The most common way is to ignore the ball as a reference point and collectively move towards the space where the ball will eventually arrive. In other words, drop deeper and more centrally to protect the space near the goal and wait to force the ball backwards or wide and away – the space behind the defense and in front of the goalkeeper decreases as the ball moves forward and the defense moves backwards. Another option is to move collectively towards the ball and play with the offside rule. If prepared and timed correctly this can be an extremely valuable way to win the ball back even without access to the ball.

Preparing for the press means moving into the proper positions to be able to press according to the team’s strategy. It’s also possible to prepare the offensive team for the defensive team’s press. It’s quite common to see a defense “condition” the play of the offense in a certain way in order to move them into an area the defense is seeking to press.

Atletico preparing Chelsea for a pressing trap in the center of the field.

Above is a variation to preparing the opponent for the press. Atletico Madrid seek to move the opponent into the center of the field in order to isolate him from his teammates and then close the pressing trap on him. The players move in specific routes and block the outside passing lanes in order to encourage the opponent to move into the center of the field.

Once the opponent is isolated from his teammates and has no escape route, the team can move towards the ball collectively and win it in a good area which would likely result in a great counter attack. Pressing traps can vary as well – aspects of the trap include where the trap is set up to isolate the opponent, how many players participate in the trap, the type of pressing when closing the trap, how the opponent is isolated, when the trap is set, and more.

In the above example, Atletico Madrid were quite active as they moved out of their shape to start and baited the opponent into the center. Preparation varies depending on if its dynamic or static and which game phase or game state it is in.

So what are the triggers to begin a press once in position to do so? They normally depend on aspects like field of view, control of the ball, ability of the player, connectivity of the opponent, or the nature of the pass. If a player isn’t facing in the direction of his passing options then it is extremely difficult to escape a press, therefore the team should press before the player can re-orient himself.

The ball is much easier to take from an opponent who controls it poorly. A team can collectively press the ball at the moment it’s miscontrolled because it would take time to re-establish control of the ball. This plays a part in the “opponent’s ability” as well. If the player is very poor at making decisions and controlling the ball it would be logical to put that player under immense pressure as soon as he’s about to receive it. Most players are taught to press the opponent “as the ball is traveling” because the scene cannot change dramatically within the time the presser leaves his position as the ball is moving between players.

The ball cannot dynamically change directions in the middle of its route between players (unless there is some crazy spin on the ball, which would be visible and anticipated by the players) so it is an optimal time to press the destination point of the ball. If the presser decided to leave his position while it is under the control of the opponent player (without the following layers of the press to protect the vacated space and cover him) then the ball could change direction quite easily as the opponent can simply dribble and exploit the movement of the presser.

When the defending team goes to press can also depend on which section of the field they set up their block and where they seek to isolate the ball. The press can also vary on which part of the team begins the press, which direction the team moves, and when the press stops.

An example of a team pressing an opponent towards the center and then towards the sidelines once the ball has moved there.

If the team is seeking to press high up the field and towards the center, it’s possible for the wingers to begin the press with arcing runs towards the central defenders while blocking any passing options into wide areas. If the team seeks to press from the midfield towards the flanks it’s possible for the winger and fullback to begin the press against the touchline.

The pressure usually stops when the ball is won, when access to the ball is lost (due to being dribbled, failing a tackle, being overloaded, etc.), or the ball is forced deeper than the pressing team is willing to move. It’s also possible to stop pressing once the ball is forced into an area which isn’t necessarily deep, but which the team feels comfortable leaving unpressured, such as the flanks in the midfield. For example, in certain situations Barcelona have forced the ball wide and then just focused on the center while just containing the opponent in wide areas and not allowing penetration.

Similarly, the direction of the press can vary depending on the compactness of the team – horizontally, vertically, and diagonally. Within that compactness there are more specific forms of pressing like backwards pressing and pressing within one’s own shape. Diagonal pressing refers specifically to a team moving directly towards the ball and “cutting the corners” of your formation as they are the least valuable areas and they are furthest away from the ball. Basically, if the ball is in the center of the field the team will collapse diagonally towards it – if the ball is with the opponent fullback the team will collectively move towards it in a diagonal fashion.

Horizontal and vertical pressing is basically when the team (or a section of the team) moves collectively towards the ball in a purely horizontal or vertical fashion – which is more theoretical. When looking at the concept of backwards pressing, it is referring to when a player presses the ball once it has already past his position on the field. For example, if the ball moves past the two strikers in a 4-4-2 formation and in front of the midfield 4, if the two strikers move backwards and press the opposition from behind they are performing backwards pressing (which doesn’t occur very often even in big leagues like the EPL that typically lack compactness – which might also be a psychological point, because players don’t want to backwards press if they don’t have support in the immediate vicinity).

Pressing is not always “collective” either, the collective positional structure is made up of individual players in specific positions and specific phases. Some players might still be focusing on “defensive organization” while others are already pressing together. Also, one player could be man marking while others are performing zonal marking. Not all players are always in the same phase or moving in a collective fashion – which can lead to some very complex pressing systems.

Not all defensive movements are the same either. The types of defense I will describe are variants of zonal and man-marking. Along with that, you can take the variations of pressing movements I write about in the counterpressing section of this piece as variations of pressing too. It’s important to remember that pressing is usually a mix of these variations instead of being purely one type of pressing during the match.

Rigid Man Marking

In “rigid man marking” each player chooses an opposing player and presses him specifically, following the opponent wherever they go. This is easy to do for the players as it doesn’t require much thinking. The idea is to have constant access to each opponent at all times throughout the game and therefore put huge pressure upon the opponent while blocking their options.

The weaknesses lie in the fact that each opponent is followed by a player. This puts the pressing player in a reactionary role as they must follow the opponent’s movements – therefore losing control of his own movements. The opponent can drag his opponent away from important areas to open space, he can switch positions with other opponents to confuse the pressing team and disrupt their structure, and if the opponent is skilled he can beat the pressing player and potentially create overloads all over the field.

Flexible Man Marking

This type of man marking is similar to the previous variant except that players seek to switch players off to each other whenever possible in order to avoid being dragged away from important areas or avoid confusion when players switch positions during a press. An obvious problem here is in the moment of the transfer. When transferring an opponent from one presser to another there are two pressing players on one opponent, meaning there is an open player elsewhere.

Space Oriented Man Marking

In this variant the pressing players are focused on protecting a specific space around their position, and if any opponent moves into this space the pressing player begins to man mark the opponent. Once the opponent leaves the designated space the player returns to his position and protects his zone. The logic behind this variant is that any opponent who is near the ball should be pressed while the rest of the team seeks to close available spaces.

When a player leaves his position to man mark the rest of the team can collectively move towards the opened space to close up any holes – though this does create space on the far side of the field. A weakness of this variant is that the player that leaves his position can easily be manipulated and bypassed thus creating overloads higher up the field for the opponent.

Position Oriented Zonal Marking

In this type of zonal defense, players seek to remain in their positions in relation to their teammates and shift towards the ball. The idea behind this type of zonal marking is that there is no need to directly pressure the opponent or the ball when the team can control the space around the ball by shifting towards it in its block.

Because this type of marking is oriented specifically to one’s teammates the compactness of the team is maintained throughout the block – though it does require a lot of running to close the open space if the opponent seeks only to circulate the ball in safe positions. If the ball is played into a tight near-side area (created by the block shifting towards the ball) it is pressed and the opponent is in a very difficult situation. As you can tell, this form of pressing the ball is a bit more passive in comparison to others because the team just shifts towards the ball and waits for the opportunity to press instead of actively seeking out the opportunity to press.

Man Oriented Zonal Marking

This zonal marking is oriented to the opponent and the pressing players seek to cover their respective zones while moving closer to a player which may be within the zone. This is different to the Space Oriented Man Marking because in that variant the players will focus on defending their respective zones but will aggressively man mark any opponent who enters their space.

Space Oriented Zonal Marking

This variant is focused upon congesting the available playing space around the ball. The team seeks to overload the space near the ball in order to put pressure on the opponent and limit his options. The key to making this form of pressing successful is making sure there is access to the opponent and the ball player is put under pressure.

If the team just shifts towards the space around the ball without putting any access or pressure on the opponent – then they will most likely fail as the opponent can just circulate the ball safely and easily manipulate the team’s aggressive shifting by switching the ball and attacking the open side. Access is the key to any press – particularly one which aims to trap an opponent in a pressured area while vacating the far side of the field.

Option Oriented Zonal Marking

The main point of reference for this type of defense is the ball itself. Where could the ball go? Which is the best way to prevent the ball from hurting us in a specific situation? The players on the team move differently from each other – they focus mainly on flexible movements to prevent the progression of the ball based upon its positioning. This requires a great deal of intelligence and coordination from the pressing players as it can be a huge mix of man marking, zonal marking, blocking passing lanes with cover shadows, etc. If done incorrectly it is possible for a large amount of space to open up in the defensive shape.

To see more in-depth pieces on Man and Zonal Marking look at these articles from our website: Man Coverage / Man-to-man-Marking and Zonal Marking / Zonal Coverage.

Porto players blocking the passing lanes into the Bayern midfielders. Notice the space between the midfield and defense for Porto!

Focusing upon the passing lanes while pressing is an interesting tactic. In basketball this is called ‘fronting.’ The basic idea is that it is better to mark the possibility of the ball reaching a specific destination rather than the destination itself. Would you rather man mark Lionel Messi and let him receive the ball or would you rather mark the passing lane into Lionel Messi and prevent him from ever receiving the ball? This idea is used quite frequently in basketball and contributed to some of Michael Jordan’s least impactful games when he was defended intelligently in this way.

Above is a video of Payton guarding Jordan and fronting him frequently. It basically forces the opponent to choose a different pass option and move away from the lane that is being blocked. Porto did this against Bayern’s central midfielders when they were higher up the field. When Bayern’s players dropped deeper they simply stayed oriented towards them but goal-side of the ball.

Above is a video which shows a few examples of what happens when a player tries to front in too much space or with no support. It would be unstable to front a player who drops extremely deep as another player could just move into the vacated space or the player who is being covered could utilize the large amount of space to escape the cover shadow. Bayern focused on longer passes over the opponent midfield and into overloads before crossing in the second leg comeback.

This was more successful because in the first leg Bayern attempted to play through the Porto midfield which was blocking passing lanes – but in the second leg they focused upon moving directly into the space (which was huge due to the midfielders positioning themselves higher up to block passes) behind the Porto midfield by bypassing them completely.

When there is a smaller amount of space it is easier to cover a passing lane because the movement of the covered player is limited – therefore the angle from the ball to the player is much easier to move with (as the ball is extremely dynamic in its positioning for the most part, it’s important that its destination point doesn’t have the opportunity to be as dynamic) and lobbed passes into the space are less successful.

This is why the “fronting” done in basketball happens more often in the “low post” which is closer to the basket and the baseline where there is less space rather than near half court where there is a lot of space to move in. Another difficult aspect when looking at fronting in large amounts of space is that there isn’t as much direct contact between the players so blocking the passing lane is even more difficult as the opponent has free movements with nobody physically disrupting him and the pressing player is put into a reactive role.

Cover shadows and specific running paths which block passing lanes happen very frequently when pressing. Guardiola’s principle of defending two players at once by defending the space in between them applies here. There are various running paths that can be taken during a press and various ways to utilize cover shadows – but the idea behind it remains the same; the opponent’s decisions can be more easily manipulated when their ability to make “other decisions” is decreased. By reducing their options a team can actively change the possessing team’s structure and passing patterns.

This leads into how pressing allows a team to control the rhythm of the game. In modern football, defense is normally more dominant than the offense in regards to thinking structure. Offenses are usually in a “reactive” role as they don’t seek to change the defense’s structure. Rather, they react to what the defense is doing and attempt to score with that reactive offensive thinking structure.” As a defense marks their zones they gain some control over the situation – they are no longer following the opponent, but they are defending their space and the opponent must play against them rather than controlling the defender’s movements.

An example of a half back moving forward and forcing the opponent to change.

To find some articles on the “advancing halfback” and David Alaba’s role as a left halfback look here: Der vertikale oder vorstoßende zentrale Abwehrspieler and Aspektanalyse: David Alaba, der Halbraumlibero.

Most offenses search for how they can go around or through a defense, but don’t look to change the structure of the defense itself in favor of the offense. An example of this “proactive” form of attack is Pep Guardiola’s teams – specifically Alaba’s role as a “half-space libero” where he moves forward from the halfback role and can force the opponent into a 4-4-2. An “active” offense is one that would resemble the more rigid attacks of Bielsa or Van Gaal – one which plays in its way regardless of what the defense is doing.

A “passive” offense would resemble Mourinho’s Inter in 2010 vs. Barcelona in the second leg where it doesn’t seek to do anything. One extra category could be added called “ignorant” in which the team simply ignores the opponent and tries to play, and even further layers could be distinguished within these thinking structures such as “passive aggressive” – though all of these thinking structures require a separate and more in-depth analysis for another theory article.

This defense definitely thinks differently in comparison to the previous example with Atletico Madrid, no?

Defenses have similar thinking structures too. They behave in similar ways to the offensive thinking structures, meaning that a proactive defense would seek to change the structure and movement of the opponent. A team which presses correctly could force the opposition to alter their positioning in order to continue playing – which disrupts the opponent’s harmony and dynamic. If the positional structure of the offense is forced to change, then the combinations to escape pressure will have a different structure as well – usually forcing a weaker structure. In this way, a defense can “attack” the possessing team. Therefore, some coaches do not believe in the “phases of the game,” which I will elaborate upon later in the piece.

There can be a special psychological effect that comes with aggressive pressing or counterpressing as well. After a team has pressed the ball a few times, the possessing team will begin to expect the press. They make decisions as if they are being pressed even if they aren’t “truly” being pressed any longer – in this way a “false press” can evolve and a team can merely display the beginning characteristics of a high press and force the possessing team into poor decisions. This both saves energy and allows one team to control the other. It can lead to “rhythmic pressing,” where a team spends portions of the game pressing intensely and other portions in a “resting press” or a “false press” – which has its own specific advantages.

The act of pressing an opposing team and their space to play takes away options by guiding them away from the pressured areas. Depending on the options left to the player with the ball it can also increase the difficulty of executing a decision. The time it takes to perform an action is decreased in both physical and mental ways. The “fear” or anticipation of a press happening can force the player to play as if some decisions are already unavailable for him before they truly are.

Finally, the different aspects within a compact press should be differentiated and evaluated. TP wrote an in-depth tactical theory piece on the subject for us. It is possible to differentiate the aspects of compactness into space, tactic, dynamic, and synergistic compactness (with access of course). Spatial compactness refers specifically to being compact within one’s own shape – in other words, there isn’t much space within the block of the team.

Tactical compactness means that within the team’s block the defense doesn’t open various possibilities for the opponent play to within it. Dynamic compactness means that within the block the team is positioned to more easily anticipate the opposition’s actions in order to pressure them quickly.

Finally, synergistic compactness (or staggered compactness) means that within the positional structure of the defensive block there is cover and layers to any movement, trigger, or action that is performed by the block. Along with access to the ball, these are all aspects which you could find in a compact team, but it’s important to differentiate these deeper layers and understand them in order to use them better. In the end, a mixture of all these aspects is what makes compactness successful.

Some things to think about in regards to pressing are: in option oriented zonal marking, movements which are in the opposite direction of the block’s collective movement are underrated and have interesting effects. The idea that not all players are in the same game state or phase on a physical or mental level is interesting as well and opens up a lot of possibilities when looking at specific positional structures and how to achieve them.

Counterpressing

The effects of counterpressing on the traditional 4 phase cycle (yes, I did use MS Paint for this).

Counterpressing can be defined as pressing the ball in transition from offense to defense – attempting to move the cycle of the “phases of play” in the opposite direction. The cycle of the game moves in the fashion shown in the above graphic – but what if you could move from offensive organization to defensive transition and immediately back into offensive organization? This “match control” is a main characteristic of counterpressing. It allows you to skip the defensive organization phase entirely if done correctly.

Guardiola has said that his Barcelona team were the “worst defensive team in the world,” so he liked to avoid defending against the ball as much as possible. The cycle is quite flexible and can be manipulated in many ways throughout a football match – with some teams seeking to stay within only a few phases of the cycle and others playing throughout all of the phases. For example, a team caught in a “chaos pressing” matchup could be playing in offensive and defensive transitions constantly – never truly settling into any “organization.” It’s possible to catch two strong counterpressing teams in these types of exchanges throughout games. It could also be a peek into the future of football – who will control the chaos better?

Counterpressing not only plays a large role in controlling the rhythm of the game and stabilizing the defense, it also plays a big role in play-making. If the ball is won successfully in defensive transition that means the opponent was in offensive transition and moving into an attack. Because the opponent was moving into a counterattack (which means they were spreading out and running up the field) when they lose the ball they are unorganized and exposed in regards to controlling the offensive transition of the ball-winners. Schweinsteiger admired how Spain prepare for defense while in possession here:

“If you look at the ideal example, Barcelona or Spain, you can see how good their defenders are at setting up, even while they still have possession. That is perfect defending. The teams that defend well in this tournament will go far. In many situations when you are attacking, you already have to start thinking about what happens once the ball is lost. As a defensive player, you already have to watch the opposing attackers and ask yourself what could happen when the ball is lost.”

– Bastian Schweinsteiger

Preparation is an important aspect of both counterpressing and pressing. In order to properly pressure the ball, the players must be positioned in the correct areas before the ball is lost. It requires concentration as well as the ability to quickly switch mentality from attack to defense.

Pep Guardiola has a famous “15 pass rule” in which the main purpose is to make sure his players have the time to move into their appropriate positions within the team’s structure before beginning the attack. The reason the players must take up these positions is not only to prepare to attack but to defend. If the players are positioned properly they will be able to press better in defensive transition. The players cannot focus completely on offense at all times, they must be thinking about what will happen if they were to lose the ball and position themselves accordingly.

Many times teams will move forward “too early” in regards to how many players they have in forward positions in relation to the opponents.  This results in an inability to control the transitions through pressing. Therefore, the team who is poorly positioned to pressure when the ball is lost must react to how the opponent is attacking rather than determining how the opponent will play by pressuring them. This ultimately results in a lack of game control.

Dortmund trying to occupy a small area of the field while remain distant from each other during counterpressing.

A basic guideline for positioning could be for the players to seek to occupy smaller areas of the field in a compact manner while remaining as far from each other as possible (and maintaining connection) within that small area. It’s also important to consider the value of the center of the field while pressing. When the opponent wins the ball they can be forced away from the center of the field and towards the touchline or even backwards – limiting his space, ability to turn, and reducing his options. This causes the transition to take longer or the ball to be won back, and if the transition takes longer the defense can reorganize more easily.

A team which players extremely wide and focuses on playing through the flanks would struggle to counterpress properly as they aren’t compact. At the same time – a team which plays extremely narrow wouldn’t be able to counterpress properly because they wouldn’t control a large enough area of the field. It is all about balancing the positional structure in regards to the opponent’s defense. A coach can decide where the team should be narrow and where it should be wide, maybe depending on where the opponent’s best player plays.

Just like a normal press has specific differences, counterpressing does as well. The defensive transition looks similar to a team which sits in a compact block and shifts towards the ball. Though when transitioning from attack into defense, teams are in an “offensive structure,” which can be described by crazier numbers in regards to formations, such as 2-3-2-3. But how exactly does the team try to win the ball back in these moments?

Space Oriented

This category is what Jurgen Klopp’s Dortmund would fall under. This method is focused on congesting the available space for the opponent. When the players press the space around the ball the opponent will be cut off from his teammates, pressured, and won’t have any room to play. The team seeks to move in a compact fashion towards the ball and focus on the space around the ball instead of specific opponents or passing lanes as the high number of players in the space around the ball naturally cut off the opponent’s teammates and passing lanes.

This type of pressing suffocates the opponent’s space and the players can move closer and closer to the ball before taking it away, forcing a turnover from a short pass attempt, or steering the ball into a disadvantageous area. This is similar to a very compact zonal defense shifting towards the ball – they are focused congesting space while moving towards the ball, but they also make sure they are connected to the opponent.

Man Oriented

Heynckes’ Bayern often used this method. The focus here is on pressing the ball with one or two players while the other players focus upon any access points the opponent on the ball may have by moving into a man-marking scheme in the surrounding layers of pressure. The advantage of man-marking is that the defenders will always have access to the opponent – meaning they can directly challenge for the ball every time.

The presser of the ball must be careful not to be beaten by the dribble as this form of pressing is more oriented towards direct challenges. Normally, the ball presser will try to force an action, but if he can win the ball that’s even better. In contrast to space-oriented counterpressing, this pressure allows more breathing room for passes but it leads to many more challenges and tackles. This fit Heynckes’ team well as they had players who were excellent in challenging for the ball.

The danger lies in the fact that man-marking can easily be manipulated by dragging the pressers around and destroying the stability of the press. It can also be tough if the opponent has excellent 1 vs. 1 players and players who are excellent in tight spaces.

Passing-Lane Oriented

Pep Guardiola’s teams fall under this category. This type of Counterpressing is primarily focused upon coaxing the opponent into playing a pass into a seemingly open lane before intercepting the ball. The players immediately move towards the ball and block certain passing lanes while leaving others open – this baits the ball player into trying to play a pass to his teammate, but the passing lane is then attacked by one or more players for the interception. The team usually seeks to force the ball into areas less strategically important areas like the sidelines where the opponent is further from the goal and space is congested.

Sometimes they will block all of the passing lanes and move towards the opponent in order to force a long pass or force a pass backwards – or, alternatively, give up the ball.

Ball Oriented

If you’re looking for more articles dedicated specifically to counterpressing we have two here: Counter- or Gegenpressing and Counterpressing variations.

The Dutch team of the 70s could fall under this category. This pressing is focusing solely on the ball. All the players in the surrounding area press the ball immediately once its lost without focusing on the ball-player’s options. This wins the ball by exerting huge amounts of pressure on the ball carrier and whoever he might pass it to. This is dangerous if the player on the ball is a good dribbler and can beat a player to lift his head up to open options for an escape pass – which the pack of pressers wouldn’t be able to follow at the same speed the ball is moving.

Pressing takes dynamic movement, good anticipation, and intelligent execution. This is why most of the best dribblers in the world are also good at pressing the ball, e.g. Lionel Messi. When Messi is actually working hard on defense he is quite an impressive presser of the ball who can perform many different actions.

One specific action while pressing is to deliberately run past the opponent, this would mean the opponent would not be slowed down, but the pace of play will be quickened. The pressing player will likely miss the ball due to not seeking to “sit down” and establish a distance to the ball and control his speed when engaging the ball player. When moving full speed towards the opponent it is quite easy for the player on the ball to move past the presser, but the presser’s intention isn’t to win the ball – he only wants to force the opponent into a quick movement and get his head down.

After the player on the ball makes his quick movement it is easy for the rest of the pressing players to read his next move and recover the ball. The player who ran “through” the opponent is then an immediate and direct option for transition as he’s moved past the opponent and into open space up the field.

Counterpressing can vary from team to team based upon where a team will look to do it (if they don’t do it everywhere), how many players they use to do it, and how long they seek to do it. The 5-6 second rule made famous by Guardiola’s Barcelona is one example of a team which had a specific timeframe for their pressure – if the ball wasn’t won back within 5-6 seconds of having lost it the players move into their defensive block. Some interesting variations of counterpressing could arise when studying the effect of time on counterpressing situations and how it affects positional structures.

Counterattacking

Finally, we have Counterattacking. This is a term most people who watch football are more familiar with – as the term has existed for ages in various types of sports, games and combat. Counterattacks can be defined as attacking in transition from defense to offense. This is different than transitioning with the intent to restart a deep circulation of the ball. Once again, the intent of the team is really the key to all three of these concepts.

The idea behind the counterattack is take advantage of the fact that the opponent is in the transition phase. If one team is transitioning from defense to attack, the other team is transitioning from attack to defense. This means that the team which is transitioning from attack to defense most likely isn’t in a suitable positional structure compared to what it would be if they had time to transition into an organized defense – though some coaches work to set up a suitable positional structure for the transition phases while attacking.

Attacking in this moment means the counterattacking team can take advantage of aspects that can be found when facing a disorganized defense – increased amounts of space, greater options, and less defensive pressure. When combined these aspects allow the attack to gain a valuable characteristic which is difficult to create and control against an organized defense – speed of attack. When facing a deep, compact, and organized press it is difficult for the players to ever reach “full speed” unless they properly prepare for the action and begin their movements ahead of time. It is the players with excellent acceleration and close control of the ball in tight areas that succeed in these situations.

Combining the previously mentioned aspects of a counter attack creates an atmosphere that is difficult to control for the defense. A full speed attack which has space, time, and multiple options is the perfect candidate to penetrate the defense and create high-probability goal-scoring chances. When defending at such high speeds it is much more difficult to maintain the body control necessary to quickly change directions, maintain balance, and read the situation in order to adjust properly.

This is made especially difficult as the defender has a reactive role in the engagement. He must defend the offensive player’s movements while the attacker is the one with the ball and thus can determine how the ball will move. At full speed, a talented attacker can add dribbles and feints to throw the defender off before penetrating the necessary space. But how much space is a defense truly covering when defending against Counterattacks?

The width from half-space to half-space for most transitions is enough. The exposed defense cannot control all of the space efficiently and are open to combinations and quick switches from one half-space to another to penetrate.

Width – many people talk about this quality of attack as an extremely important aspect of any offense. So do counterattacks spread from touchline to touchline? No, they very rarely ever do. It’s very difficult to move the ball with pace and control from one touchline to the other consistently in modern football. What is important is relative width to the defense – an offensive team only needs to be wide enough to stretch the defense. Anything beyond that could have adverse effects depending on the team’s strategy. Do you want your winger to be on the touchline if the farthest the defender will move from the center of the field is to the edge of the box?

This is how most counterattacks work — they stretch from one half-space to the other at maximum! Most offensive transitions in football resemble the offensive transitions in basketball in this sense. In basketball there is a phrase which goes “filling the lanes in transition,” in football a similar action takes place as players fill the half-spaces and the center. So why does a “narrower” transition have better results than one which stretches from touchline to touchline?

This is because a player in each half-space is enough to stretch a defense which is low on numbers while maintaining a stronger (closer) connection between the attacking players. The distance from one edge of the box to the other is much shorter than it is from one touchline to the other – this means that passes are quicker, more accurate, and easier to control. If the offensive transition happens to stem from one of the flanks, then it is quite common to see the far-side winger completely abandon the flank and move into the center to maintain compactness.

These aspects together provide a favorable atmosphere for quick combinations in transition – which is particularly difficult for a defense because if they make a mistake they do not have the time needed to recover position in such a large amount of relative space. If the defense tries to pressure and fails (which is usually the case if there are smaller amount of defenders), then they must move across quite a large area to try and prevent penetration of the defensive line.

Given the multiple advantages of breaking through with a counterattack, it is important to differentiate the various strategies and tactical variations when it comes to offensive transition. Similar to counterpressing, the starting positions of a counterattack are determined by the positioning of the players while on defense. The defensive structure and strategy will relate directly into the strategy and structure for the offensive transitions. If the defensive team is compact on defense and win the ball, they are naturally in a better position to escape a counterpress through quick combinations with many players in the immediate area.

These zones can vary for specific strategies, but the majority of counterattacks can be broken down into the use of the center and half-spaces before penetration (or during creation) and in penetration (or during finishing). The flanks could also be included for various reasons even though they aren’t used as frequently.

When looking at counterattacks, these specific zones that I’ve outlined give an overview of the strategically different areas on the field. Teams usually try to break through the center and the half-spaces – the half-spaces are used more often due to the fact that the center is more concentrated with opponents in transition. Overloads in transition help to break through zones as well as use the value of the specific zone more intensely. For example, if the ball is won deep in the center of the pitch due to a pressing trap in a compact defense, the higher number of defenders become a higher number of attackers – which serves to overload the central zone and allow the players to combine out of the center and break into the flanks more easily.

Depending on the lineups and strategy of a specific team, the counterattacks will vary as well. A team like Real Madrid, who have Ronaldo and Bale out wide, press the flanks and remain compact so they can overload the flanks and break through the defense with their talented wingers – because it fits their players and their strategy. Where a team aims to win the ball on the field and which zones they aim to break into determine the nature of their offensive transitions – and these aspects are further determined by the coaching philosophy and strategy which stems from the types of players available.

Within the counterattacking strategies lie the tactics – such as how many players attack in transition and which passing, movement, and dribbling patterns are used. In regards to the thought process to escaping counterpressure and counterattacking, Pep Guardiola has mentioned that one of his principles is to first search for the long escape pass (preferably to the center forward or winger) and if it is not available to search for a safe short pass or combination to escape the pressured zone.

Besides playing vertical or diagonal passes in behind the defense into space for runners, there are combination strategies when it comes to the long pass into the forwards. The first low and long pass forward will search for the attackers – such as a “target man,” i.e. a player who is the focal point of the attack and can control the ball under pressure as well as create for others. A target man is commonly the center forward (classically, the #9), though a winger can be the target man as well. The positions which are naturally the quickest to move into high areas are the ones which begin in higher areas – such as the strikers and the wingers.

Though the situation isn’t exactly transitional – Salzburg’s goal here was to move Kampl into a creative position while have 3-4 runners ahead of him. A perfect example of an intermediary goal of a transition offense if the direct through pass isn’t available immediately.

The number of players which support the forwards varies depending on the strategy. With less players supporting the offensive transition, the atmosphere calls for more dribbling. With more players supporting the offensive transition, more complex combinations may occur to penetrate the defense. If the defense cannot be penetrated immediately with a through pass, an intermediate option in transition is to put one of the offensive players in a creative position – meaning a player who can receive the ball with time and space to play the penetrating pass to the forwards or even dribble and shoot.

Mourinho, and many other coaches, have talked about the principle of always having 5 players in defensive positions during an attack. So naturally his teams attack with 4-5 players while the other 6-5 push up behind the defensive transition to condense the space. I will use this common number as an example throughout my graphics, but it is important to know that counterattacks for any team could vary.

An example of Messi moving inside with his diagonal dribbling while the other runners make runs which bind the defenders, providing options for combinations, and opening space. This resulted in a Messi goal after he played the pass into the most central player and then received a lay-off. He also could have played the far side winger through unmarked.

The orientation of the counterattack can vary. In the case of Lionel Messi, he can receive the ball after a vertical pass into Suarez who lays it off towards Messi moving inside while the other players make penetrating runs for him. Or he could receive the ball directly to his feet and cut inside while the ball is on his left foot – therefore having his body between the ball and the defense. From there, he could dribble inside diagonally, play his long diagonal ball over the top, or move inside and combine with the forwards. The runs being made by the other attackers serve to both bind the defenders and to open space for Messi at the same time.

This image shows the effects of a lay-off pass after a long vertical pass. Pressure gathers around the destination of the ball (Robben) and opens space for Mueller to expose once he receives the lay-off as he is in stride and facing forward.

The previous example contained many important elements of counterattacks, such as – lay-off passes after a vertical ball, defender-binding runs by the attackers, and diagonality. A lay-off pass after a vertical ball attracts many players to the destination point of the ball before quickly moving the ball away to a teammate who is better positioned, has a good field of view, and can take advantage of the space created by the vertical pass into the forward as the defenders gather around him. The lay-off pass can be played with various techniques – the inside of the foot, the outside of the foot (which is more easily hidden and quicker), a back-heel pass (which would attract the attention of the defenders in the opposite direction of the pass – the direction of a players eyes plays a role as well), or a chipped ball over the feet of the defenders (a very underrated form of passing).

Two more passes are also interesting – the one-two and the “return pass.” A one-two pass or a “wall pass,” is a basic combination which uses an overload to move the initial ball player past his opponent quickly. Basically, in a 1 v 1 situation, another player can come create a 2v1 and the ball player can dribble towards the opponent and, once he has gotten close and forced the opponent to commit, then pass to his teammate before running around the opponent and receiving the return pass in space – this is a basic example of using an overload to break through a zone. This can involve third man, fourth man, and more runs off of the ball in more complex combination play.

The effects of a return pass. The defender gets lured toward ball moving quickly between the players and leaves too much space open which allows penetration.

The “return pass” is used frequently in counterattacks as well as normal offensive organization. This is basically a 1-2 pass without the penetrating run. Iniesta, Xavi, Busquets, and Messi use this pass quite frequently between each other. The idea is simple – to lure the defender towards the ball before one of the players takes the ball and move into the space the defender vacated. In this example, the winger plays a pass to the center forward who immediately returns it to him, but the passing managed to pull the defender slightly more towards the center which allowed the winger to break through the space on the return pass. These types of passes can also include multiple off the ball runs as well.

In regards to specific types of passing, the principle of pass communication comes into play as well. Bielsa has said that there are 36 different ways to communicate through a pass – for example, a very hard pass into a players feet during a combination could be read by the player as the passer telling him to “dummy” the pass (let it go through him into a teammate further along the passing lane) or that the situation for the receiver will be very tight and difficult to solve so the speed of the pass had to be higher in order to enter the zone. That is only a few ways of communication through a pass, there are many more which could be explained in its own tactical theory article!

When looking at the “field of view” during combinations and offensive transition, there are many strategic values to this aspect of play.  After the lay-off pass the receiving player can now have the ball while his field of view is forward and he can accurately assess the situation and make a decision. This would be much more difficult if the ball was played into the target man and he wasn’t allowed to turn – his field of view would only allow him to play backwards accurately.

Field of view when facing goal from the half-spaces.

For a deeper analysis on half-spaces look here: The Half Spaces.

This also applies to the specific zones I’ve outlined earlier. The field of view when moving forward in the half-space means that the player is facing diagonally towards goal – allowing him to view options which are central and deeper than him, which wouldn’t be the same if the player was facing forwards – he would have to turn side to side to play passes towards the side. On top of that, the half-space is connected to both the center and the flank – so it has access to varied strategic zones, while the center can only move directly into a half-space on either side. The center is of course the most important area in football and many great synergetic effects arise from controlling this area.

Half-spaces have other nice characteristics in contrast to the center as strategic zones [include link to half-space piece]. If the field is divided into 5 vertical strips, the ball must move across 4 zones to go from touchline to touchline – which is very long and easy to defend. When inside the half-space, a player is connected to the near side flank directly and is 3 zones away from the far flank, which is easier to reach than 4 but is still a bit far – nevertheless it forces a defense to stretch and defend the far side a bit more.

The space-opening effects of the Barcelona players playing in one of the half-spaces.

If the player is in the center, he can play a pass across 2 zones (1 zone wouldn’t shift the defense very much) and reach the flank on either side, and the flank is strategically the least valuable zone as it’s so far from the opponent goal and the field of view is limited by the touchline. Though if the ball moved 2 zones from the half-spaces, it would move into the other half-space. So the ball can move a farther distance quickly and remain in a zone which is closer to the goal, which has multiple advantageous effects.

The importance of field of view applies to offensive transition as well in the fact that it can be a pressing trigger for a defense. When a player has first won the ball, his field of view is the worst as he has taken his eyes off the game to focus and take time to re-orient himself technically (controlling the ball) and tactically (seeing where his teammates are) – this is the moment most teams seek to press the ball (counterpressing). So it is important to have players in the immediate area to support the ball-winner and move the team into a more stable position.

Coaches in Barcelona have said that whoever has won the ball has done his job and doesn’t have to do anymore – he should look to pass the ball off to a teammate who has a better field of view to initiate the counterattack. There are always exceptions of course — if a player clearly intercepts the ball and has it under control quickly and didn’t take his eyes off the game for long, he can immediately initiate the offense transition.

Looking back at the Lionel Messi example, the idea of a forward’s runs binding defenders is important. When Lionel Messi cuts inside and starts dribbling diagonally toward the goal, Suarez or Neymar can look to make a diagonal run in the opposite direction of Messi right across the defenders. As he travels across the defensive line the defenders must pass him along to each other’s zones – this not only delays their movements towards the ball, but it also drags them in the direction of the run. This is because if the defender doesn’t follow the player, the player can just receive a pass in the space unmarked. So the defender follows the run to avoid the immediate threat, but he opens up the space he should be occupying.

So as Messi is dribbling inside he can either choose to play his teammates through the defense or use their space-opening decoy runs to drive into the created space and shoot. The space-opening runs can also open spaces for late-runners to move into untracked quite often – like Neymar running inside diagonally while Jordi Alba exposes the opened wide area. There are many advantages to these defender-binding runs – any movement from the offensive players has some sort of consequence. It can distort the defensive system, open space, offer a passing option, and more.

Evasive runs from the center or from the point of the ball are also a part of a striker’s movements. An evasive run refers to a run moving from the center into either side of the field towards the flanks. This can bind the defenders as well as create central space for wingers to move inside and combine or dribble through. Another aspect of this type of run is possibly creating a 1 v 1 situation on the flank once the striker’s run has ended. A similar run can be made away from the ball if needed – for example, if Cristiano has the ball on the left and Benzema is next to him and they are defended by two players, Benzema can move away from the situation in order to turn it into a 1 vs. 1 situation for Ronaldo by dragging his player away. This is advantageous due to the fact that a 1 vs. 1 situation in large amounts of space is less complex to deal with for a forward than a 2 vs. 2 situation.

This example takes the previous scene with Messi and highlights the effects of his diagonal dribbling instead. Messi will often move inside in this manner and “only” have to bypass 2-4 players at an angle with his body between the defender and ball. Because he is moving diagonally he evades a large portion of the team while moving towards goals and attacking an underloaded area. Respect Messi’s Diagonality!

The third aspect mentioned in the Messi example is diagonality. This simply means that a team has a high orientation towards diagonal play – similar to the term verticality. Diagonal play has multiple beneficial effects – one of which is the fact that it breaks both horizontal and vertical lines simultaneously. This causes defenders to make much more complicated movement than if the pass were only vertical or horizontal, meaning there is a larger room for mistakes in the chain-movements of the defense. A diagonal pass both directly gains space and shifts the field of play.

Facing the field diagonally from the flank or half-space means that the ball player is closer to the sideline while facing away from it – meaning he faces away from the least important space on the field at the moment and isn’t likely to receive backwards pressing. Taking into account the ball-oriented movement of every defense, they naturally “underload” the far side of the field and the farthest point of the ball because it is in the least amount of danger of being exposed – right? Well diagonal balls have these zones in their range (part of the reason Messi’s passes are so successful) as they can move long distances quickly while arriving in an area with minimal pressure.

Examples showing the value of diagonal passes even against deep defenses. Both of these situations resulted in goals after a Juanfran cutback cross in Atletico’s 3-1 victory of Chelsea.

Another interesting aspect regarding diagonal passes is the fact that in any given space, a diagonal pass from one “corner” to the other is the longest possible pass. So even if a defense has moved deep, they are still open to being exposed by a long diagonal pass behind them on the far side – whereas many defenses are used to dealing with shorter passes and obvious crosses when they’ve dropped deeper. Using diagonal passes and overloading the ball-far space which was under-loaded by the opponent defense is a common strategy against deep defenses. Real Madrid under Ancelotti, Atletico Madrid under Simeone, and Manchester United under Sir Alex Ferguson were some of the teams which did this frequently.

The final characteristic of diagonality I will mention is how it eliminates opponents on the route to goal. When Messi is moving inside diagonally he is “evading” a large group of players in the near side while moving towards the far side players and towards goal. While he is doing this the offensive players make runs which bind and drag more players into the space which Messi is dribbling away from – almost giving it the look as if he is going around a large portion of the defense and attacking the point at which the defense has a smaller amount of players to break through. This was particularly common in the seasons he played as a right winger under Guardiola and the current season under Lucho as he was allowed to gain more momentum when moving inside from the less crowded touchline (among other things).

The different strategic zones within the penalty box when looking to create a goal scoring chance.

*An interesting piece by Michael Caley on the value of making extra passes in the “Danger Zone” can be found here.

When finishing off counterattacks, the main goal of the team is to penetrate the penalty box – be it through passing or dribbling. I’ve outlined the most important zones in the box in the image above – with most of the penetrations coming in the half-space areas. After penetrating the box, most of the best goalscoring chances come from a very fast and low pass across the face of goal for a tap-in (depending on the positioning of the defenders) or a fast and low cutback pass moving away from the goal and taking advantage of the defenders’ backward-moving momentum. The passes across goal end up in the higher central zone while the cutbacks end up in the deeper central zone. Shots directly from the half-space after penetration is another efficient (but less efficient than making the extra pass?*) form of scoring.

Other good approaches involve diagonal dribbles towards the box and combining to break through or continuing the dribble and shooting – though these may be more difficult than the previous options. As mentioned earlier, long diagonal balls towards the weak side of the defense (be it for headers or to play into feet) are also an efficient form of finishing off an attack – though it can involve lower percentage aspects depending on the specific situation.

Finally, there are some interesting psychological effects when it comes to counterattacks. The quick impulse to switch the player’s mindset from defense to attack is highly important when it comes to offensive transition as it could mean exposing the opponent with greater speed. The fact that there are larger amounts of space to play into during a counterattack also has an important psychological effect on the players. As they are moving at high speed and into large amounts of space, they make decisions which are much more aggressive, direct, and confident – as opposed to the more cautious and thinking approach if the spaces were to have more defenders.

Mourinho’s Inter in 2010 were interesting in part due to their wider horizontal defense instead of defending in a narrow and horizontally compact fashion in some scenes.  As you recall from the earlier parts of this piece, Inter didn’t want the ball – so they just moved towards the ball passively and sought to prevent penetration. Barcelona could switch the ball through midfield very easily because of that. The interesting part came when switching the ball, because whenever the ball would move to the “weak side,” Inter would already have players there as they weren’t so horizontally compact – and the players never sought to win the ball so they weren’t easily pulled out of the shape.

This forced Barcelona’s overloads on the weak side (Maxwell and Pedro for example) to have an inefficient positional structure to break through the Inter defense in the overloaded zone. Maxwell stayed a bit deeper as he wanted to be sure to receive the ball and there was less opportunity to move vertically because of that. Combination play in football is all about minor positional advantages, be it on the ball-side or goal-side. It’s similar to basketball in this sense as well because in basketball multiple “picks” or “screens” are set in order to give one team a positional advantage over the other.

In the end, the players had to think with the ball more and delayed their actions (decisions and executions) – the best moments of penetration came when Xavi or Messi were involved because they are excellent decision makers as well as having the necessary technical execution.

Anything Else?

To finish off I’d like to elaborate on the philosophy of Lillo and Guardiola as well as some other coaches. The idea is that phases of the game do not exist. They do not separate the game into “offensive organization, defensive organization, offensive transition, and defensive transition,” but they view the game as a continuous flow of specific positional structures which the team is trying to achieve.

Of course one team will still have the ball and another team won’t, but this is not as important as the positioning of the players themselves. As I mentioned throughout the piece – it is possible to attack while defending and to defend while attacking. This is why separating the game into the traditional 4 phases misses some of the complexity that’s involved in the game. Some players might be in a specific phase of play while their teammates are doing something differently – so it is difficult to categorize the entire team into a collective game phase.

The way they view the game is through the positioning of players in relation to the reference points of the game to form a collective positional structure. Regardless of what’s happening the team should seek to have a good structure and ball-oriented shape – this will provide the stability and efficiency needed in every situation.

To use the traditional game phases in order to better explain this: when in possession, the team want to have a positional structure which is efficient for attacking but would help them counterpress the ball or drop deep if they lose it. While transitioning to defense the team seeks to have a positional structure which is best for pressuring the ball or protecting the goal, but also translates well into the other phases.

The general idea is that on the hierarchy of importance, the positional structure of the team is more important than who has the ball or which “phase” the game is in. The team only seeks to have a specific positioning in relation to what is happening in the moment and play that way throughout the game. These guidelines to the specific positioning and movements during the game are all coached to the players and worked on throughout the season. The game is different when viewed through the idea that a team is only ever seeking the appropriate positional structure to what is happening throughout the match rather than viewing it through the recurring traditional four phase cycle which could lose some of the complexity of the game.

The link to the original post for Marti Perarnau can be found here: http://www.martiperarnau.com/tactica/pressing-counterpressing-and-counterattacking/

In football there are two broad categories of defensive approaches; zonal defending and man-marking. Each approach has sub-divisions; however, the two styles differ mainly on reference points. In zonal defending each player references their team-mates and the ball, in man-marking however, the reference point is the opponent.

The difference in reference points leads to huge differences in how zonal and man-oriented defences operate in terms of speed and style of access, shape, and number of players in each duel. In turn, there are also large differences in how attacking sides approach these types of defences. The methods a team use to get free from man-marking is called dismarking, and this article will detail the various ways it can be done.

Individual dismarking

Man-marking seeks to pitch the game into a series of 1v1 duels with each defender responsible for an opponent. As such, being able to get free from an opponent on an individual level can be the basis to unbalance the opponent’s whole structure.

Double movements

In these situations, attackers (any player whose side have the ball) have a crucial advantage: they are aware of their movement before the opponent, the opponent can only react. On an individual level then, feints or “double movements” are a common way to create the separation from a marker to receive the ball. Double movement here simply refers to when a player moves in one direction, before moving in another, usually the opposite.

Although the attacker has a natural advantage in being able to start their movement before the opponent, there are ways around this disadvantage for the defender. With this dynamic advantage, the defender needs time to react and re-position themselves, and in football distance is the key factor influencing time. The further away from the ball an attacker is, the longer the pass will take, and the more time the defender will have to adjust themselves.

It follows then, that attackers should seek to shorten the distance between themselves and the ball when moving to evade a marker. This is key in exploiting the advantage that the attackers naturally possess.

When aiming to get free from an opponent to receive the ball from deep, there are different directions in which double movements can be used. A common route is for an attacker to move towards the opponents’ goal, threatening to run in behind the opponent, before quickly changing direction and coming short to receive. Alternately, the attacker could come short initially, before running into depth.

In a double movement, the initial movement is used to increase the space for the attacker to move into in the opposite direction. Due to their man-orientation, the defender follows the initial movement, but are already slightly disadvantaged due to starting their movement later than the opponent. This often leads to the defender speeding up to reach the attacker in time for the ball’s arrival. This increased speed from the defender means they will take longer to re-adjust when the attacker changes direction, and the separation is thus increased. Neymar is an example of an attacker who uses double movements extremely well.

Receiving patterns

Man-marking, of course, emphasises the need for individual ball handling skill from the attacking team, due to the number of individual duels the style leads to. With man-marking, the defensive team should have access to press every possible pass. Therefore, the receiving skills of the attacking team’s players are hugely important, since they will usually be made under pressure.

The defenders can only mark an opponent from one angle. Since the primary objective is to prevent the opponent scoring, defenders mark from a goal-side position. As such, the passing lanes to the attacking players are often open. If the defending team are actively aiming to win the ball back, this can be a rare situation where neither side are satisfied with the status. Since the attacker cannot progress, and the defender lacks access to the ball.

For the defender to win the ball in front of the receiving opponent, they need to leave their goal-side position and get in front of the opponent to intercept. This creates the potential for the attacker to bypass their marker and advance towards goal.

In these situations, there are interesting influences on the attackers’ decision. Firstly, they must perceive the angle and speed of the opponents’ approach which can be done visually and/or auditorily. The speed of the opponents’ approach will determine how quickly the attacker should drop towards the ball, and the angle of approach will determine which direction to go in once they have received the ball.

The skill set of the players is also a huge factor in determining how the attacker behaves when receiving with an opponent behind. Players with great strength and mild to low mobility, such as Ibrahimovic, often keep their body between the ball and opponent, use their strength to hold the defender off and roll past them. Whereas agile dribblers such as Messi and Hazard often use said agility to quickly turn past the defender. Furthermore, the opponent can be mis-directed if the receiver feints to make a first time pass in a particular direction before turning out in the other, Busquets and Napoli’s Zielinski often use this to outplay their marker.

Of course, not all duels occur with the defender approaching the attacker vertically. In many instances attackers receive the ball with pressure coming from besides them, as the defenders try to combine their marking with reducing the area of the field the attacker can move into.

In these situations, the attacker is able to receive the ball on one side (usually closer to the wing), whilst the defender attempts to prevent them turning towards the centre. Ideally then, the attacker will find a way to transfer this space from the “wing-side” of the defender to the “centre-side”. A body feint can be particularly effective in these situations.

By dropping the shoulder and faking to move towards the wing, the attacker encourages his opponent to move in the same direction to maintain the pressure on him. When the defender commits to pressing towards the flank, the receiver can let the ball run across his body, bypassing the opponent in the process, and control it on the back foot (the foot closer to the centre), thus accessing the centre.

Generally speaking then, the aim of such receiving patterns is to either increase the space given to the attacker on one side of their opponent, or better still, to transfer this space to the side of the defender that is closer to goal.

Dribbling towards goal

Once a player on the attacking side has received the ball, how can they transfer this advantage further forwards and create a dangerous situation? The answer is simple; dribble towards goal…seriously! This creates two threats for the defending team, the active dribble and the positioning of the other attackers.

If the dribble is not pressured, the ball carrier can just dribble all the way to the goal. If the dribble is pressured, at least one opponent will vacate their marking assignment in the process, this should open a passing option to progress.

When a defender leaves the opponent they were marking to press the ball, they usually attempt to press whilst using their cover shadow, to prevent the pass to the opponent they just moved away from. As such, advancing beyond this point, requires manipulation of cover shadows.

One way of doing this is through continued dribbling. When a defender presses whilst using their cover shadow, they often slow down as they aim to maintain their position in the lane between the ball and the opponent they aim to cover. As such, they can be vulnerable to a change of pace from the dribbler which can allow the attacker to advance and/or bypass the cover shadow, opening the lane to the previously covered opponent.

Vacating position

Another way to lose a marker is to simply vacate one’s base position. Usually when an opponent drops from their position, they are followed by an opponent, who is encouraged to press intensely. This is due to the direction of the potential pass (advancing towards goal), the defenders’ pressing direction (towards the opponents’ goal) and the attackers’ field of view upon receiving the ball (facing their own goal).

However, when an attacker drops far from their position, the defender has to also consider the space they leave behind, and the opponents’ potential to use this space to create danger. This effect is clearer the further forwards the attacking player plays, since following more advanced players would mean vacating spaces closer to goal.

When a defender decides against following their dropping opponent, the attacking side can create an overload in another part of the field. With this underload, the defensive side no longer have the capacity to man-mark, and the possession team will have a free player. Usually, the defensive side will try to manage the situation by leaving the deepest player free, but this still creates a free man further forwards, who can manipulate the situation with a dribble.

The alternative, of course, is that the defensive side follow their direct opponents regardless. In the process they will vacate positions within their defensive structure that can increase the likelihood of a direct attack being successful.

Take a striker dropping into midfield for example. If an opposing centre back follows him into midfield, the margin for error in the defensive line is greatly reduced. The centre of the defensive line becomes more open for diagonal depth runs from wingers, or a vertical one from an attacking midfielder. This is particularly dangerous since a margin of error helps the defence deal with the dynamic disadvantage that comes with reacting.

Vacating one’s position also exists in a horizontal sense. Players on the ball-far side can create similar dilemmas for their markers by moving over to the ball side. In this situation the defender has to decide whether the risk of leaving the defensive structure completely unbalanced is acceptable. Of course, some width is needed to retain a threat on the far wing, and thus create the dilemma.

In this situation, the reds’ right winger has moved over to the right wing, creating the dilemma for his direct opponent. Whilst the winger’s movement reduces his side’s overall spacing, it creates interesting potential. If he is not followed, they can benefit from an overload on the near side, removing the opponents’ ability to mark every nearby attacker. This overload can be used for a direct breakthrough on the near side through dribbles and/or combinations.

Alternately, if the winger is followed the reds can benefit from the reduced margin of error on the far side, where the right back, or far central midfielder can move to exploit the unbalanced defensive structure.

The idea of vacating position has interesting implications on team structure against man-marking. If the possession side play with an initial structure where the centre is occupied and the flanks vacated, the defensive side will also occupy the centre. The spaces left for a breakthrough therefore, would be the wings.

Alternately, if the possession side initially vacate the centre, the opponent has to decide between following and leaving dangerous central spaces open, or holding position and leaving the opponents unmarked. Vacating spaces closer to goal is thus more beneficial, both in terms of creating a dilemma for the opponent, and leaving said valuable spaces open for potential breakthroughs.

Late/deep runs

As mentioned earlier, one of the aspects that makes man-marking difficult for individual defenders is the reactivity. Since the job is to follow a particular opponent, the defenders have to react to the positioning or movement of the attacker. As such, when an attacker moves they will have a dynamic advantage, simply by starting their run earlier.

This effect can be crucial in small time frames, allowing the attacker to receive the ball free of a marker for a small period. However, the effect can also be felt in longer distance situations, where starting the run sooner can allow the attacker to reach top speed before the opponent.

For this reason, starting runs late and/or from deep positions can be an effective way of breaking through against a man-oriented defence. This effect can be felt best on the ball-far side for a number of reasons. On the ball-far side, attacking teams often have players in deep positions to cover against transitions, that could potentially be a threat in attack (full backs). Secondly, the far side of the opponents’ defence will usually have less cover, leaving them less potential to adjust in the event of losing a duel.

In the video below, notice when the marker realises their opponent is making a run. Also notice how reaching top speed quicker due to starting their run earlier, allows the attacker to reach the box before their opponent.

Group-tactical dismarking

Although man-marking creates several individual duels and can at times lead to a focus on these individual battles, there is huge potential in group interactions to beat individually focused opponents. Group-tactical dismarking then, refers to dismarking methods heavily involving two or more individuals.

It’s important to note that group-tactical methods are not mutually exclusive to the individual methods detailed above. In fact, many of the individual methods enhance the group-tactical ones, and several are fundamentally connected.

Using the 3^rd man

One sub-category of group-tactical dismarking is playing with the 3^rd man. Using the 3^rd man refers to moves where player A indirectly passes to player C, using player B as an intermediary. Using the 3^rd man can occur in three main forms; wall passes, layoffs and 3^rd man runs.

3^rd man wall passes

In most forms of man-marking the defending side leave at least one spare man in the defensive line. This in turn leaves their front line underloaded against the back line of the opponent. As such, one of the possession team’s centre backs are usually free on the ball. In order to advance, the possession side need to transfer this “free man status” further forwards.

As mentioned previously, dribbling towards goal is a common and effective way of creating a free man further up field. The active dribble will, at some stage, attract pressure from the opponent to prevent the dribbler advancing too far up the field. This presser will leave their assigned opponent in the process, the previously marked opponent becomes a free man.

However, they are rarely directly accessible since the presser will often use their cover shadow to block the opponent they were previously marking. An alternative route is therefore necessary. As discussed earlier under receiving patterns, the goal-side positioning of the markers creates open passing lanes to the players of the possession side.

As such, they can effectively play first time passes, since the small time period on the ball gives the defender little chance of access. The nearby marked team-mates can thus provide the alternative route to access the free man.

In these situations, it’s important that the player providing the alternative route is close to the ball carrier and the next receiver. As I wrote last year in my theoretical analysis of the blind side;

“Essentially this makes use of the fact that one opponent can only cover a player from one direction, the key therefore is to create an alternative passing route to the team-mate. The alternative passing routes can only be created effectively if the ball can be moved into another position quicker than the opponent can re-position themselves. Therefore it is vital to create a passing option in close proximity to reduce the opponents’ time to react”

Opening and/or using the deepest route and layoffs to the 3^rd man

Due to the opponent-orientation, man-oriented defences often lack compactness, with small distances to the opponent favoured over small distances to the team-mate. In turn they are usually unable to prevent passes into even the most advanced attackers.

In fact, against a man-oriented defence the only reason that the most advanced attackers would not be reachable immediately is due to the positioning of the possession side itself. If a player on the possession team is positioned in the passing lane (blocking) to another team-mate, it follows that the player’s marker will also be blocking this lane. The possession side will effectively be halving the workload of the nearby defenders.

In a positional approach then, good spacing is vital to keep as many passing lanes as possible open. With all passing lanes open, there are huge benefits in using the furthest option possible.

“When a team defends man to man, you have to play a lot with the striker” Pep Guardiola May 2017

When the ball and the opponent are both in front of a defender, the decisions and actions are simple. They can see the ball, and their opponent and can simply press forwards if their opponent receives the ball. When the ball moves behind a defender, their decisions and actions become difficult. Seeing both the ball and the opponent is no longer possible. This is particularly an issue for man-markers, since they need to see the opponent if they are to mark them.

When the possession side play directly to a striker from deep, the ball has moved beyond the midfield and forward lines of the defending team. The attention of the defending midfielders and forwards is now drawn to the ball. This is a vital reaction since the ball’s movement will imply their next action, for example if a defender is outplayed, a nearby midfielder will need to drop.

However, this reaction also creates the potential for the deeper players to become free. In some instances, the defending midfielders and forwards will adjust their position when the ball goes beyond them, preparing to cover, whilst in other cases, they remain in position. In either case, their focus on the ball creates the potential for a blind side adjustment from the possession side. By moving out of their previous markers’ cover shadow, the midfielders on the possession side can become available for layoffs.

With a long pass, the time taken and the predictable nature of its destination means the defenders can generate high pressure where the ball arrives. Having an option to lay the ball off, is thus of huge importance. Naturally then, using the 3^rd man is an efficient solution. Due to the aspects described above, when receiving the lay off, the 3^rd man will have a forwards facing field of vision, as well as space, advantageous conditions for a progressive next action.

An additional point to maximise the benefits of this pattern is the direction of the layoff. Pressure will accumulate in the lane where the ball was played to the striker. If the lay off is made within the same lane, the pressure can easily be transferred from the striker to the next receiver. Ideally then, the layoff will be made diagonally, meaning more space for the receiver, as well as having a forwards facing field of view.

This same pattern of using the deepest route and laying the ball off, can be performed in a more dynamic way. Although it seems counterintuitive, there are some benefits of having a structure where midfielders are positioned in the passing lanes from defenders to the attackers.

When the possession side start with such a structure, the movement of the players will likely be in a direction that opens the route to the next lines. In the positional approach explained above with all passing lines left open, all the oppositional defenders must be aware since the ball could immediately reach the opponent they are marking.

Alternately, in this dynamic approach some of the possession side’s players are not immediately available, since team-mates and thus opponents are directly in between. When a defender’s direct opponent is not immediately reachable, the attentional demands are reduced, often leading to looser marking.

The possession side can take advantage of this with quick movements to open the line to a more advanced team-mate. In many cases, this will mean movement into wider positions to open a vertical passing option. If the movement and pass are quick enough, the advanced team-mate may receive the ball with enough separation from their opponent to turn towards goal. If not however, the wide movement from the deeper team-mate can easily translate into a curved run to receive a layoff.

A further interesting note about the dynamic approach to this pattern, the prior movement to open the direct passing lane means that by the time the layoff is received the receiver will have momentum.

3^rd man runs

3^rd man runs are the third pattern of playing with the 3^rd man. Third man runs differ to the other third man patterns, in that the 3^rd man is used for a dynamic breakthrough past a line of the opponents’ defence (usually the back line).

Similar to using the deepest route and laying the ball off (explained above), the feature that makes 3^rd man runs difficult to defend is the attention that the ball’s movement demands. In my theoretical analysis of the blind side, I explained in detail the issues that 3^rd man runs pose to defenders, here I will make it specific to man-marking.

Whilst seeing the opponent is an important factor for any defence, it is particularly important if you are tasked with marking them. In many 3^rd man run combinations, the first pass bypasses at least one line of the opponents’ defence, often the midfield line.

If this initial pass moves on the inside of the defending midfielders, they have to adjust their body position to see the ball. This opens the potential for blind side runs on the outside of these defenders. If the initial pass moves past the outside of these defenders, the potential for blind side runs is on the inside of the defender, particularly dangerous since it’s closer to goal.

Whilst the defender changes their body position, and reads new information (pressure on the ball, direction etc) they are tasked with marking a runner. Even if the defender remains aware of the blind side runner, the act of changing body position, whilst their opponent sprints forwards creates a dynamic disadvantage that is difficult to negate.

This dynamic advantage is what allows the runner to breakthrough lines of the opponents’ defence. The last line defenders may switch from their assigned opponent, to tracking the runner, but they have to attempt this from their previously static position. At this point the runner will have significant momentum.

The speed of the ball’s movement must also be mentioned. When the ball moves at high speeds, access is very difficult for the defence, and on an individual level, the constant adjustment of their field of view makes losing their opponent more likely.

Dynamic positioning

Dynamic positioning is another sub-category of group-tactical dismarking. This simply refers to the attacking side’s approach to finding and acting in space, dynamic positioning is where the attacking side primarily use movement to find space.

On an individual level, dynamic positioning is quite a natural response to man-marking, being the result of trying to lose one’s marker. However, it can be applied more consciously on a group level; through positional rotations, opposite movements or overlaps.

Positional rotations

As explained within the individual dismarking section, man-marking is inherently reactive. The nature of following means reacting, and markers often experience a disadvantage due to this. This is the key factor that positional rotations exploit to create advantages.

Positional rotations refers to when two or more players in the possession team swap positions. When one attacker begins a movement, they will briefly create separation from their opponent, giving them the effect of a free man. If this, momentarily free, attacker moves towards another defender, it creates a brief 2v1-like situation.

If the 2^nd attacker moves in a different direction simultaneously, the defender has to decide between following their original opponent or staying in position to mark the incoming attacker. Both decisions, of course, imply how the first attacker’s marker should react. If the defender chooses to follow their original opponent, the second defender has to move quickly to also follow their original opponent.

Alternately, they can perform a switch, where they both hold position and mark new opponents, but this goes against the instinct of a man-marker who is trained to follow any movement.

The decision of the first defender is tough, and has to be made at speed, the second defender must quickly react to the first defender’s decision. Creating these decisional crises is what makes positional rotations effective.

In many cases the first defender fails to make a decision quickly enough, being caught between the two opponents, temporarily leaving both free. The second defender then has to read their team-mates’ indecision, and take a decision, by which time one of the moving opponents could have received the ball.

Opposite movements

In some ways, opposite movements can be considered as a type of positional rotation since they share many of the same factors and effects. An initial movement is used to create a temporarily free attacker, whilst a nearby team-mate moves away, giving both markers a decision to make.

Within opposite movements however, the attackers do not switch positions, but simply move in opposite directions. Just like positional rotations, creating “2v1-like” situations for the defenders is the key effect here.

Vertically opposite movements also have the characteristics of vacating position. If an attacker drops from one line of the opponents’ defence to another, their marker will be reluctant to follow if another attacker is running from deep towards them.

The problem for defenders in these situations is that they are trained to follow any movement, so the movement will initially be covered. When the opponent continues to move, far from their original position, the defenders are caught between this trained instinct to follow, and the understanding that moving so far out of position will create an unbalanced structure.

Since the priority when defending is to protect the goal, both defenders usually prioritise the opponent moving towards goal. Therefore, the attacker who moves towards the ball is often, briefly, left free to receive the ball. Only when both defenders are sure that the opponent moving towards goal is covered, will they move to press the one coming short.

Using open man and combining past pressure

The idea of leaving a spare defender for cover, whilst the rest of the team-mates man-mark is highly common in most man-oriented teams. In some forms of man-marking, the individual marking is mixed with ball-orientation as a team. This means the ball-far players are positioned more narrowly to help cover the centre. This of course means the ball-far defenders have bigger distances to their assigned opponents. The distance for the possession team to access these ball-far players gives time for these covering ball-far defenders, however there are potential advantages in playing to the ball-far side.

Since the players on the ball side will be marked tightly, receiving the ball in a static position will mean receiving under heavy pressure. The static position also makes the pressure very difficult to outplay with an opponent so close, who can close the ball carrier’s potential movement angles before the ball is moved.

On the ball-far side however, the larger distance to the opponent gives the receiver a small time frame to receive, before their marker comes across to press. This time frame can be used to take a touch forwards, allowing the possession team to push the opponent deeper.

Alternately, the receiver can take advantage of the favourable situation-dynamic. In this situation, the receiver gets the ball in a relatively static position, whilst the opponent comes towards them. If the receiver has a nearby passing option, they have the potential to combine past the pressure. By passing the ball whilst the opponent presses, the carrier can ensure the ball bypasses the opponent.

The receiver of the next pass will be pressed from behind, and will thus need a passing option. The previous passer can quickly move into space immediately after passing, to go against the grain of the pressing opponent. As such, they can become available for a return pass, breaking the pressure in the process.

Although exploiting the far side was used for a simple explanation, the same dynamic can also be created on the near side. When the possession team can pass to a team-mate who has a passing option and incoming pressure, this same dynamic can be created.

The general idea is that the ball carrier passes and moves into space WHILST the opponent moves towards the carrier, going against the grain of the defenders’ movement to create a dynamic advantage and breakthrough.

A final note

All the patterns detailed above share a dynamic nature (at some point in the process) which is a logical necessity, if one is to create separation from an opponent that is trained to mark tightly.

An interesting point is how the reactive nature of man-marking, forces pro-active actions from the attacking side. To effectively beat man-marking, the movement and actions on the ball often need to be manipulative. These manipulative actions aim to create dilemmas where man-orientation will create undesirable situations for the opponents’ defensive structure, and abandoning their marking assignments is the alternative.

Acting to manipulate, the attacking team can have “prior knowledge” of the situations that their movements/actions on the ball are likely to create. This prior awareness will have benefits when it comes to exploiting the resulting situations.